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In your action group, is it ever benefi cial to lie to other members?
When is it wise to lie to authorities?
If a member of your group has done something wrong, is it better 
to be open about it now or keep it hidden in the hope that outsiders 
will never know?
What are the pros and cons of infi ltrating opposition groups to col-
lect information about harmful activities?
Should we wear masks at rallies?
 ere’s lots of research showing that lying is an everyday occurrence in 
most people’s lives, and furthermore that lies can be bene cial in some
circumstances. But they can also be very damaging, especially lies by 
authorities.
 e Deceptive Activist introduces key ideas about lying and deception 
and then provides a series of case studies in which activists need to 
decide what to do.  ere are no  nal answers, but it is important to 
address the questions.
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
Ron and Sarah are on their way to a meeting of anti-war 
activists. Somehow, they get onto the topic of lying.  
 Ron: “Look, I avoid lying as a matter of principle. 
It’s a Gandhian thing. I was very influenced by Rob 
Burrowes who wrote about this.”1 
 Sarah: “Oh yeah? What about this? You’re listening 
to an amateur musical group, and your friend Helen is in 
the group. You think it sounds terrible, but then Helen 
comes up to you afterwards and asks ‘Did you like it?’ 
Are you going to tell her what you really think?” 
 Ron: “I’d try to be honest, but in a polite way. Maybe 
something like ‘It was good to see you enjoying yourself, 
Helen’.” 
 Sarah: “Isn’t that a cop-out? You didn’t really say 
what you were thinking. Isn’t it deception?” 
 Ron: “Well, I wouldn’t tell a lie. I didn’t say anything 
actually false.” 
 Sarah: “Let’s try this scenario. You’re living in occu-
pied France during World War II. The Nazis come to your 
door and ask whether there are any Jews in the house.” 
 Ron: “Really? The Nazi argument?” 
                                                
1 Robert J. Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolence Defense: A 
Gandhian Perspective (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1996), p. 183. See chapter 5 for a discussion. 
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 Sarah: “Just answer. Would you lie to the Nazis to 
save a Jew?” 
 Ron: “How about this? I respond, ‘You’ll need to go 
elsewhere if you want to find Jews’.” 
 Sarah: “But you’re deceiving the Nazis. You’re not 
telling the full truth.” 
 Ron: “It’s only hypothetical. In real-life situations, I 
always try to be honest.” 
 Ron and Sarah arrive at the meeting. It’s a group of 
eight experienced campaigners, and they are planning a 
protest at an arms factory. The idea is to inform the police 
about impending civil disobedience, but only after getting 
into position.  
 Sarah, being provocative: “Don’t you think we 
should tell the police everything in advance?” 
 Sam: “But then we’d never get into position for the 
action. They’d stop us.” 
 Chris: “That’s right. We should only tell them what 
they need to know. Especially that we won’t be doing 
anything violent.” 
 Ron (taking the bait): “Yes, Sarah, I know I said I 
avoid lying as a matter of principle. But we won’t be 
lying.” 
 Sarah: “So why not invite the police along to our 
meeting?” 
 Sam: “Enough, enough! Let’s get this sorted out and 
then we can have the philosophical discussion about 
Gandhi and honesty.” 
 
Who — Sarah, Ron or Sam — is being sensible and who 
is being principled? The group could have continued 
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discussing lying. If so, would their conclusion depend on 
basic principles, or would it depend on the circumstances, 
for example what the police might do? 
 Truth and lying are important issues in activism, as 
they are in everyday life. Most people think telling the 
truth is important, and can get angry at obvious political 
lying. Yet most parents train their children to lie. Sue is 
having a party for her fifth birthday and aunt Ellen is 
coming to visit. Sue’s parents warn her to say thank you 
and tell how much she likes aunt Ellen’s gift, even if it is 
really ugly and unwelcome.  
  
Activism and lying 
Ron and Sarah are activists: they want to change the world 
for the better and they, like nearly everyone who tries to 
change the world, believe they are ethical. Ron and Sarah 
are a special sort of ethical activist: they want to use 
methods that reflect their goals. They want a more peace-
ful world so, unlike militaries and terrorists, they use 
peaceful methods. 
 A complication arises when it comes to deception. 
Ron and Sarah, without even thinking carefully about it, 
prefer a world that is more open and honest. After all, too 
much harm is caused by powerful groups using secrecy 
and lies to serve their interests. Ron in particular has taken 
to heart the idea that lying is wrong, but Sarah, with her 
questions, points to some complications. Sarah’s scenarios 
suggest that being open and honest might not always be a 
good idea, even for a highly ethical activist. 
 My aim in this book is to highlight the tensions 
around activism, openness and honesty. This involves 
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presenting some background information about deception 
and lying. Chapter 2 covers basic concepts and findings, 
including types of lies and how common they are. Chapter 
3 takes up the big topic of lies by authorities, such as 
government leaders. Chapter 4 is about methods of de-
tecting deception. Chapter 5 is about ethical dimensions 
concerning lying and telling the truth. Chapter 6 presents a 
range of scenarios in which activists need to confront 
issues of secrecy and honesty, and offers some criteria for 
assessing the use of deception. Chapter 7 summarises 
some key points. At the end there’s an annotated bibliog-
raphy of books I think are especially worthwhile. These 
provide documentation and you will find in them addi-
tional references that support the general statements I 
make about deception. 
 It would be nice to be able to point to some easy 
answers, but unfortunately there aren’t any. Furthermore, 
even just getting into the topic can be uncomfortable, 
because popular ideas about lying, especially about how 
bad it is, clash with evidence about the positive functions 
of lying.  This clash is especially acute for activists who 
see themselves as behaving ethically, yet assume decep-
tion is unethical. Rather than sweeping the tensions under 
the carpet, it may be better to start talking about deception 
and about when it can serve worthwhile purposes. 
 
2 
Lying and deception  
in human affairs 
 
 
Key points 
• Lying includes telling falsehoods and withholding truths. 
• Lies can be beneficial or harmful or somewhere in 
between. 
• Most people lie more frequently than they realise. 
• Secrecy and lying are often connected. 
• Self-deception is common, and is linked to deceiving 
others. 
• Social systems are built on “basic lies” about the way the 
world works. 
 
Most people think lying is saying something they know is 
false. Instead of telling the truth, they say something else. 
For example, a government spokesperson says, “We have 
conclusive evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass de-
struction,” even though the evidence is sketchy. But what 
about the more cautious statement, “There is evidence that 
Iraq has weapons of mass destruction”? This claim is 
safer: there might well be some evidence of WMDs, even 
though this evidence is weak and questionable. Is it a lie? 
 A lot of people think that withholding the truth — not 
saying something you know is true — doesn’t count as a 
lie. According to this view, saying “There is evidence that 
Iraq has weapons of mass destruction” isn’t a lie. 
6     The deceptive activist 
However, it is definitely deceptive: relevant information is 
omitted, for example that the evidence is testimony from 
an unreliable informant. 
 Because of this common approach to the idea of 
lying, government officials often go through contortions to 
say things that aren’t technically false, but leave out vital 
information necessary to understand the truth. To talk 
about lying of this nature, there are two main options. The 
first is to set aside the word “lie” and instead refer to 
deception. The other option is to define “lie” differently, 
so as to include withholding the truth.  
 The second option is adopted by Paul Ekman, one of 
the most prominent writers about lying. He defines a lie as 
“a deliberate choice to mislead a target without giving any 
notification of the intent to do so.”1 Note his use of the 
word “mislead.” This can be done by telling a falsehood 
or by withholding the truth. Using Ekman’s definition, the 
government spokesperson is lying about WMDs — or at 
least someone involved in preparing the statement is lying. 
 
“Lying is done with words, and also with silence.” ― 
Adrienne Rich, Women and Honor: Some Notes on 
Lying 
 
 For most people, these options are familiar in every-
day life. Someone invites you to a party and you decline, 
saying “Sorry, I have a prior engagement.” Actually, you 
dislike the host or just think you’ll be bored, but don’t 
                                                
1 Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, 
Politics, and Marriage (New York: Norton, 1985/2009), p. 41. 
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want to wreck your relationship by being brutally honest. 
The phrase “brutally honest” is revealing: honesty can be 
damaging to others or to relationships.  
 Your partner asks, “How do I look in this outfit?” If 
you’re sensitive, your answer will be attuned to your 
partner’s expectations. If the two of you are used to being 
“brutally honest” then maybe you can say what you think, 
but otherwise you might say, “You look great” even 
though you really think something else. After all, the 
question “How do I look in this outfit?” often isn’t really a 
sincere request for information: it’s meant to solicit a 
compliment. If someone is really inviting a compliment by 
using a standard code, then why not give one? 
 People speak in code all the time, saying things they 
don’t mean literally. In greeting you, a co-worker might 
say “How are you today?” In Australia, this is a conven-
tion, meaning “Hello.” So you answer “Fine” rather than 
“I didn’t sleep well last night and now I’m tired and have 
a headache.”2 
 The politeness code is straightforward in everyday 
interactions, and can also be applied in special circum-
stances, with positive or negative consequences. You visit 
your dying friend Chris, who asks “Was it all worth-
while?” or “Have you always loved me?” You might feel 
compassionate or polite and answer, “Yes, of course.” 
Actually, you know Chris did some bad things and made a 
mess of a promising life, and you don’t love Chris at all.  
                                                
2 Different cultures have different codes, so in some places this 
example will not make any sense. 
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 What if your friend, who is seriously ill but doesn’t 
want to recognise it, says “We’ll go to the big concert 
together next week.” You could be blunt and say, “You’re 
seriously ill, and really need to have an operation.” If 
you’re too polite, you may do a disservice to your friend. 
In response to the “How do I look?” question, an honest 
answer, phrased cautiously as “You might look even better 
in the other outfit,” could prevent a fashion disaster. 
 Codes can become complicated, and not everyone 
can decipher them. Some people are more literal than 
others and don’t easily pick up on the underlying message. 
People on the autism spectrum can have special difficulty 
picking up hidden meanings. This means that speaking in 
codes in which the literal meaning is false or misleading 
can provide accurate messages to some but be deceptive 
for others. 
 The way people present themselves to others is often 
misleading. An example is pretending to be confident 
when you’re not. Cosmetic surgery, make-up and holding 
in your stomach can give a false impression of your age 
and physical condition. Expensive clothes might suggest 
you are richer than you actually are.  
 Social media offer many opportunities for creating an 
image. By posting attractive photos of yourself, of your 
travels and your friends, and seldom posting anything 
suggesting boredom or difficulties, you present a shining 
picture to the world. Some who know you well may 
realise they’re not receiving a full picture of your life, but 
nonetheless seeing only the best sides of your friends’ 
lives can be demoralising due to the process of social 
comparison. It also can encourage a sort of competition in 
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positive self-presentation, which means mutual deception 
becomes the norm. 
 Setting aside codes, conventions and presenting a 
personal image, most people are regularly deceptive in 
more obvious ways, and not just about telling little kids 
that Santa Claus is coming. After a man beats his wife and 
the neighbours call the police, he tells them they were just 
having a loud argument. His wife, afraid of him, also lies 
to the police. Both of them lie to their neighbours, either 
by telling falsehoods or withholding the truth.  
 Serious deceptions often lead to a whole string of 
lies. A man has a gambling habit but is too ashamed to tell 
his partner or his friends. He hides his addiction through a 
series of lies about where he spends his time, who he 
meets, where the money goes, and a host of other things. 
As well as gambling, there are many possible scenarios for 
a life filled with lies: alcoholism, sexual affairs, theft, 
sexual harassment, paedophilia, and various diseases.  
 Any activity linked to shame can lead to deception. If 
you suffer panic attacks or have compulsive behaviours, 
you may feel ashamed to admit it. You might say you’d 
rather not take a flight and not admit to a fear of flying. In 
a classroom, the teacher asks, “Does everyone under-
stand?” The children remain silent because none of them 
wants to reveal their ignorance. The same thing happens to 
adults. The boss asks for feedback about any possible 
problems with a new policy, and no one in the room is 
willing to point out an obvious flaw because they are 
afraid of the boss’s reaction. They are all being deceptive 
about what they think. According to Ekman’s definition, 
they are all lying. 
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 Researchers say that most people are seriously decep-
tive — telling falsehoods and withholding the truth — on 
a regular basis, typically several times daily, depending on 
how this is measured. If uses of conventional codes such 
as saying “Fine” when you’re feeling not so well are 
included, this adds greatly to the total. Most people think 
of themselves as honest, but the reality is quite different.  
 Anyone who has ever hoped their parents would die 
or wished calamity on their co-workers is unwise to 
express these thoughts. Someone who always tells the 
truth and withholds nothing is likely to end up losing all 
their friends.  
 
Is it a lie? 
Going back to Ekman’s definition of a lie — “a deliberate 
choice to mislead a target without giving any notification 
of the intent to do so” — it is useful to note that some 
forms of deception are not lies. A novelist creates a fic-
tional story that, in many instances, is intended to capture 
truths about the human condition, but is not intended to be 
the literal truth. By being categorised as fiction, the 
novelist has, in Ekman’s terms, given notification of the 
intent to mislead the reader. The same applies to films. Of 
course there are some grey areas. Documentary films are 
intended to be truthful, but there are creative adaptations 
of true stories that mix truth and fiction. A filmmaker 
might add the disclaimer “based on a true story,” which 
signals that some facts have been changed for dramatic 
purposes. A different disclaimer, “inspired by a true 
story,” suggests a looser connection with the facts. 
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“Writing fiction is the act of weaving a series of lies to 
arrive at a greater truth.” ― Khaled Hosseini 
 
 Professional wrestling is a type of performance art, 
not intended to be a true competitive sport. Is it a lie? 
Some audience members believe the contest is real rather 
than staged, so for them a professional wrestling event is a 
lie, but for others, who know how it operates, there is no 
deception. 
 There’s another complication implicit in the defini-
tion: a lie is “a deliberate choice” by the liar. Sometimes 
people are deluded. If Fred believes he is a famous author, 
then when he tells others about his accomplishments he is 
not lying, because he believes what he says. In many 
cases, people start off lying and then, having repeated the 
lie many times, start to believe it. There is lots of evidence 
that people can come to believe things that never hap-
pened.3 In cases of “recovered memory,” an adult may 
remember being sexually abused as a child. In some cases, 
these memories reflect actual abuse, but in others false 
memories are encouraged by therapists, rehearsed repeat-
edly and eventually felt to be just as real as actual 
memories. In such a case, a false recovered memory is not 
a lie, because the adult fully believes it is true.  
 An important point here — obvious but worth stating 
— is that just because someone believes something does 
                                                
3 A highly cited study is Henry L. Roediger III and Kathleen B. 
McDermott, “Creating false memories: remembering words not 
presented in lists,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learn-
ing, Memory, and Cognition, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1995, pp. 803–814. 
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not make it true. You may be honest, but that’s not a 
guarantee that everything you say is true. 
 
Types of lies 
Lies can be classified in various ways. A simple distinc-
tion is between benign and malign lies. Benign lies are 
intended to be beneficial to the target, for example when 
you tell a friend they’re doing well on a task to give them 
encouragement to keep trying. Malign lies are harmful to 
the target, such as when you blame someone else for your 
own mistake or crime. 
 
“A truth that’s told with bad intent 
Beats all the lies you can invent.”  
― William Blake, Auguries of Innocence 
 
 The distinction between benign and malign lies, 
basically between good and bad lies, is convenient as an 
initial classification, but it doesn’t capture many of the 
complexities of deception. A more elaborate system uses 
colours to signify the significance of the lie.4 
 White lies are ones that seem harmless, and may help 
smooth social relationships. These lies seldom hurt any-
one, and provide no special benefit or protection for the 
liar. Examples are falsely saying “Very much” when asked 
“Did you enjoy the party?” and saying “Yum” when 
eating your friend’s somewhat unappetising meal. 
                                                
4 I draw here on the framework presented by Mahzarin R. Banaji 
and Anthony G. Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good 
People (New York: Delacorte Press, 2013), pp. 21ff. 
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 Gray lies are more ambiguous in terms of protecting 
a person by hiding the truth. You’ve been dreaming about 
a former relationship and then, when asked by your 
current partner, “What were you moaning about?” say 
“Was I moaning? I don’t remember.” Denial can be more 
pointed, when someone astutely labels your behaviour. 
For example, you’ve been complaining at length to a 
friend about your neighbour’s large new house extension. 
Your friend says, in a pleasant manner, “You’re really just 
envious, aren’t you?” You say, “No, not at all,” thus 
denying what you suddenly realise is an unwelcome truth. 
 Colourless lies involve self-deception (a topic cov-
ered in more detail later). Someone who drinks an 
enormous amount of alcohol may say to the doctor or a 
friend, “I drink a lot, but I’m not an alcoholic.”  
 Red lies are one that, millennia ago, would have 
provided an advantage in survival. This might be stealing 
someone’s food and then blaming the theft on an innocent 
person, or lying to a romantic partner that “We’ll be 
married after I get a divorce.” Your business is going 
bankrupt but you lie to everyone that it’s going fine. You 
spend lavishly on clothes, cars and dinners to impress 
friends and clients, suggesting that you have a lot more 
money than you do — actually you can’t really afford 
your luxuries. (Note that lying can occur via deeds as well 
as words.) Red lies are involved in many types of corrup-
tion, as well as threats that will never be carried out: 
“You’ll regret this” or “I’ll kill you.” 
 Blue lies are falsehoods intended to convey a deeper 
truth. You say “I’ve always loved you” when you believe 
love is the essence of the relationship even though there 
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were plenty of times without love, or filled with active 
hate.  
 
Secrecy and lies 
Your friend Chris asks you to keep a secret. Chris is plan-
ning to leave Sam after many years together, but doesn’t 
want Sam to know about it just yet. You say to Chris, “I 
won’t tell anyone.” Depending on who you interact with, 
you’re probably going to have to lie or break your 
promise. If you see Sam on a daily basis, then you have to 
withhold the truth. That may be awkward, especially if 
Sam says, “Things haven’t been going well with Chris 
recently. I’m not sure what to do.” This is a plea for 
sympathy or help, and the challenge of keeping Chris’ 
secret becomes greater. If your loyalty to Chris is greater, 
you might decide to keep the secret, but you might decide 
that your concern for Sam’s welfare overrides your 
promise. 
 Some people just can’t keep a secret. If you want 
everyone to know some piece of gossip, just tell Al, who 
will tell everyone else, often with embellishments. 
However, as Al’s reputation for gossiping becomes 
known, acquaintances will never tell Al anything they 
really want to remain secret. 
 When you promise to keep a secret and actually do, 
this is commonly seen as virtuous. It means you can be 
trusted to keep your word. But, ironically, it also means 
you have to be a convincing liar, not revealing the truth 
even under interrogation. 
 Many jobs have secrecy mandated in specific do-
mains. A lawyer is professionally required to maintain 
Lying and deception in human affairs     15 
 
confidentiality regarding meetings with clients, and 
similar expectations affect teachers, doctors, journalists, 
clergy and various others. Many government employees 
have to sign contracts banning them from revealing 
information gained in the course of their work. In national 
security, employees have to obtain a security clearance; 
penalties for violating secrecy requirements can be severe. 
In all these areas, maintaining secrecy can mean that 
deceiving others is necessary, even routine.  
 When others recognise professional obligations, there 
may be no immediate tension. Seldom does a member of 
the public approach a doctor and say, “I’d like you to give 
me information about patient Smith.” When there are 
formal protocols, everything operates smoothly. Never-
theless, professional obligations can lead to moments 
when deception is required. The doctor might be attending 
a social function and meet someone for whom a particular 
piece of patient information would be highly relevant, and 
would like to say “You really need to know that Smith 
will probably die soon.”  
 Secrecy can serve valuable social functions as well as 
protecting criminals and corrupt systems. It is not auto-
matically good or bad. In any case, secrecy is often tied up 
with deception. 
 
Self-deception 
Can you lie to yourself? It sounds contradictory, but that’s 
because people think their “self” is unitary, namely a 
single whole. If the “self” has different parts, then one part 
can deceive another. 
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 An example is an alcoholic who doesn’t want to 
admit to the label “alcoholic.” One part of the alcoholic’s 
self knows about the problem, and the suitability of the 
label, but another part, the conscious part, doesn’t recog-
nise it.  
 Lying to others is closely linked to self-deception, 
indeed lying to others is often necessary to maintain self-
deception.5 A man who beats his wife doesn’t want to 
admit to himself that he acts like a brutal bully; his lies to 
others about how good a husband he is enable him to 
maintain his own illusions. 
 
“We lie the loudest when we lie to ourselves.” ― Eric 
Hoffer 
 
 Many psychologists adopt the model of humans 
having two minds.6 One is intuitive and automatic, the 
other rational and reflective. The rational mind is the one 
we think of as ourself; it is more commonly the conscious 
mind. Yet many decisions are driven by the intuitive mind, 
for example the urge to drink alcohol and for a man to lash 
out at his wife. Amazingly, the two minds operate inde-
                                                
5 Robert Trivers, The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and 
Self-Deception in Human Life (New York: Basic Books, 2011). 
6 See for example Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Thinking Twice: Two 
Minds in One Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2011); Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to 
Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
Lying and deception in human affairs     17 
 
pendently for the most part: it is difficult or impossible for 
the rational mind to directly access the intuitive mind. 
This is apparent when people do things — buy an expen-
sive car, eat junk food — that their rational minds know 
are unwise. 
 The divergence between the intuitive and rational 
minds can be a source of lying and self-deception. 
Suppose you buy a new phone. You chose the phone 
because your intuitive mind preferred it, perhaps because 
of the colour, sleek style or because all your friends are 
getting the same model. But you don’t consciously want to 
admit to such motivations, so you say to others that you 
needed all the functions provided or the phone had good 
consumer ratings or something else that sounds plausible 
— anything but what you suspect is the truth. And perhaps 
you don’t really know the truth in your conscious mind, 
because you don’t want to admit to yourself that you, like 
nearly everyone else, are swayed by marketing or social 
conformity. 
 Self-deception is common in politics. When politi-
cians lie often enough, they may start believing their lies, 
in which case they aren’t technically lies any longer, but 
rather falsehoods that are sincerely believed. 
 At a meeting of activists, Mary accuses Fred of being 
sexist, because of a comment he made. Fred responds, 
“I’m sorry if my remark came across as sexist. I didn’t 
mean it.” Maybe deep down Fred realises he did mean it, 
but he lies to save face at a meeting where anti-sexism is 
the standard line. Or maybe Fred deceives himself, 
believing he has no sexist thoughts. Mary might also be 
deceiving herself. Maybe she criticised Fred to get back at 
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him for an earlier slight: she wasn’t really concerned about 
his comment, so in a sense her accusation was premised 
on a deception — and likely a self-deception — about her 
real motivation. 
 This example illustrates the complexities that can 
arise when self-deception is added to deceptions in social 
interactions. In most cases, no one is fully aware of what 
everyone is thinking, including themselves. 
 
Detecting lies 
Many people imagine they are good at detecting when 
others are lying. Employers believe that in a job interview 
they can tell which applicants are telling the truth about 
their accomplishments and aptitudes and which ones are 
giving exaggerated or fabricated accounts. Police believe 
they can tell when suspects are lying. Parents believe they 
can tell when their teenage children are lying. 
 There’s research on this, and it shows that these 
beliefs are usually wrong.7 Most people, indeed nearly all 
people, cannot distinguish a lie from the truth just by 
watching someone or hearing them speak. Their rates of 
success are little better than flipping a coin. 
 This is despite various manuals giving advice on 
detecting lies, for example by noticing that liars give 
fewer details in their accounts or have more facial tics or 
                                                
7 See Ekman, Telling Lies; Gerald R. Miller and James B. Stiff, 
Deceptive Communication (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993); 
Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportuni-
ties, 2nd edition (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 
2008). See chapter 4 for more on this. 
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move their eyes in certain ways.8 Some of this advice has 
entered popular culture, but it seems not to have enabled 
much improvement in lie detection capabilities. Anyone 
who says they can always detect a lie is simply wrong, 
though they probably believe they do have this capacity. 
Indeed, anyone who says they can detect lies most of the 
time is almost certainly wrong. 
 The flip side of being poor at detecting lies is that 
most people can be convincing liars. Paul Ekman carried 
out revealing experiments in which student nurses 
watched one of two videos. One video showed a gory 
medical scene involving burns and an amputation, the 
other a placid ocean scene. The students believed that 
hiding their feelings was an important skill for their future 
careers, and so had a strong incentive to avoid revealing 
their emotions. Most of them were successful: observers 
of the students could not determine which video they had 
watched.9 
 Rather than trying to detect lies by observing a 
person, it is far more reliable to check facts. If someone 
says they have a degree from Oxford, then ask to see their 
diploma or contact the university for verification. When a 
co-worker says he was ill and couldn’t take a shift, you 
might know he was recovering from a big night on the 
town — you saw him come home early in the morning and 
stagger into the house. 
                                                
8 For example, Jo-Ellan Dimitrius and Mark Mazzarella, Reading 
People: How to Understand People and Predict their Behavior—
Anytime, Anyplace (New York: Random House, 1998). 
9 Ekman, Telling Lies, pp. 54–56. 
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Basic lies 
There are some features of society about which there 
seems to be a conspiracy to ignore or misrepresent: no one 
speaks the truth, even though everyone knows it. Such 
features can be called “basic lies.”10 They are related to 
ideology, which is a set of concepts for understanding the 
world, serving some groups more than others. 
 Basic lies can be different in different places. An 
example is the idea that everyone is equal before the law. 
Judges and politicians usually support this idea, which is 
central to maintaining trust in the legal system, even 
though they know there are serious biases in courts, for 
example with the rich being treated differently than the 
poor.11 
 In the media, a basic lie is that journalists can report 
the news without bias, just by reporting the facts. Most 
journalists need to maintain this illusion in order to 
continue their work, otherwise they become propagandists 
or advertisers. The way that news stories are constructed 
helps maintain the illusion of objectivity.12 Did you ever 
see a news story starting out with a personal approach 
such as, “I talked to various people and this is what I 
discovered”?  
                                                
10 F. G. Bailey, The Prevalence of Deceit (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). 
11 Adam Benforado, Unfair: The New Science of Criminal 
Injustice (New York: Crown, 2015). 
12 Paul H. Weaver, News and the Culture of Lying (New York: 
Free Press, 1994). 
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 In many countries with systems of representative 
government, most people say they live in a “democracy,” 
which means rule by the people, implying citizens directly 
make decisions that affect them. In practice, people vote 
for those who will govern them, something far from the 
original idea of a democracy in ancient Greece.13 Elected 
politicians commonly claim a mandate for some policy or 
other, when actually being elected does not necessarily 
mean anyone voted for a particular policy (a referendum 
would be required for that), and being supported by a 
majority of voters does not imply that everyone supported 
the politician. 
 In many countries, most citizens believe that “we” 
are the good guys and “they” (some enemy or stigmatised 
group) are the bad guys. In the US after 9/11, politicians, 
the media and much of the population believed that the US 
was an innocent victim of an unprovoked attack: US 
government policies were seen as benevolent rather than 
interventionist, self-serving, even imperialistic.14 
 Closer to home is the common belief in some coun-
tries about “stranger danger,” namely that children are 
under threat from human predators eager to kidnap or 
assault them. Research shows that the greatest threat to 
children is from their own family members (and from 
                                                
13 David Van Reybrouck, Against Elections: The Case for 
Democracy (London: Bodley Head, 2016). 
14 Mark Cronlund Anderson, Holy War: Cowboys, Indians, and 
9/11s (Regina, Saskatchewan: University of Regina Press, 2016); 
Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, Why Do People Hate 
America? (Cambridge: Icon, 2002). 
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vehicles). Yet this information seems to have little impact 
on the way people think about danger. 
 To call something a basic lie implies that people 
actually realise what is going on but choose to proceed 
according to the shared illusion. This is like the story of 
the emperor’s new clothes, except that when a child (or a 
cynic) cries out that the emperor is naked, no one pays 
attention. For many basic lies, there are critics and 
challengers who set about exposing them, but this seems 
to have little impact: most people carry on just the same. 
 
Conclusion 
Most people like to think of themselves as honest, and 
believe honesty is the best personal policy. Therefore it 
can be a shock to examine the evidence that most people 
regularly deceive others and themselves. Another common 
belief is that lying is almost always bad, yet in interper-
sonal interactions, lying can be beneficial in maintaining 
relationships and even in helping others.  
 However, some forms of deception are quite harmful. 
Lies by authorities often serve the interests of people at 
the top of organisations at the expense of workers and the 
community.  
 The result is that the usual idea that honesty is good 
and lying is bad needs to be modified, and this makes life 
more complicated. Truth-telling has a social value to be 
sure, but it needs to be balanced against other values. 
 Another complication is that because most people 
believe lying is always bad, then catching someone in a lie 
(a political opponent for example) can be a potent method 
of attack. The most common way to respond to such 
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attacks is to assert one’s honesty, and sometimes this in-
volves further deception, for example about what one has 
said or done. The result is ever more layers of deception.  
 
 
Reproduced by permission of Polyp, http://polyp.org.uk 
3 
Deception by authorities  
 
 
Key points 
• Deception by authorities is often more damaging than 
deception between individuals. 
• Powerful groups, to reduce outrage over their actions, 
use the methods of cover-up, devaluation, reinterpreta-
tion, official channels and intimidation, as shown in the 
cases of Abu Ghraib and the Nazi T4 programme. 
• Authorities can deceive through propaganda, infiltration 
of activist groups, and secrecy. 
 
When authorities engage in deception, it is often a serious 
matter. The category “authorities” includes politicians, 
corporate executives, government officials, police com-
manders, religious leaders, trade union officials, scientific 
experts and a host of others in positions of power and 
assumed trust. “Authorities” can include both individuals 
and the organisations they represent. 
 Just as with interpersonal lies, deception by authori-
ties is potentially beneficial and potentially harmful. 
However, unlike the everyday lies that ease social rela-
tionships, lies by authorities are seldom so innocent. If a 
journalist asks “How is the war going?” and a politician 
answers “Fine,” the fact that the war is actually not going 
so well is not just hiding discomfort but affecting public 
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understanding and debate about matters that affect many 
human lives. 
 Another reason to be especially concerned with 
deception by authorities relates to Lord Acton’s famous 
saying that “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely.”1 Authorities in this context refers to 
individuals and small groups at the top of hierarchical 
systems, precisely the individuals and groups most 
susceptible to the corruptions of power. By being at the 
apex of a bureaucratic organisation or prestige system, 
authorities have more power and a greater ability to 
prevent any adverse reactions due to deceptions that serve 
their interests. 
 Activists often have to deal with deception by author-
ities. For example, many companies lie about the 
environmental and health effects of their activities. A 
classic case involved the company Grünenthal that manu-
factured and sold the morning sickness drug thalidomide. 
Reports started coming in about peripheral neuritis among 
pregnant women who took the drug. Grünenthal dismissed 
these reports, made no attempt to publicise statistics about 
adverse reactions, and kept the drug on the market. Later, 
a few doctors noticed that some children of mothers who 
had taken thalidomide had extreme deformities, and 
published their observations, eventually leading to the 
                                                
1 For research that supports Acton, see David Kipnis, The 
Powerholders (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); 
Technology and Power (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990); Ian 
Robertson, The Winner Effect: How Power Affects Your Brain 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2012). 
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drug being withdrawn. Nevertheless, Grünenthal fought 
against legal claims for many years.  
 Grüenthal’s behaviour involved systematic decep-
tions at various levels. The company: 
 • denied all causal connections between thalidomide 
and peripheral neuritis 
 • lied to doctors who wrote asking whether the side 
effect of peripheral neuritis had been seen before 
 • tried to conceal the number of cases reported to the 
company 
 • tried to suppress publication of reports about pe-
ripheral neuritis by putting pressure on authors and editors 
 • sought to counter critical reports with favourable 
ones by using money, influence and distortion 
 • ran a smear campaign against a German doctor, 
Lenz, who tried to expose a link between thalidomide and 
birth defects.2 
 In this chapter, I give examples of several types of 
deception by authorities, including propaganda, infiltra-
tion, lying by figures of authority, and certain types of 
secrecy. To ground this treatment, first I present a set of 
tactics commonly used by powerful groups when they 
want to reduce public outrage over some action or policy.3 
                                                
2 The Insight Team of The Sunday Times (Phillip Knightley, 
Harold Evans, Elaine Potter and Marjorie Wallace), Suffer the 
Children: The Story of Thalidomide (London: André Deutsch, 
1979). 
3 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); “Backfire materi-
als,” http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/backfire.html. 
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Managing outrage 
Today, torture is seen by many people as reprehensible. 
Therefore, governments do not admit to being involved 
with it or tolerating it; instead, they lie about it. Let’s 
consider more systematically the tactics used by govern-
ments trying to reduce public outrage over their own 
involvement in torture.  
 Cover-up The existence of a torture programme, or of 
individual cases of torture, is hidden from wider audi-
ences. This is deception via secrecy. If cover-up is effec-
tive, outsiders have no idea of what is occurring, so overt 
denials are unnecessary. 
 At Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq after the US invasion in 
2003, guards tortured prisoners in various ways, for 
example chaining them in stress positions, piling them on 
top of each other naked, threatening them with dogs and, 
most famously, attaching electrodes to a prisoner and 
making him stand on a box. All this was done in secret, 
with no intention of telling outsiders. Only the prisoners 
and guards knew what was going on.4 
 Devaluation Typically, the victims of torture are 
denigrated and demonised, for example by being labelled 
terrorists, criminals, subversives, heretics or enemies. 
Devaluation can occur in advance, during or after torture. 
It helps reduce outrage, because many people are not as 
concerned about what happens to a devalued person as to 
a valued one. Torture of a terrorist seems more acceptable 
than torture of a pacifist. 
                                                
4 For references on this analysis, see Truda Gray and Brian 
Martin, “Abu Ghraib,” in Martin, Justice Ignited, pp. 129–141. 
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 Devaluation is a type of misrepresentation. It typi-
cally seeks to reduce empathy for victims by using 
negative stereotypes that do not capture the essence of a 
person. Furthermore, the labels applied often are false. 
Political opponents are called terrorists not as a legitimate 
description but rather as a pejorative label. 
 At Abu Ghraib, prisoners were called terrorists, 
insurgents, towel heads and other names. More generally, 
in the war on terror, opponents are stigmatised as 
inhuman, evil and dangerous. 
 Reinterpretation Rather than presenting torture as a 
violation of human rights and dignity — the normal sort of 
interpretation — governments use a variety of method to 
reinterpret torture, namely to get people to think of it 
differently, as less bad. One reinterpretation technique is 
lying, for example saying that there is no torture occur-
ring, or perhaps that investigations show there has been no 
torture, when actually there were no investigations. 
 Lying may sound like cover-up, discussed earlier as a 
different tactic, and certainly there’s a close connection. 
The distinction is that with cover-up, outsiders don’t even 
know anything is happening. With lying, false statements 
are made. This is the distinction between lying by 
omission (cover-up) and overt lying by making false 
statements. After the Abu Ghraib torture was revealed, 
one lie was that higher officials were not implicated. 
 A second reinterpretation technique is minimising the 
scale or effects of an action. Torture is acknowledged, but 
the amount of it is stated to be smaller than reality. Also, it 
might be said not to be all that harmful. The technique of 
minimising is a type of lying. The US government referred 
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to treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib as “abuse,” 
avoiding the word “torture,” and the term “abuse” was 
adopted by most of the US mass media. In this way, the 
seriousness of the actions was minimised. 
 A third reinterpretation technique is blaming others 
rather than the actual perpetrators and responsible offi-
cials. Torture might be blamed on rogue operators, corrupt 
officials, or an out-of-control unit. As noted above, the US 
government blamed the prison guards for the torture, 
avoiding placing any responsibility on higher officials. 
Critics of the government have argued to the contrary that 
torture at Abu Ghraib was in accordance with policy 
expectations. 
 A fourth reinterpretation technique is framing, which 
means looking at things from a particular angle or per-
spective, in particular in a way that makes the actions 
seem more acceptable. Torture is often framed as neces-
sary to obtain information, as a defence against enemies 
who are plotting to cause harm. In this way, torture is 
looked at not hurting others but rather as part of a defence 
against their evil intentions. (According to many experts, 
torture is not an effective means of extracting valid 
information. In any case, it is more commonly used for 
punishment and retribution than for obtaining infor-
mation.) 
 Official channels are agencies or processes that are 
supposed to ensure fairness, honesty and justice. Examples 
include grievance procedures, ombudsmen, police, 
auditors and courts. When someone suffers an injustice — 
they are bullied, cheated, defamed, assaulted or unfairly 
dismissed — often they will go to an official body in 
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search of protection or restitution. In many cases formal 
procedures and watchdog agencies do their job well. But 
when the perpetrator is powerful, perhaps especially when 
the government is implicated in injustice, official channels 
may give only an illusion of justice. 
 When an injustice has the potential of stirring up 
public outrage, and when perpetrators are powerful, 
official channels often serve to reduce outrage. Govern-
ments may refer matters to an agency, or sometimes even 
set up a formal inquiry. After the Abu Ghraib torture story 
became prime-time news, the US government turned to 
official channels, announcing prosecutions of prison 
guards involved. 
 For powerful perpetrators, the advantage of official 
channels is that they are slow, rely on experts such as 
lawyers, and deal with technicalities. As processes con-
tinue, public outrage declines, reducing the threat to those 
in positions of power. 
 The trials of Abu Ghraib prison guards followed this 
standard pattern. The trials proceeded over many months, 
moved the issue from the public domain to the procedural 
domain of the courts, and conveniently targeted low-level 
participants in the torture, not even addressing high-level 
politicians and military figures implicated in the system of 
imprisonment and interrogation. The trials diverted atten-
tion away from those with the greatest responsibility. 
 By shifting attention away from people responsible 
and by giving a misleading appearance of providing 
justice, official channels are involved in an elaborate 
deception of the public. This deception is not a case of 
lying by individuals (though this can occur along the 
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way), but rather is built into the system of agencies and 
processes that are tasked with providing justice but are not 
given the resources or power to tackle high-level abuses. 
Official channels might be considered to constitute a 
“basic lie.”5 
 To say that official channels are involved in an 
elaborate deception of the public may be a bit unfair, 
because part of the problem is that so many people want to 
believe in official channels. Consider for example the 
legal system. Many people believe that courts dispense 
justice. However, those directly involved with lawyers, 
judges and courts know that courts are supposed to apply 
the law but justice can be elusive. There are systematic 
discrepancies in outcomes due to institutionalised bias in 
police operations (low-level thieves are more likely to be 
arrested and charged than corrupt business executives), 
inequalities in money and power (rich individuals can 
afford expensive legal support), and alarm raised by 
politicians and the media about certain types of crime 
(such as terrorism).  
 Despite these sorts of biases, a large number people 
look to the legal system to provide justice. They also look 
to auditors, ombudsmen, anti-corruption bodies, human 
rights commissions, environmental agencies, politicians 
and a host of others to be fair and efficient in fixing 
individual and social problems. Belief in formal channels 
develops from a young age: children often take things at 
face value, so if a parent or teacher makes a promise, this 
                                                
5 See chapter 2 and F. G. Bailey, The Prevalence of Deceit 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
32     The deceptive activist 
is taken as a truth. Likewise, when politicians make 
promises, many people give them the benefit of the doubt. 
As an adult, experience with electoral politics and learning 
about political lying can lead to cynicism. However, most 
people have little direct contact with courts, anti-corrup-
tion agencies and the like, and so may assume they do 
what they are supposed to do.  
 In many cases, governments pass laws or set up 
agencies to give the appearance of a solution to a problem. 
Pollution? Set up an environmental watchdog and thereby 
placate the public. Racial harassment? Pass a law against 
it. In many cases, the agencies are inadequately funded 
and the laws are not effectively enforced, and in any case 
a better approach might be to empower the public rather 
than rely on a government agency or law. 
 Belief in official channels can be aided by a more 
general belief that the world is just.6 Some people believe 
implicitly that nearly everything that happens is fair, so 
they blame women when they are sexually harassed and 
blame the unemployed for losing their jobs and not finding 
new ones. A strong belief in a just world often means 
blaming the victim. It also can lead to undue confidence in 
official channels. 
                                                
6 See for example Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A 
Fundamental Delusion (New York: Plenum, 1980); Leo Montada 
and Melvin J. Lerner, eds., Responses to Victimizations and Belief 
in a Just World (New York: Plenum, 1998); Michael Ross and 
Dale T. Miller, eds., The Justice Motive in Everyday Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
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 Official channels thus are part of a grand deception, 
not so much through design but through a combination of 
people’s mistaken expectations and beliefs interacting 
with governments and other powerful groups setting up 
and pointing to agencies and laws as if they are capable of 
solving individual and social problems. 
 Intimidation and rewards Powerful groups, when 
they are involved in something potentially seen as unjust, 
may seek to reduce public outrage by intimidating or 
rewarding people involved, including victims, witnesses, 
journalists and campaigners. Even the threat of sanctions 
may be enough to silence those who would otherwise 
speak out. Intimidation and rewards are not necessarily 
deceptive in themselves, but they can enable deception. 
 In the case of torture at Abu Ghraib and other US 
foreign prisons, it was risky to be a whistleblower: speak-
ing out about torture was hazardous for the person who 
spoke out. For example, Sergeant Frank “Greg” Ford 
reported witnessing torture by fellow soldiers. In response, 
he was forcibly taken out of Iraq on psychiatric grounds, 
though psychiatrists later said he was completely sane. 
Other military whistleblowers were treated the same way. 
On the other hand, there were rewards for those who toed 
the US government line. US media companies were 
initially reluctant to break the Abu Ghraib story, valuing 
their relationship with the US government. Only when 
another outlet was planning to expose the torture did the 
reward of breaking a big story outweigh going against the 
government.  
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Layers of secrecy 
Deception by authorities almost always involves layers of 
secrecy. To say something is being covered up is to 
assume that some people really know what’s happening: 
they are not deceived. The torture at Abu Ghraib was 
known to the prison guard perpetrators, obviously enough, 
as well as the prisoners. After Joseph Darby obtained two 
discs with the photos of torture and abuse and submitted 
them to authorities, knowledge about the events reached a 
wider circle; this continued as more officials were brought 
into the investigation. Journalists and editors learned about 
the torture, but even then it was secret so far as wider 
audiences were involved. Only after the story became 
headline news was secrecy fully breached. 
 Secrecy can be likened to an onion. There are some 
people, at the core of the onion, who are knowledgeable 
while outer layers are ignorant. Some secrets remain at the 
core of the onion whereas others, as in the Abu Ghraib 
story, eventually reach more and more outer layers. The 
idea of layers of secrecy is important in any study of 
deception involving more than a few people. If a friend is 
stealing from your fridge and keeping it a secret, and no 
one but the two of you cares about the issue, then it is 
pointless to talk about layers of secrecy. In contrast, in a 
major issue of public importance, there can be many 
layers. Furthermore, knowledge of something being kept 
secret is not just a matter of yes or no: often there are 
different levels of understanding, with those at the core 
usually knowing more — though it is always possible they 
are mistaken or even deceived.  
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 Media organisations, government officials and activ-
ists today know about Abu Ghraib photos that have never 
been released, and also may know about other torture 
centres and about high-level responsibility. Much of this 
information is publicly available in the sense that an 
assiduous citizen can track much of it down, but never-
theless it remains secret or obscure for most people whose 
knowledge of the scandal derives from mass media 
accounts.  
 
The T4 programme 
People sometimes imagine that ruthless governments can 
do anything they like with impunity. One favourite 
example is the Soviet government under Stalin, responsi-
ble for killing millions of people. Another is the German 
government under Hitler, also responsible for millions of 
deaths. Yet even such governments cannot get away with 
anything they please. They commonly use deception to 
reduce outrage from their murderous policies. Here I’ll use 
the example of the Nazi T4 programme to kill people with 
disabilities, initiated in Hitler’s Germany, and imple-
mented by German doctors. The entire programme was 
based on secrecy and deception, reducing outrage by using 
the five methods already outlined.7 
 Cover-up The Nazi T4 programme was initiated in 
1939 but was not publicly announced or explained. Quite 
                                                
7 This case study is drawn from my paper “Euthanasia tactics: 
patterns of injustice and outrage,” SpringerPlus, Vol. 2, No. 256, 
6 June 2013, http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/256. Ref-
erences for all statements are contained in this article. 
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the contrary: great efforts were made to keep it secret. To 
run the programme, the obscure agency KdF (Chancellery 
of the Führer) was chosen because of its small size and 
low visibility. 
 Though the programme was classified top secret, 
many knew about it, notably the doctors involved. They 
were perpetrators and aided in the cover-up. They hid their 
actions from those most likely to be disturbed by and to 
protest against the killings, including relatives, members 
of the Catholic Church, and foreign populations. After 
public protest led to the closing of two killing centres, 
transit institutions were created to add greater secrecy to 
the process. 
 Devaluation Under Nazi rule, people with disabilities 
were commonly labelled “idiots,” “crazies” and “crip-
ples.” Perpetrators used the expression “life unworthy of 
life.” The eugenics movement, strong in Germany as well 
as some other countries, devalued anyone deemed to have 
defective genes. The Nazis produced propaganda films 
denigrating people with disabilities. For example, the 1936 
film Erbkrank was intended to justify the compulsory 
sterilisation of people with intellectual and physical dis-
abilities by portraying them as criminals and subhuman. 
Devaluation, at a psychological level, also helped enable 
the killings. 
 Reinterpretation Language is the most obvious part 
of reinterpretation: the Nazis used the terms “euthanasia” 
and “mercy death” to describe the killings, which other-
wise would be called murder. Another reinterpretation 
technique was to rationalise killings by saying that people 
Deception by authorities     37 
 
in institutions were expensive drains on the Nazi state 
when facilities were needed for injured soldiers. 
 Outright lying was another standard reinterpretation 
technique. For example, patients from institutions were 
transferred to other centres for killing, with guards in 
white coats in attendance to make it seem like a medically 
supervised process. Parents were told that their children 
were being sent to special centres where they would 
receive better treatment. Relatives were sent death certifi-
cates with false information about the cause of death. To 
disguise the central direction of the programme, physi-
cians and administrators used pseudonyms. Lying can 
serve as a form of cover-up; it fits within the category of 
reinterpretation when relatives knew that something had 
happened — death of a loved one — but were deceived 
about how and when it occurred.  
 Official channels The programme was never given 
legal approval; Hitler refused this because the German 
people would not support it. Instead, Hitler wrote a letter 
privately authorising the programme and this letter was 
used to convince some participants. A formal meeting 
served to win over sceptical legal professionals. 
 In August 1941, possibly in response to public 
criticism (see below), Hitler halted the programme, but 
this official stop order was deceptive. The “halt” only 
applied to killing centres and did not apply to children. 
The killing programme continued, with physicians and 
nurses outside of the nominated centres killing both 
children and adults using starvation, tablets and injections, 
until the end of World War II in 1945. 
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 It was only after the war that official channels, 
namely courts, were used against the perpetrators. After 
1947, the German Federal Republic judiciary mostly made 
decisions that allowed T4 participants to rejoin German 
professions, for example by terminating trials, acquitting 
defendants or giving lenient sentences. 
 Intimidation Speaking out against Nazi policies was 
always risky. Parents who refused permission for their 
children with disabilities to be sent away were threatened 
with being sent to work camps or having all their children 
taken into state custody. After Bishop Galen’s sermon 
condemning the T4 programme (discussed later), ordinary 
Germans found to possess, circulate or discuss the sermon 
were subject to reprisals including losing jobs, being sent 
to concentration camps or execution. 
 The perpetrators of the Nazi T4 programme thus 
relied on all five types of tactics to reduce outrage — a 
very strong indication of the potential for popular outrage 
about the programme. This is exactly what is to be 
expected using this analysis of tactics: when powerful 
perpetrators anticipate resistance, they are likely to use a 
range of tactics that reduce outrage. 
 What then about challenging the programme? Meth-
ods of doing this can be categorised into five types of 
counter-tactics to the five types of outrage-reduction 
tactics. 
 Exposure The key to challenging cover-up is to get 
information to receptive audiences. Information about the 
T4 programme gradually leaked out via observations and 
inferences by relatives and local people. The breakthrough 
event was a 1941 pastoral letter by Clemens August von 
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Galen, Catholic bishop of Münster, which was reprinted 
and widely distributed throughout Germany. 
 Validation To challenge devaluation, the victims 
needed to be conceived of as humans with lives worth 
living. Von Galen, referring to the targets of the T4 
programme, said “we are dealing with human beings, with 
our neighbours, brothers and sisters,” describing them 
positively in terms of vital relationships. (However, von 
Galen was far less vocal about the value of Jewish lives.) 
 Reframing To counter techniques of lying, minimis-
ing, blaming and framing, the programme had to be named 
as an injustice, namely killing pure and simple. One 
asylum director, Heinrich Hermann, used the word 
“killing” in criticising T4 to visiting euthanasia planners, 
who were disconcerted by such direct language. 
 Mobilisation There are two ways to respond to 
official channels used to give a deceptive appearance of 
justice. One is to avoid or discredit the official channels. 
In the long term, discrediting the Nazi regime accom-
plished this, so much so that virtually any Nazi policy was 
discredited by association. The other response is to not 
rely on official channels for redress but instead to mobilise 
support among the public, for example by talking to 
individuals, publicising the issues, holding private or 
public meetings, forming networks and groups, and 
making public protests.  
 For many months prior to von Galen’s pastoral letter, 
various individual opponents of T4 — especially church 
people — wrote letters to or had meetings with govern-
ment officials, such as in the Ministry of Justice, but this 
insider approach achieved little. These were significant 
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signs of opposition but they were not so effective as 
mobilising public support: they essentially relied on an 
official channel, namely appealing to government offi-
cials, that gave only the appearance of offering a solution. 
 Resistance The counter to intimidation is to continue 
taking action against the injustice and to expose evidence 
of intimidation in order to create greater outrage. Those 
who opposed the euthanasia programme at the time, in 
word or deed, displayed incredible courage. 
 In summary, the Nazi T4 programme is an ideal illus-
tration of an injustice in which all the methods of reducing 
and fostering outrage can be observed. It shows the central 
role of deception in protecting authorities from popular 
resistance to their policies. 
 
Political deception in New Zealand 
In New Zealand in the years leading up to 2014, a political 
blogger named Cameron Slater had huge influence. His 
blog, named Whale Oil, was highly partisan and aggres-
sive, with numerous posts attacking politicians and politi-
cal initiatives.  
 One of Slater’s specialties was the sexual smear. He 
would obtain information about a politician’s extra-marital 
affairs and gradually present it over several days. Some-
times he would simply imply that a politician was 
involved in a sexual scandal, without any evidence: this 
was the technique of sexual innuendo. 
 Political blogs present themselves as sources of news 
and commentary, but are not bound by the expectations 
and practices common in conventional news media. Slater 
could present claims and slurs that newspapers would not 
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print but, once online, regular journalists and editors could 
not resist the easy stories offered. Sometimes Slater fed 
material directly to mass media journalists, giving them 
scoops, always in the form of attack politics, targeting a 
politician or policy proposal. The Whale Oil blog thus 
served to lower the standard of political discourse in New 
Zealand.  
 Slater presented the Whale Oil blog as independent. 
It pursued a right-wing agenda, but sometimes attacked 
politicians in the National Party, the right-leaning 
dominant party. What most people didn’t know was that 
Whale Oil involved a massive deception. 
  Someone leaked a massive file of Slater’s emails and 
Facebook conversations to Nicky Hager, an investigative 
writer who was the author of several path-breaking 
exposés. Hager used the material in the files to write a 
book titled Dirty Politics.8 
 According to Hager, Slater was not an independent 
blogger. Behind the scenes, he was being fed information 
from the office of John Key, the prime minister. Further-
more, an employee in the prime minister’s office drafted 
some posts for Whale Oil, attacking the government’s 
opponents. Slater also received information from govern-
ment minister Judith Collins and from paying clients. For 
example, a client — a candidate for National Party pre-
selection in a safe seat — paid Slater to take down a 
                                                
8 Nicky Hager, Dirty Politics: How Attack Politics Is Poisoning 
New Zealand’s Political Environment (Nelson, New Zealand: 
Craig Potton, 2014). 
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political rival. Slater boasted to his friends about being 
able to tear down front-runners for the selection and boost 
a wealthy outsider. The key to this was collecting dirt and 
publishing attacking comments on Whale Oil, while 
posing as an independent commentator. 
 The appearance of independence was even more 
important when running the agenda of the prime minister. 
John Key presented himself as a positive figure, and didn’t 
want to be implicated in sordid campaigning: that was 
outsourced to Slater. 
 Slater, as well as making money from advertising on 
Whale Oil and from clients, also had a personal agenda, 
namely pursuing a far-right vision for New Zealand 
politics. This involved trying to get far-right candidates 
selected within the National Party, as well as attacking 
politicians in the Labour Party and other parties on the 
left. 
 Slater worked closely with several others, for exam-
ple Simon Lusk, a strategy consultant for a National Party 
member of parliament. Several of these allies would send 
Slater completed articles; Slater would publish them under 
his own name. This was systematic plagiarism, namely 
taking the work or ideas of others and presenting them as 
one’s own, and was another form of deception. 
 Slater had help from inside government bureaucra-
cies. On quite a few occasions, he or his sources would 
apply for government documents using New Zealand’s 
freedom-of-information legislation, and receive them far 
more quickly than usual requests. He or his sources 
somehow knew exactly what to ask for, which was 
material that could be used to discredit political targets. 
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Slater would prepare a series of blog posts hinting at 
exposures, while waiting for documents to arrive. So there 
was another form of deception concerning misuse of 
inside information from within government bureaucracies. 
 Hager in Dirty Politics gives exquisite detail about 
Whale Oil and associated political operations, showing 
that how attack politics was based on systematic decep-
tion. Hager notes that members of the public normally 
have no way of knowing they are being hoodwinked and 
that political agendas are being driven by special interests. 
Hager’s book suggests that whenever a political scandal 
becomes big news, it is wise to be sceptical: it is quite 
possible that the scandal has been manufactured out of 
little or nothing, and that it is being driven by players who 
do not reveal their agendas. 
   
Propaganda 
When officials present slanted perspectives, it is some-
times called propaganda. This term gained notoriety by its 
use in so-called totalitarian regimes, of which the Soviet 
Union and Nazi Germany are exemplars. George Orwell 
in his famous novel 1984 offered a chilling portrait of 
society in which government propaganda dominates 
public perceptions, in the most stark fashion: the society is 
involved in continual warfare, but this is called peace, and 
archives are rewritten so that recorded history conforms to 
current government dogma. 
 
“If you tell a big enough lie and tell it frequently 
enough, it will be believed.” ― Adolf Hitler 
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 Today, some of these same processes have become 
standard in countries that are nominally free. Governments 
employ communication specialists to sell policies to the 
electorate, using various techniques to make outcomes 
desired by the government seem worthwhile and to ignore 
or discredit undesired ones. Public relations is the 
common term for referring to the work of these specialists, 
who are also called spin doctors, with spin being the angle 
or perspective emphasised by the way a message is 
framed.9 
 Spin doctoring is the government version of advertis-
ing, which itself is a pervasive form of propaganda, most 
commonly on behalf of corporations. Of course adver-
tisements come in all shapes and sizes. A grocer advertis-
ing the price of apples and oranges is not being particu-
larly deceptive, even if some other fruits are overpriced 
and poor quality. It is more relevant to apply the label of 
propaganda to ads that provide little information while 
conveying images that appeal to unconscious drives.  
 Tobacco companies have excelled at propaganda. 
Those who lived through the era when cigarette ads were 
freely broadcast on television will remember the associa-
tions of smoking with being cool, fresh and healthy. 
                                                
9 For example, Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Age of 
Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion (New 
York: Freeman, 1992); Douglas Rushkoff, Coercion: The Persua-
sion Professionals and Why We Listen to What They Say 
(London: Little, Brown, 2000); Norman Solomon, War Made 
Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005). 
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Indeed, it was the genius of cigarette ads to associate 
smoking with young appealing models, enticing teenagers 
to smoke in order to be sophisticated and women to smoke 
to be liberated. These days, in some countries, anti-
smoking ads feature pictures of smokers with black lungs 
and horrific-looking cancers. 
 Governments and corporations are the major purvey-
ors of slanted messages, but now nearly every organisation 
has to compete in the information marketplace, presenting 
a favourable image. This includes churches, trade unions, 
political parties, doctors, lawyers and environmental 
organisations. Massaging the message is so standard that it 
would be shocking for any group to present an honest 
picture of itself. This would be equivalent to a supermodel 
or celebrity presented without the usual attention to dress, 
makeup and facial expression. Paparazzi go in search of 
candid photos of celebrities, of wider interest precisely 
because they are unstaged. 
 Because the word “propaganda” has connotations of 
conscious deception by authoritarian governments, it may 
be better to use other expressions to refer to deception by 
authorities, including image management, spin-doctoring 
or biased reporting. The apparently neutral term “public 
relations” has acquired negative associations, being asso-
ciated with managing a public image by highlighting 
positives and hiding negatives. 
 There is actually a continuity between deception by 
authorities and by individuals. Most people could be said 
to manage their image in various ways, for example by 
smiling insincerely, making Facebook posts to create a 
desired impression, and not revealing ulterior motives. 
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The problem with deception by authorities is not so much 
that there is more of it, but that authorities have more 
power, so their deceptions can be more damaging. If 
power tends to corrupt, then deception in the service of 
power is dangerous. 
 
Propaganda, take two 
In regular propaganda, an organisation is overt in what it 
does, for example making statements. The statements may 
be false or misleading, but at least everyone knows the 
organisation is making them. This can be called white 
propaganda. 
 Then there’s black propaganda, in which authorities 
pretend to be someone else. This method has become 
more commonplace with the presence on the Internet of 
“sock puppets,” which are people using false names. Let’s 
say there is a discussion of some controversial topic, such 
as racism or abortion. A sock puppet can enter the discus-
sion and pretend to have extreme views in order to 
discredit them. For example, an anti-racist campaigner 
might enter an anti-immigration discussion group and 
pretend to be a racist with extreme views. This might 
alienate some of the more moderate members of the 
group. 
 Another level of deception is for this sock puppet to 
take on someone else’s identity, for example making posts 
or sending messages that purport to be legitimate. If you 
receive an email from me, with my name and email 
address presented in the usual (or a convincing) way, then 
you assume I sent it. But it’s possible that someone has 
forged both the message and my email address.  
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 Some spam involves forging identities. You might 
receive a message purporting to be from a bank asking 
you to log in to receive a payment, or a message purport-
ing to be from a telecommunications company asking you 
to log in to fix a problem. Because this sort of deception is 
so common, relatively few people are tricked; for those 
who are fooled, the consequences can be serious. 
 An example of black propaganda is for a government 
to run a radio station that presents itself as being on the 
other side, in order to discredit the other side.10 For exam-
ple, during the cold war, the CIA ran a radio station from 
Taiwan falsely presenting itself as the voice of dissidents 
in mainland China. Black propaganda can involve actions, 
not just words. One well-documented plan by the CIA in 
the 1970s was called Operation Northwoods. The idea was 
to carry out terrorist actions against the US people but 
make them appear to be carried out by the Cuban govern-
ment, then led by Fidel Castro and seen as an enemy by 
the US government. The idea was for this “false flag” 
operation to trigger outrage against the Castro regime and 
enable the US military to launch an invasion of Cuba to 
overthrow the government. 
 Black propaganda is often hard to prove. Documents 
about Operation Northwoods became public, but in many 
cases there are only suspicions and heated debates. One of 
the allegations against the government of Syria led by al-
Assad, engaged in a war against a number of opponents, is 
                                                
10 Lawrence C. Soley and John S. Nichols, Clandestine Radio 
Broadcasting: A Study of Revolutionary and Counterrevolution-
ary Electronic Communication (New York: Praeger, 1987). 
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that it has covertly aided Islamic State, nominally one of 
its enemies, by releasing Islamic militants from prison and 
not bombing Islamic State positions. The reason for such 
apparently strange behaviour is that if al-Assad’s enemies 
are seen to be Islamic terrorists, then all the Syrian 
government’s opponents will be discredited, and outside 
interventions will be targeted at Islamic State, not the 
Syrian government. Meanwhile, Syrian government forces 
can concentrate their efforts against its other enemies.11 
 This sounds complicated and conspiratorial, and it is. 
Black propaganda by its nature is devious. Even when 
exposed, it is easy to disavow: because of the complica-
tions and apparent contradictions, few members of the 
public will bother to investigate in sufficient depth to 
determine what is actually happening. Even journalists 
will be discouraged from doing stories by the time 
required and the complexity involved. 
 In between white and black propaganda, there is 
another category: grey propaganda. This includes cases in 
which the evidence is not clear or the motivations of 
participants are hard to determine. Consider the case of the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, which was justified by George W. 
Bush, Dick Cheney and other senior US officials on the 
basis that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction and had links with the 
terrorist group al-Qaeda. Bush and Cheney did everything 
they could to make the case for war. Were they lying?  
                                                
11 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of 
Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), pp. 144–149 and 
elsewhere. 
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 Subsequent investigations showed that Saddam 
Hussein had been telling the truth about not having 
weapons of mass destruction. Nor was there any good 
evidence that his resolutely secular regime had any 
sympathy or connections with al-Qaeda. Bush, Cheney et 
al. may have wanted to launch an invasion for other 
reasons, and needed a justification so badly that they 
believed informants who told them what they wanted to 
hear but would in other circumstances have been 
dismissed as flaky. This is an example in which deception 
and self-deception reinforce each other. It is plausible to 
argue that Bush and Cheney wanted to believe in pretexts 
for invasion and ended up believing them, enabling them 
to be sincere in the way they sold the invasion to the US 
public. 
 There are other grey cases. The Tonkin Bay incident 
in 1964, in which North Vietnamese patrol boats suppos-
edly fired on a US ship, was used by the US administra-
tion as a trigger for pushing through a Congressional 
motion that escalated the Vietnam war. But this might 
have been a false alarm: the evidence that North Vietnam-
ese patrol boats were present and had actually fired was 
ambiguous.12 Cases like this show that authorities can 
choose to use ambiguity to their advantage, interpreting 
events and evidence in a way that serves their agendas. 
This is not a planned black operation, in which the intent 
is to deceive the public. In grey operations, there can be a 
combination of deception and self-deception. 
                                                
12 Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the 
Pentagon Papers (New York: Viking, 2002). 
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Infiltration and disruption 
Governments and corporations sometimes seek to under-
mine challengers by infiltration and disruption. In the 
famous McLibel case, the food corporation McDonald’s in 
the late 1980s hired spies (infiltrators) to attend meetings 
of London Greenpeace, an anarchist group not linked to 
Greenpeace International. The group, which had only a 
handful of activists, at the time was producing a leaflet 
titled “What’s wrong with McDonald’s?” giving infor-
mation about adverse health effects of McDonald’s food, 
poor treatment of McDonald’s workers, impacts on the 
Amazon rainforest by beef production for McDonald’s 
burgers, and other alleged McDonald’s shortcomings. The 
infiltrators collected information about the leaflet, and the 
company then threatened to sue five London Greenpeace 
members for libel. 
 This backfired on McDonald’s. Three London Green-
peace members acquiesced, but two — Helen Steel and 
Dave Morris — defended the legal action, in the process 
triggering a massive campaign that was a public relations 
disaster for McDonald’s.13 
 The issue here is the deception involved in infiltra-
tion. The infiltrators presented themselves as genuinely 
interested in London Greenpeace’s efforts. This sort of 
deception can lead to distrust and paranoia. 
 In some ways, just the possibility of infiltration can 
be damaging to an action group, reducing trust among 
                                                
13 John Vidal, McLibel (London: Macmillan, 1997); see also 
Fiona J. L. Donson, Legal Intimidation: A SLAPP in the Face of 
Democracy (London: Free Association Books, 2000). 
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members and sometimes creating suspicions about those 
who are genuine. In some cases, infiltrators develop close 
personal relationships with regular members, and even 
have children with them, and are so trusted that when the 
infiltration is exposed, members refuse to believe it.14 
 Infiltration usually serves to collect information. It 
can also involve disruption. An infiltrator can pose as an 
extreme militant, encouraging the use of violent tactics 
and even helping organise them. The point is to discredit 
the movement: when the group uses violence, it is easier 
for the government to justify repressive measures. 
 In the US government’s COINTELPRO programme, 
which ran from the 1950s to the 1970s, attempts were 
made to disrupt social movements. One technique was to 
write fake letters, purporting to be from another activist 
group, with the intent of encouraging rivalries and distrust. 
The essence of the programme was to use deceptive 
methods to undermine trust and promote discord.15 
 
Lies by authorities 
Police, when arresting or interrogating suspects, may lie as 
a means of obtaining what they want: acquiescence, 
admissions, information, confessions. A typical technique 
is to make threats: “You’re going to go to prison, and be 
                                                
14 Eveline Lubbers, Secret Manoeuvres in the Dark: Corporate 
and Police Spying on Activists (London: Pluto Press, 2012). 
15 Nelson Blackstock, Cointelpro: The FBI’s Secret War on 
Political Freedom (New York: Vintage, 1976); Paul Cowan, Nick 
Egleson and Nat Hentoff, State Secrets: Police Surveillance in 
America (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974). 
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raped.” Another sort of lie by police occurs in court, when 
officers lie about what happened, for example claiming the 
defendant assaulted them, when actually it was the police 
who assaulted the defendant. This technique, called 
verballing, is only sometimes exposed when there are 
independent witnesses, videos or other contradictory 
evidence. 
 To say that police lie is not to paint them as particu-
larly corrupt. In many cases, they lie to achieve what they 
believe is justice. For example, they may have lots of 
evidence about a person’s criminal behaviour but nothing 
admissible in court, so lying to obtain a conviction seems 
justified. Furthermore, many criminals lie routinely, so 
lying by police is nothing special. The main distinction is 
the difference in power between police and their targets. 
When authorities have a lot more power, their lies usually 
have greater consequences, and there is a greater potential 
for abuse. 
 Sometimes police, in search of a murderer, choose 
the wrong person, intentionally or unintentionally. In 
intentional cases — which might be motivated by payback 
against someone they have a grudge against — the police 
collude to build a case against the person, who is framed 
and may go to prison for the murder. Lying is central to 
frame-ups. Months or years down the track, supporters of 
the innocent person, now in jail, may seek to reopen the 
case, offering new evidence and pointing to flaws in the 
prosecution case. Many police, embarrassed by evidence 
suggesting their own incompetence or complicity, resist 
any reconsideration. This may not be conscious, but 
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instead be confirmation bias: police interpret every new 
bit of information in terms of their preconceived ideas.16 
 Clergy are authorities. They do not have legal power 
to command members of the church, but they have moral 
authority. In more hierarchical churches, for example the 
Catholic Church, leaders have enormous authority, with 
parishioners seeing their priests as agents of God, to be 
obeyed without question. In this context, when priests 
sexually abuse children, the interaction of deception and 
authority is especially toxic. Such priests — only a small 
minority — carefully select their targets and groom them 
with gradually escalating requests and actions. The 
grooming process is itself built on a lie. Then the priest 
uses various techniques to discourage the child from 
saying anything about the abuse. The young targets 
seldom have the emotional maturity to understand what is 
happening, and join in the deception, not telling anyone, 
and carrying the burden of a secret for years, decades, 
even their entire lives. Then there is the deception by 
church leaders who are informed about the abuse and, 
instead of expelling the perpetrators from the church and 
reporting them to the police, transfer them to another 
parish, where they continue the same behaviours. Sexual 
abuse in churches thus involves deception at several 
levels. 
 
                                                
16 Matthew Syed, Black Box Thinking: Marginal Gains and the 
Secrets of High Performance (London: John Murray, 2016). 
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Reluctance to release information 
Organisational elites seek to control public perceptions. 
They use public relations strategies to present positive 
images about the organisation, frame narratives from a 
favourable angle, and hide or deny negatives. These 
methods are deceptive separately and in combination. The 
most visible elements are the presentation of positive 
images and the use of flattering framing. In the back-
ground is hiding of negatives. Perhaps fortunately, hiding 
information opens organisations to the possibility of 
exposure and exposés, though these too can be misleading. 
 In their quest for a positive public image, organisa-
tions try to hide what would contradict or otherwise harm 
such an image. Much of what goes on in organisations is 
routine and of little interest to anyone, but in most organi-
sations there are secrets that are kept closely under wraps. 
Those who expose such secrets — whistleblowers, jour-
nalists, oversight agencies — are seen as threats. 
 For most governments, secrecy is standard operating 
procedure. It took years of campaigning to bring in 
freedom-of-information laws, and they are often expensive 
and difficult to use, requiring persistence to obtain crucial 
secrets.  
 Most corporations are even more resistant to expos-
ing internal problems, and they can block enquiries by 
invoking confidentiality, commercial secrecy and privacy 
concerns. They can also destroy information. Fred Gulson 
was a tobacco company insider who became a whistle-
blower, testifying about the company’s “document reten-
tion policy,” which actually was an operation to shred 
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huge volumes of documents about what the company 
knew about the health hazards of smoking. 
 Secrecy is one of the primary means by which 
authorities are able to deceive outsiders.  
 
Governments and protest 
After nuclear weapons were built during World War II and 
huge arsenals created in subsequent decades, threatening 
global devastation, there has been continual citizen 
protest, including upsurges of massive opposition. Going 
by what government spokespeople say, none of this 
protest has had the slightest impact on official decision-
making. However, they are lying. 
 Lawrence Wittner carried out an exhaustive examina-
tion of the worldwide movement against nuclear weapons, 
including examining records of US government discus-
sions about nuclear weapons development and deployment 
and about negotiations to control and reduce arsenals. 
Contrary to their public statements, government leaders 
were acutely sensitive to protest. Wittner concluded that 
arsenals expanded when there was little public opposition 
and were restrained or reduced when the public outcry was 
greatest.17 
 The lesson from this is to never believe what govern-
ment leaders say about whether and how they were 
influenced. Even when they actually understand the 
impact of protest on their own decisions, they are unlikely 
to admit it. 
                                                
17 Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, 3 
volumes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993–2003). 
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Deception in science 
Scientists are often considered to be authorities, in terms 
of their expertise rather than their formal position or their 
ability to control others. Scientific research is a domain in 
which truth-telling is fundamental to the entire enterprise. 
If scientists, when writing research papers, intentionally 
deceived others, science as we know it could hardly exist. 
If the author of a scientific paper could twist findings, 
readers would not know whether to trust them. This helps 
explain why fraud in science — generally taken to refer to 
altering or manufacturing data — is treated as a major 
transgression. This sort of scientific fraud can be detected 
in various ways, including by reports from whistleblowers 
and by the detection of anomalies in data and methods. 
 Despite the importance of truth-telling in science, and 
indeed in scholarship more generally, there are a number 
of deceptions embedded in publication conventions and 
the image of science. Consider the scientific paper, 
typically a concise summary of the research topic, the 
methods used, the findings and their implications. Scien-
tists know that research papers follow a convention, and 
do not provide a description of the way research is 
actually carried out. Chemists do not write “We spilled 
some chemicals and noticed an unusual colour. So we 
investigated further and discovered we were looking for 
the wrong thing.” Such honesty about the research process 
is rare, indeed so rare that a prominent scientist once wrote 
Deception by authorities     57 
 
that the scientific paper is fraudulent.18 If so, it’s only false 
to outsiders, because scientists know that published papers 
are telling a story according to a formula. 
 Another type of deception involves the image of 
science, the standard picture being that scientists are 
objective, dispassionate searchers for the truth. The 
reality, known to most researchers, is that scientists can be 
highly emotional and in particular highly committed to 
their ideas, so much so that they often maintain them in 
the face of contrary evidence.19 Many top scientists are 
competitive, seeking to obtain fame via their research, and 
sometimes engage in bitter disputes over priority for 
discoveries. Actually, many scientists believe in this story-
book image: they think they actually are objective. This is 
a type of collective self-deception, in which the conven-
tions of science, and the images conveyed in science 
textbooks, are taken as reality. 
 The image of the sober, dispassionate scientist — 
enhanced by the formulaic scientific paper — is useful 
when researchers make pronouncements: they have more 
credibility when seen as objective, with subjective 
elements submerged or disguised. When a government or 
                                                
18 P. B. Medawar, “Is the scientific paper fraudulent? Yes; it 
misrepresents scientific thought,” Saturday Review, 1 August 
1964, pp. 42–43. 
19 Michael J. Mahoney, Scientist as Subject: The Psychological 
Imperative (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976); Ian I. Mitroff, The 
Subjective Side of Science (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1974); David 
Lindsay Watson, Scientists are Human (London: Watts & Co., 
1938). 
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company wants to defend its policy or plan, finding some 
willing scientists can be effective in offering legitimacy. 
The scientists are presented as objective and contrasted to 
citizen opponents who are stigmatised as subjective and 
hence easily dismissed. 
 There is also another aspect of deception in science: 
companies may fund research that serves their interests, 
manipulate results, hide unwelcome findings, and use 
publications as tools for marketing campaigns. This sort of 
deception is widespread in biomedical fields, for example 
in research on pharmaceutical drugs.20  
 To refer to scholarship as a domain for truth-telling is 
most accurate when vested interests play little role and 
when researchers have little to gain by exaggerating or 
distorting their findings, and can easily be exposed when 
they do. The more general point is that even domains 
where truth-telling is vital can be plagued by passions, 
biases and the presence of vested interests. Whenever an 
area develops a reputation for honesty, it is predictable 
that interlopers will try to benefit from a false impression 
that they too are honest. 
 
Conclusion 
Types of deception by authorities are mostly similar to 
those between individuals. There are benign, conventional 
lies, and there are some major, damaging lies. The main 
difference is that deceptions by authorities affect a lot 
                                                
20 Peter C. Gøtzsche, Deadly Medicines and Organised Crime: 
How Big Pharma Has Corrupted Healthcare (London: Radcliffe, 
2013). 
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more people and can influence policies and practices with 
long-term implications.  
 Anyone who comes up against authorities — that’s 
just about everyone — needs to know about how they can 
be deceptive, intentionally or otherwise. Protesters need to 
understand police deceptions; election campaigners need 
to understand political lying; employees, especially 
whistleblowers, need to understand lying by managers; 
soldiers need to understand lying by their commanders; 
citizens need to understand lying by national leaders. 
 Despite the importance of understanding lying by 
authorities, many people give them the benefit of the 
doubt. They have a “truth bias,” assuming authorities are 
telling the whole truth unless there is convincing evidence 
to the contrary. Despite politicians repeatedly breaking 
campaign promises, many voters treat new promises with 
undue regard.  
 On the other hand, it is possible to become too 
cynical, not believing anything a politician or a corporate 
boss says. This points to the need for reliable methods of 
detecting lies. This is the topic of the next chapter.  
4 
Detection  
 
 
Key points 
• Most people can’t detect lying through behavioural cues. 
• To detect deception, it’s useful to assess a speaker’s 
track record, the context and motivations. 
• Evidence is often the most powerful tool for detecting 
deception. 
 
Many people believe they can tell when someone is lying. 
Parents think they can tell when their children are lying. 
Police think they can tell when suspects are lying. Bosses 
think they can tell when subordinates are lying. 
 How do they know? Sometimes it’s an intuitive 
sense. Other times it’s based on specific observations: the 
other person is looking away, fidgeting, blinking more 
than normal, or any of a number of other tell-tale signs of 
body language. 
 
“It is always the best policy to speak the truth, unless 
of course you are an exceptionally good liar.” — 
Jerome Jerome, The Idler 
 
 Researchers have sought to test whether people are 
any good at detecting lies. As noted in chapter 2, most 
student nurses can be very good at concealing their 
emotions and lying about whether they have seen a gory 
medical video or a pleasant scene. By looking at the 
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student nurses, observers could not tell which video they 
had seen.1 This same finding has been replicated many 
times. The basic result is that lots of people think they can 
detect lies, but very few can actually do so better than 
chance. In other words, their lie-detection skills are no 
better than guessing. 
 When little children lie, they often give themselves 
away. Two-year-old Jessica says about her toy duck “I 
didn’t take Freddie” while holding Freddie in her hand.  
 
“In its natural state, the child tells the literal truth 
because it is too naive to think of anything else. 
Blurting out the complete truth is considered adorable 
in the young, right smack up to the moment that the 
child says, ‘Mommy, is this the fat lady you can’t 
stand?’”  —  Judith Martin, Miss Manners’ Guide to 
Rearing Perfect Children (1985) 
 
But as children get older, they become much better liars. 
In this, they are often trained by parents and others in their 
lives. “Be sure to tell grandmother that you really like the 
present she gave you.” “Don’t tell your mother I gave this 
[chocolate] to you.” “Tell Sal [who has just called] that 
I’m not here.” Most of these are white lies, told for innoc-
uous social purposes. Others are more serious. “Tell your 
                                                
1 Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, 
Politics, and Marriage (New York: Norton, 1985/2009), pp. 54–
56. For a comprehensive treatment of lie detection, see Aldert 
Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities, 2nd 
edition (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2008). 
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mother I’m staying late at work.” “Tell the shopkeeper 
that you put the [stolen] goods in your bag by mistake.”  
 Because parents and other people in a child’s life 
commonly provide training and role models for lying, it is 
hardly surprising that most children become pretty good at 
it. The only surprise is that when children get a bit older, 
so many parents think they can tell when the kids are 
lying. 
 There may be a few people who actually are good at 
detecting lies just by observing someone’s body language. 
Members of the US Secret Service, who scan crowds 
looking for threats as part of their job, apparently can 
become skilled at lie-detection, but are still far from 
perfect, guessing correctly around 64% of the time 
compared to a bit over 50% for police officers, university 
students and various other groups.2 
 The conclusion is that few humans are good at detect-
ing lies just through observation, and most do no better 
than chance. The trap is false confidence, as when police, 
bosses or parents think they know when someone is telling 
the truth just by talking to them, or even think they can tell 
by looking whether someone is honest. It’s better to 
assume you have no clue and thus not rely on observation, 
but use other methods. 
                                                
2 Paul Ekman and Maureen O’Sullivan, “Who can catch a liar?” 
American Psychologist, Vol. 46, No. 9, September 1991, pp. 913–
920. Whether there are individuals with exceptional capabilities 
to detect deception has been questioned: Charles F. Bond, Jr. and 
Ahmet Uysal, “On lie detection ‘wizards’,” Law and Human 
Behavior, Vol. 31, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 109–115. 
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 What about the polygraph, commonly called a lie-
detector? This is a machine hooked up to detect a person’s 
physiological signs such as heart rate and blood pressure. 
The polygraph doesn’t detect lies, but instead only the 
bodily responses that some people have when they lie. If 
you’re calm when you tell the truth but become emotion-
ally aroused when saying something you know is false — 
your heart races a bit — then a polygraph, with a skilled 
operator, can detect when you’re lying.  
 However, polygraph tests are not reliable. Some 
people can lie without a worry, so the polygraph shows 
nothing different. Psychopaths, who lack a conscience, 
can do this, and others can train themselves to be calm 
when lying. Then there are people who are so nervous that 
when telling the truth on a sensitive matter the polygraph 
response indicates they are lying. They are so worried by 
the process that it gives a false positive, namely register-
ing lying when they are telling the truth. Finally, people 
who have deceived themselves, namely who believe their 
own lies, will pass a polygraph examination. That’s 
because they think they are telling the truth. 
 To look more systematically at ways to detect decep-
tion, it’s useful to classify methods into three main types: 
assess the speaker, check the evidence, and assess history 
and context. These are summarised in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Methods of detecting deception3  
 
1. Assess the speaker 
 • use behavioural clues  
 • assess the speaker’s track record 
 • evaluate motives and incentives  
 
2. Uncover and analyse the evidence 
 • assess whether the evidence has been a reliable 
indicator previously 
 • expose conflicting claims and statements 
 • clarify key points and concepts 
 • compare with other views; undertake research 
 • test veracity (individually): check facts, obtain 
statistics 
 • test veracity (collectively): get a group together to 
bring out suppressed information and perspectives; 
cultivate whistleblowers, leakers, internal 
sympathisers, investigative journalists 
 • self-deception: search for contrary evidence 
 
3. Assess history and context 
 • assess past circumstances for their correlation with 
lying 
 • assess incentives for lying provided by the context, 
for example money or reprisals 
 • look at environmental clues concerning deception, 
for example patterns of collusion or self-interest 
 
                                                
3 Adapted from a table in Brian Martin, “Tactics of political lying: 
the Iguanas affair,” Journal of Language and Politics, Vol. 13, 
No. 4, 2014, pp. 837–856, at p. 845. 
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Assess the speaker 
 
Behavioural clues 
As already discussed, most people aren’t very good at 
using behavioural clues, though many people think they 
are. However, most people have no training in using 
behavioural clues and have a potential to learn.  
 Most people are very good at hiding their feelings. 
When someone says something upsetting, they may mask 
their feelings of disgust or fear by smiling. However, just 
before their smile, there may be a very brief expression of 
their true feeling, called a micro-expression. It is so brief, 
just a fraction of a second, that it is easy to miss. Through 
practice, though, it’s possible to become better at two 
things: seeing the micro-expression and correctly inter-
preting it, for example as disgust or fear.4  
 A fake smile, that feigns the feeling of happiness, is 
easy to do, but fake smiles are subtly different from 
genuine smiles, called Duchesne smiles. A fake smile just 
involves the muscles around the mouth, whereas a 
Duchesne smile also engages small muscles around the 
eyes, which is quite hard to do voluntarily, without the 
accompanying positive feeling. 
 So if you see Sally smile, through practice you 
should be able to detect whether there was a preliminary 
micro-expression, to interpret this micro-expression, and 
to check whether the smile is fake or genuine. Let’s say 
                                                
4 Paul Ekman, Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and 
Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life (New 
York: Times Books, 2003). 
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you detect a feeling of fear masked by a fake smile. Does 
this mean Sally is consciously deceptive? Not necessarily. 
It might indicate an unconscious fear. It might be useful to 
know this.  
 The next question is whether you do anything about 
your extra insight into Sally’s emotions. It might not be a 
wise idea to ask her whether she’s afraid, because this 
might upset her for no useful purpose. If you don’t say 
anything but keep your information to yourself, now it’s 
you being deceptive! But this is to get ahead of the story. 
For now, I’m discussing detecting deception; what to do 
about knowledge of deception is another stage. 
 Suppose you think Sally is unconsciously hiding a 
fear resulting from something you’ve said. But how can 
you be sure? Even if you’re highly skilled at detecting 
micro-expressions, you can make mistakes. So it’s a good 
idea to check your interpretation of Sally’s response. 
Perhaps you’ve been talking about putting a protest banner 
on a high building. Sally might be afraid of heights but not 
want to show it among activists she respects, and you later 
observe her avoiding looking down from three floors up. 
Or perhaps you’ve been talking about the effects of 
nuclear war, and Sally is afraid of death. However, that 
wouldn’t be a surprise, because most people are afraid of 
death. You might learn more about how this is likely to 
affect Sally by reading about terror management theory5 
                                                
5 Jeff Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon and Tom Pyszczynski, 
“Terror management theory of self-esteem and cultural 
worldviews: empirical assessments and conceptual refinements,” 
Detection     67 
 
— being reminded about death can affect people’s 
behaviour without them being aware of it — than by 
trying to observe her response to actual risks of dying. 
 The implication here is that it may be possible to 
become much better at reading people’s emotions from 
their face — or their voice or body language — but this 
may require a fair bit of practice. Furthermore, you need 
independent information to check your assessment 
obtained from behavioural clues. 
 
Assess the speaker’s track record 
If you know that someone has lied repeatedly before, this 
is an indication they are prone to lying. Some people are 
called habitual liars: they make up all sorts of stories, 
about what they own, where they went to school, who they 
know and what they’ve done. When caught out in a lie, 
they blithely switch to another. 
 Occasionally a well-known figure is exposed for 
having deceived others for many years. Bruno Bettelheim 
was a prominent child psychologist and writer whose 
books were read by many as revealing truths about human 
behaviour. Then, much later, Richard Pollak wrote a book 
about Bettelheim, showing that throughout his life he had 
misrepresented his own past and that many of his research 
findings were suspect.6 If, much earlier, someone had 
made a careful analysis of Bettelheim’s claims, Bettelheim 
                                                                                                                                          
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 29, 1997, pp. 
61–139. 
6 Richard Pollak, The Creation of Dr. B: A Biography of Bruno 
Bettelheim (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
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might not have been taken so seriously. Even so, Pollak’s 
critique offers a warning about being too trusting.  
 Some politicians make all sorts of promises during 
election campaigns, and then go back on them after 
getting into office, using various excuses. These broken 
promises can almost become predictable. 
 For decades, the tobacco industry covered up internal 
knowledge of the harmful effects of smoking. Now that 
this cover-up has been exposed, this could be a warning 
not to trust anything tobacco companies say about the 
health hazards of smoking. 
 On the other hand, some people have a reputation for 
being honest, for telling it like it is, for being straight 
shooters. Some even are known for being honest when no 
one else has the courage to speak out, for example dissi-
dents in China or Iran. If there is good evidence for a 
person’s reputation for honesty, this is a recommendation 
for believing them. 
 However, a lot of care is needed when using this 
criterion for detecting deceit. A dissident might be coura-
geous in speaking truth in the face of government repres-
sion, but still be cautious, only speaking out on carefully 
chosen times and topics. Furthermore, courage in dissent 
does not necessarily carry over into honesty in personal 
dealings. Some prominent figures have secret lives. 
Whether being selectively honest is a problem depends on 
your values, and what is at stake.  
 One problem in relying on a track record is that track 
records themselves can become a target for attack. To 
attack a political opponent, campaigners may monitor 
every statement, finding one instance of an alleged lie 
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(which might just be a mistake), and then trumpet this lie 
endlessly, seeking to discredit the politician’s reputation 
for honesty. When Julia Gillard was prime minister of 
Australia, her opponents, led by Tony Abbott, leader of 
the opposition, relentlessly accused her of lying about an 
election promise concerning a carbon tax, labelling her Ju-
liar.7 Gillard lost the next election, and Abbott became 
prime minister and proceeded to break numerous election 
promises. 
 In the midst of all the clamour, it would be difficult 
to make an assessment of Gillard’s and Abbott’s track 
record concerning election promises. Was Gillard espe-
cially duplicitous, or were Abbott and company especially 
ruthless in exaggerating one alleged deception into a long-
running slur? Did Abbott really break more election 
promises than Gillard, and were they more significant? A 
dispassionate, non-partisan assessment is needed, and this 
would be extremely difficult given media management 
strategies by both political parties. 
 Making an informed judgement about the track 
record of an individual or organisation is important, yet it 
is often bypassed because of the truth bias: many people 
assume others are telling the truth unless there is persua-
sive evidence to the contrary. If Alpha, a member of your 
group, has been telling damaging lies for years, this should 
be taken into account, even though this time the topic is 
different, and there are new members who don’t know 
Alpha and are willing to accept statements at face value.  
                                                
7 Kerry-Anne Walsh, The Stalking of Julia Gillard (Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 2013). 
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 The truth bias is especially damaging when dealing 
with authorities. In court, some police have a long track 
record of verballing those accused of crimes, namely lying 
in order to convict them. Judges may know about this but 
do nothing, even though perjury is a crime. Meanwhile, 
juries are not told anything about the practice of verbal-
ling, much less about the reliability of police witnesses. So 
the practice continues. 
 The role of a track record applies to organisations and 
to social systems. Just because a tobacco company has a 
new spokesperson does not mean that suddenly the truth 
will come out. In this case, the pattern of deception is 
institutionalised. It should be assumed that the pattern will 
continue. Only if there is a sudden change in the message 
should the possibility of truth-telling be taken seriously. 
 The example of a tobacco company is easy to grasp, 
but the same approach is less commonly applied to 
governments, at least governments that are considered 
friendly. Consider the issue of torture. Every government 
in the world denies engaging in torture. Informed groups, 
such as Amnesty International, document torture in dozens 
of countries. So the governments of dozens of countries 
are involved in systematic deception. Perhaps a govern-
ment spokesperson is being personally honest in saying 
there is no torture, because the spokesperson is being 
deceived by others in the system. The point is that decep-
tion is institutionalised, and the honesty of a spokesperson 
is a related but not essential issue. 
 For getting at the track record of a corporate sector 
(like the tobacco industry) or a government, detailed 
investigation is vital. One of the patterns perceived by 
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political scientists is that left-wing politicians, when 
elected, often fail to live up to the expectations of their 
radical supporters, especially when sweeping changes are 
promised.8 Some supporters become disillusioned, but the 
disappointments are infrequent enough that many put their 
trust in the next great hope. In this case, and in others, 
historians and political scientists can detect patterns. It is 
unlikely that left-wing politicians, riding a wave of sup-
port, are trying to deceive anyone, but nonetheless many 
of their supporters are probably being deceived because 
their expectations are unrealistic. 
 
Evaluate motives and incentives 
In some circumstances, people have a greater incentive to 
lie, and therefore others should be more sceptical of their 
claims than otherwise. Someone charged with a serious 
crime has a strong incentive to lie in order to avoid going 
to prison. A witness to the crime, giving testimony in 
court, has less reason to lie, at least if the witness is not 
being bribed or threatened. 
 If the witness is a close friend or associate of the 
defendant, then the witness has a motive to lie in support 
of the defendant. On the other hand, if the witness hates 
the defendant, or has been harmed by the defendant, the 
witness has a motive to lie in the other direction, to help 
convict the defendant. For a witness to be independent 
thus is important in maintaining credibility. 
                                                
8 Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969). 
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 In giving testimony in court, lying is considered so 
serious that it is a crime itself, called perjury. Yet it 
happens all the time. Every time a defendant pleads 
innocent but is found guilty, the implication is that the 
defendant was lying, yet convicted criminals are almost 
never charged with perjury. 
 More generally, a common motive for lying is that 
telling the truth will cause some harm to the speaker, for 
example embarrassment, loss of money or relationship 
damage. Companies involved in illegal dumping of waste 
are not likely to announce this to the world. Those 
involved know that revealing the truth will cost the 
company money, harm the company’s reputation, and 
maybe lead to the loss of their jobs. Criminal prosecution 
might even be possible. 
 When talking about the motive for a company to tell 
lies, there’s an important qualification: a company is not 
an individual, and it can be misleading to say that a 
company has a motive, because a company does not have 
a mind.9 People involved with the company can have 
different motives. Many employees may not know the 
truth about the illegal dumping; they do not lie, and have 
no motive to do so. Indeed, top managers might not know 
about the dumping. Those who know about it are parties to 
a deception, and have a strong motive to tell falsehoods 
about it or at least keep quiet about it.  Then there are false 
                                                
9 On the attribution of minds to others, including organisations, 
see Daniel M. Wegner and Kurt Gray, The Mind Club: Who 
Thinks, What Feels, and Why It Matters (New York: Viking, 
2016). 
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or misleading public statements on behalf of the company, 
put out by spokespeople, perhaps advised by a public 
relations firm. The people who write the public 
statements, put them out and answer questions may or 
may not know the statements are false or misleading. 
Inside the company, there can be various levels of under-
standing, misunderstanding, justification, deception and 
self-deception, depending on each employee’s knowledge, 
role and psychology. 
 When outsiders attribute a motive to a company, this 
is a convenient shorthand for referring to the motives of 
those most responsible for decisions and/or for public 
statements. To say the company has a motive to cover up 
the illegal dumping captures a key psychological and 
organisational dynamic, but it useful to remember that 
things inside the company are far more complex. Indeed, it 
is helpful to remember that any organisation is made up of 
individuals, so for some purposes it can be misleading to 
think of the organisation as if it is a person. 
 Motives are closely connected to incentives. If some-
one is paying you to keep quiet, the money is an incentive 
and your motive is financial, at least partly so. Therefore, 
looking at incentives can be useful for assessing whether 
someone might be lying. The stronger the incentives to lie, 
then in most cases the more likely lying will occur. 
 Consider the situation of lawyers who work in an 
adversarial legal system such as in the US. In a criminal 
trial, normally the plaintiff and the defendant are repre-
sented by lawyers. In quite a few cases, lawyers know or 
have a good idea about who is really guilty or innocent. 
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Nevertheless, it is their role, sometimes very well paid, to 
argue on behalf of their client. 
 Many lawyers do whatever they can to help their 
clients win, for example hammering points of attack, 
hiding or not alluding to information damaging to their 
client, objecting to certain questions by the opponent’s 
lawyer, and so forth. In making the best possible case for 
their clients, most lawyers are being deceptive at some 
level. After all, their task is partisan, not a neutral quest 
for the truth. That is supposed to be the role for the judge 
or jury. 
 Every role in society contains incentives for some 
types of truth-telling and some types of deception. Many 
people think that being a scientist is the perfect role for 
truth-telling. After all, scientific fraud — manufacturing or 
altering data — is rightly condemned. Nevertheless, 
looking more closely, there are incentives within the 
scientific enterprise that encourage certain types of 
deception. 
 Some scientists are employed by companies to under-
take research about the company’s own products. For 
example, a pharmaceutical company scientist might test a 
new drug for safety and efficacy. When studying a drug 
that shows great promise for being a blockbuster, there is 
an incentive to show the drug in the best possible light, 
minimising reporting of adverse side effects and reporting 
favourable evidence of potency. This can be done in a 
variety of misleading ways, including looking for adverse 
effects for a too-short time period, using sample sizes that 
are too small, using protocols that exclude unwelcome 
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data, and not publishing trials giving results unfavourable 
to the drug.10 
 These influences also apply to university scientists 
who are paid by a company to study the company’s drugs. 
So strong is this sort of influence on reported results that it 
has a special name: the funding effect. Funding is the 
incentive; the motive for the scientists is to keep the 
funder happy and thereby maintain jobs or research grants, 
as well as to publish articles, build a reputation and gain 
promotions.  
 So strong is the influence of funding that when 
seeking to detect deception, it is useful to remember the 
dictum, “Follow the money.” Knowing the source of 
someone’s income and wealth can do a lot to guide 
assessments of the likelihood of deception. But it is only a 
likelihood, not a guarantee. There are plenty of pharma-
ceutical company scientists who do their best to be honest, 
and some companies set high ethical standards. The 
funding effect can still occur, because bias can be uncon-
scious. It is also possible that researchers and companies 
with an incentive to be biased nonetheless produce 
exemplary work. The point about the funding effect, and 
more generally about evaluating incentives and motives, is 
to pay extra attention to the possibility of deception when 
there are incentives to be biased and to lie. Incentives can 
be influential but they also can be ignored or resisted. 
 
                                                
10 Ben Goldacre, Bad Pharma: How Drug Companies Mislead 
Doctors and Harm Patients (London: Fourth Estate, 2012). 
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Summary 
When detecting deception it can be very useful to assess 
the speaker by taking notice of behavioural clues, 
assessing the track record of the speaker, and evaluating 
incentives and motives. These methods can offer signals 
about the likelihood of deception, but they do not prove 
either truth-telling or lying. What they can do is provide a 
guess, sometimes a good guess, about what is going on. 
Do you presume honesty and need good evidence for 
lying, or do you presume deception and need good 
evidence for honesty? In other words, where does the onus 
of proof lie? Either way, you need evidence.  
  
The evidence 
Evidence is crucial in detecting deception. The complica-
tion is that evidence can be high or low quality, and 
sometimes is misleading. Occasionally evidence is de-
signed to be misleading. 
 An everyday example: your friend Peta says she can’t 
come to your group’s meeting this evening because she 
has a headache. Just after the end of the meeting, you 
receive a message from a different friend who saw Peta 
out partying. If Peta was lying about her headache as a 
reason not to attend the meeting, it’s not a serious lie, 
unless her presence at the meeting was absolutely crucial, 
and she had promised repeatedly that she would attend no 
matter what.  
 However, the evidence that Peta was lying is pretty 
thin. The person who told you Peta was out partying might 
have mistaken someone else for Peta, or might have been 
lying in order to alienate you from Peta. It’s also possible 
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that Peta did have a serious headache, but it lifted later in 
the evening, after the meeting was over, and she felt so 
much better that she went partying. 
 The lesson here is that it’s worthwhile determining 
the quality of the evidence and thinking of possible 
alternative explanations for it.  
 When the evidence is weak, an obvious step is to 
obtain better evidence. So, after the meeting, you visit 
Peta’s home to see how she’s feeling and tell her what 
happened. If she’s there, and seems miserable, you have 
evidence to counter the gossip that she was out partying. If 
she’s not there, it’s more suspicious evidence but still not 
enough to be sure she was lying. 
 In many incidents such as Peta’s headache, it’s not 
possible to reach a definitive conclusion. The logical thing 
is to suspend judgement and seek stronger evidence on 
some future occasion. However, many people feel uncom-
fortable with uncertainty and prefer to reach a conclusion, 
even if it is not well supported. This might be to believe 
Peta and disregard the message about her partying or it 
might be to assume she was lying. One of the greatest 
challenges in detecting deception is to avoid drawing 
premature conclusions or, in other words, to keep an open 
mind about possibilities.  
 Detecting deception can be important for groups far 
beyond the question of whether Peta had a headache. It 
can protect the group and sometimes an entire campaign 
from failure by determining whether a member might be 
unreliable at a crucial time. The group needs strategies to 
keep its efforts going. 
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 Some liars are quite skilled at twisting and changing 
their stories, weaving elaborate excuses and avoiding 
getting pinned down. If you regularly interact with Fred, 
who you suspect is a serial liar, it can be useful to get 
Fred’s statements in writing, or to make recordings of 
conversations with him. Then when Fred contradicts 
himself later, you have evidence. Whether to confront 
Fred with the evidence is another matter. You may decide 
just to keep the information to yourself, in case you need 
it, for example to convince someone else. Or you might 
ask Fred about the discrepancy. He might explain away 
contradictions as mistakes or jokes or not really meaning 
what he said.  
 People in the public eye, whose speeches and 
informal comments are recorded, provide a rich lode of 
evidence for detecting deception. Politicians frequently 
give talks and interviews, and can be readily caught out in 
contradictions, especially if opponents are monitoring 
everything they say. It is no surprise that many politicians 
develop a way of responding to questions that avoids 
saying too many things directly. 
 
A case of false credentials 
In 1991, a man named John McNicol set up Whistleblow-
ers Anonymous, the first whistleblowers organisation in 
Australia. I was on the mailing list for the group’s news-
letter and met with McNicol during a visit to Canberra, 
where he lived. 
 In 1993, John was the lead organiser of a one-day 
conference in Canberra put on by Whistleblowers 
Anonymous. Isla MacGregor and I had set up Dissent 
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Network Australia and, liaising with McNicol, organised a 
workshop for the day before the conference. 
 On the day of the conference, everyone involved was 
startled to read an article in the Canberra Times, the 
respected daily newspaper for the country’s capital city, 
titled “Campaigner coy at the sound of the whistle.”11 The 
article, by journalist Norman Abjorensen, exposed 
McNicol for having claimed credentials he did not have. 
Here is an extract from Abjorensen’s article: 
 
In an occasional paper circulated to journalists on whistleblower 
protection legislation, Mr McNicol listed after his name the letters 
BD, FSA (Scot), MIPRA, JP. 
 Asked about the BD (Bachelor of Divinity), Mr McNicol replied 
that it was from “an American university,” and he volunteered that he 
had been a Baptist minister at Wimbledon in London. 
 When asked to name the university from which he had 
obtained his degree, Mr McNicol declined. Asked why he had 
previously indicated it was conferred by the University of London, Mr 
McNicol said he had never made this claim. 
 However, in a directory entitled Who’s Who in Australia and 
the Far East published in 1989, Mr McNicol is listed, described as a 
journalist and public relations consultant. Under education is the 
entry: “Wick Academy; BD, London University, England.” 
 An earlier publication, Who’s Who in the Commonwealth, in 
which Mr McNicol is described as a journalist and publisher, lists 
under education: “Wick Academy, Scotland; London University.” 
 According to a letter from the International Biographical 
Centre, compiler of the directories, the information was supplied by 
Mr McNicol. 
 Further, a letter from the University of London, dated Novem-
ber 1992, and signed by Miss U. Garmann, of the university’s 
support services and student records, examinations division, says, 
“On the information given I have been unable to find any record in 
                                                
11 Norman Abjorensen, “Campaigner coy at the sound of the 
whistle,” Canberra Times, 27 March 1993, p. 3. 
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the name of John McNicol and so, cannot verify the award to him of 
a Bachelor of Divinity from the University of London.” … 
 [McNicol] said the questions being put to him were “improper 
… as far as my credentials are concerned, I’ve got nothing to hide.” 
 
 
The national director of Whistleblowers Anonymous, 
John McNicol, at yesterday’s press conference. 
 
Abjorensen undertook two tasks: detecting and exposing 
deception, in this case false claims about credentials. 
There were two elements to task 1, detection: establishing 
that McNicol had made a claim and finding evidence that 
the claim was false. Both of these are essential, because 
people under scrutiny often change their story. McNicol 
claimed he had never said he had a degree from the 
University of London, but Abjorensen had laid a trap, 
finding an entry in Who’s Who in the Commonwealth for 
McNicol listing a degree from the University of London. 
Anticipating that McNicol might say that the information 
in the entry hadn’t come from him — namely that some-
one else was responsible — Abjorensen obtained a letter 
from the International Biographical Centre stating that 
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McNicol had supplied the information.12 What we see in 
Abjorensen’s article is a careful process of pinning down 
McNicol in a lie, namely claiming credentials he did not 
have, and closing off escape routes that he might take. 
 Abjorensen’s second task was exposing deception. 
McNicol was caught out in the worst possible manner, his 
lies exposed in a major daily newspaper on the day of a 
conference on whistleblowing he had organised. Those of 
us involved in organising the conference saw this as 
damaging to the credibility of whistleblowing. It would 
have been far better if we had known about McNicol’s 
claims beforehand, though what we might have done is 
uncertain. Generally, if you are likely to be caught out in a 
lie, as McNicol was, it is better to make a full admission 
and apology. 
 However, we had no inkling about Abjorensen’s 
allegations; McNicol was a rather elusive character. As it 
turned out, at a committee meeting the day after the 
conference, Whistleblowers Anonymous changed its name 
to Whistleblowers Australia and Jean Lennane was elected 
president. McNicol faded from the whistleblowing scene 
and was not involved thereafter. So perhaps Abjorensen 
did the group a favour, helping push out McNicol and 
                                                
12 Various Who’s Who volumes at the time contacted all sorts of 
people inviting them to supply information for an entry about 
themselves. The companies made money by selling the resulting 
volumes, at a high price, mostly to people listed in them. An entry 
in such volumes provided no independent evidence of the 
eminence of individuals with entries. 
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enabling a more inclusive and honest group to take the 
running henceforth. 
 As an example of detecting deception, this example 
leaves out some details. We don’t know why Abjorensen 
initially suspected McNicol was not everything he claimed 
to be, nor why he set out to expose him at a crucial 
moment. Even so, Abjorensen’s techniques, which can be 
inferred from his article, reveal the importance of obtain-
ing documentation and authoritative support to show 
deception, and of thinking about possible escape routes — 
ways that the deceiver might argue their way out of a hole 
— and closing them off in advance. 
 
A case of corruption — and lying 
Corruption refers to activities such as fraud, bribery, 
providing special favours, and a host of other things that 
contravene the principles of fairness and honest opera-
tions. When speaking of corruption, most commonly 
people think of governments, but corruption can occur in 
any organisation, including corporations, churches, trade 
unions and charities.  
 Corruption nearly always involves deception at some 
level, to hide the unfairness from observers. In some 
countries, when you are stopped by traffic police, you are 
expected to offer a bribe to go on your way: corruption is 
institutionalised, so it becomes standard practice, though 
technically it is against the law, otherwise it shouldn’t be 
called a bribe. But if you refuse to pay the bribe and 
contest the matter in court, then various overt deceptions 
would come to the fore. 
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 In the Australian state of New South Wales, there is 
an organisation called the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption or ICAC. It is funded by the state 
government but, as its name suggests, it is independent of 
the government. ICAC solicits information about corrup-
tion in public administration — it does not investigate 
corruption in the private sector — and has extraordinary 
powers to collect information and compel witnesses to 
testify. On the other hand, it cannot prosecute individuals 
that it finds corrupt: that task is referred to police and the 
courts. 
 In one of its investigations, ICAC targeted activities 
in Wollongong City Council, the local government body 
covering most of the city of Wollongong.13 The council 
includes a dozen elected officials called councillors and a 
government bureaucracy with numerous employees deal-
ing with local concerns. 
 Exactly why ICAC decided to investigate Wollon-
gong Council is not public knowledge, but certainly it 
received tip-offs from individuals that some improper 
dealings were occurring. This would not be surprising, 
because corruption in Australian local government bodies 
is commonplace. Many of the elected councillors are 
property developers who use their positions to influence, 
directly or indirectly, decisions made about local devel-
                                                
13 In this account, I draw on “Corruption tactics: outrage 
management in a local government scandal,” Resistance Studies 
Magazine, 2012, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/12rsm.html, which 
provides a detailed analysis. The paragraphs referring to Frank 
Vellar are taken directly from this article. 
84     The deceptive activist 
opment. For example, if an area of land is rezoned from 
residential to commercial, this provides a windfall profit to 
the owner of the land. If anyone knows in advance about 
the rezoning, they can buy the land and benefit financially. 
Alternatively, the decision about which areas to rezone 
can be influenced by the current owners, who might bribe 
council staff who make the decisions. The same sort of 
thing can occur with approvals for buildings and other 
developments. 
 This sort of corruption thrives on secrecy and lying. 
No one publicly admits that rules are being broken. 
Corruption can occur under the noses of other staff, and 
often only a few individuals know about special deals. 
 One or more individuals reported their suspicions or 
evidence of corruption to ICAC, and ICAC decided to 
investigate further. The investigators tapped the tele-
phones of key people in the council, including councillors 
and staff. After collecting quite a bit of evidence from 
these telephone taps, ICAC carried out a raid on the 
council building, confiscating paper files and computers 
and searching the contents for additional evidence. 
 Until the raid, which was public, ICAC’s investiga-
tion was secret: ICAC used its own confidential processes 
to collect information, first from those who reported their 
suspicions and then in setting up the telephone taps. After 
the raid, ICAC took several months to analyse the infor-
mation it had collected, and then ran public hearings in 
which witnesses were compelled to attend and answer 
questions. If they refused, they could be charged under the 
ICAC Act, with criminal penalties probably worse than 
what would happen to them otherwise. 
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 At the public hearings, various people were put on 
the stand and asked to answer questions. The questions 
were usually put by Noel Hemmings, senior counsel for 
ICAC, and occasionally by the Commissioner himself. 
Some of the people questioned were the ones suspected of 
corruption; others were called as credible witnesses or 
experts concerning the matters addressed. The questioning 
of the individuals suspected of corruption was revealing. 
Hemmings prepared the ground well, seeking to pin down 
the individual on the stand in a lie, by obtaining admis-
sions to close off loopholes, namely ways they could 
explain away evidence. Then the witness would be 
confronted with a recording, played immediately after 
their statements, of their own conversations — obtained 
through telephone taps — that showed that they were 
lying. Or so it seemed to nearly everyone in the room. 
Despite seemingly irrefutable evidence of lying, nearly 
everyone who testified refused to admit it, and gave some 
other explanation. This could be considered a continuation 
of the lying, or just as a reluctance to admit to lying. 
 Frank Vellar, a property developer, denied asking for 
approval of his development application via planner John 
Gilbert. In the ICAC hearings, Hemmings, asked Vellar 
“Had you asked Mr Gilbert to have his computer used to 
record the consent so that Ms Morgan’s name would not 
appear on it?” Vellar answered “No, I did not.” Hem-
mings, to limit Vellar’s room to manoeuvre, asked “Did 
you have a conversation on that line?” Vellar: “No I did 
not.” 
 At this point a recording was played of a conversa-
tion between Gilbert, Morgan and Vellar. Hemmings then 
86     The deceptive activist 
asked, “I asked you questions as to whether you had made 
any application to Mr Gilbert or Mr Oxley that the 
application be signed by him and not Ms Morgan. Do you 
recall that?” Vellar: “Yes.” Hemmings: “And you denied 
it?” Vellar: “Because I did not recollect what you had 
asked me.” Hemmings: “You didn’t recollect?” Vellar: 
“You had asked me, I believe a question that I did not 
understand correctly. By playing the tape I have heard 
now what you were asking me.” Vellar thus avoided 
admitting to a lie. 
 The experience at the ICAC hearings reveals, in a 
stark fashion, people’s reluctance to admit to lying. The 
implication is that you may be able to find good evidence 
that someone is lying, but getting them to accept it can be 
much more difficult. If your aim is to force an admission 
or, more realistically, to make the lying obvious to others, 
then you need evidence that is detailed and specific. You 
need to be prepared for face-saving explanations such as 
“That’s not what I meant” or “I was just making a joke” or 
“That wasn’t me” or “That’s taken out of context” or — as 
in the case of Frank Vellar — “I didn’t understand.” At 
the ICAC hearings, witnesses were compelled to answer 
questions. In most other situations, people can avoid 
admitting to lying by simply refusing to comment, 
changing the topic or by counter-attacking, for example 
accusing you of lying or of bullying.  
 
More on the evidence 
For detecting deception, it is crucial to collect and 
evaluate evidence.  Evidence on its own is not sufficient, 
because the evidence might be wrong, intentionally 
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misleading, poor quality or not relevant. Collecting and 
evaluating evidence sometimes can be quick and easy, 
such as watching for when someone leaves a house, or can 
be lengthy and elaborate, equivalent to a major research 
project. Evidence can be used to clarify key concepts, 
expose contradictions and conflicting claims, to verify 
facts and to reassess assumptions. 
 One useful check is to ask whether evidence from the 
same source has previously been reliable. Suppose one of 
the members of your group is in touch with an informant 
in the government and is telling you about plans for 
policy, including attempts to hide information the public 
will not like and to offer misleading arguments for policies 
that will serve special interests. On six previous occasions, 
the informant’s information has proved accurate. This 
gives you some assurance that the next bit of inside 
information will be accurate too, though it’s not a guaran-
tee. It’s possible the informant might have been setting 
you up with accurate information in order to mislead you 
on something important, or that government officials have 
identified the informant and are now feeding the informant 
misleading information. 
 
The Big Short 
The global financial crisis provides a rich source of 
examples about detecting deception. Many individuals and 
groups in the financial sector were involved in fraudulent 
or misleading activities. In the US, the heart of the crisis, 
agents in the home loan sector provided loans to individu-
als who had no prospect of ever paying them back. Some 
of these so-called subprime home loans went to people 
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with no jobs and no income. These people were sold on a 
false hope of home ownership and not informed they 
would lose a lot of money a few years later, as well as 
become homeless. 
 Who would want to invest in a subprime mortgage? 
To make such loans seem attractive to investors, several 
mortgages were bundled together. Some of the mortgages 
were considered extremely likely to be repaid: these were 
called AAA. Others were less reliable, called AA, A, 
BBB, BB and B. The B types were subprime loans. The 
deception in bundling mortgages was to label the package 
of loans according to the best ones. A bundle that was half 
in the B category would still be labelled AAA and sold to 
institutional investors as highly secure. They would better 
be called “junk bonds,” meaning they had little or no 
value. 
 Then there were bundles of subprime mortgages. 
These were called collateral debt obligations or CDOs and 
sold as if they were worth something. When loan defaults 
started snowballing in 2007, banks were caught holding 
billions of dollars worth of junk bonds. Those who knew 
the risk quickly sold (unloaded) these bonds — soon to 
become worthless — to naïve investors. It was another 
deception. 
 Then there were the rating agencies, most promi-
nently Moody’s and Standard & Poor. To maintain their 
business with the banks, they gave false ratings on junk 
bonds. This was a gross deception, equivalent to a sports 
referee saying a team had scored when actually they had 
lost the ball midfield. 
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 Michael Lewis undertakes investigative work and 
writes stories that read like novels. He has taken a special 
interest in financial operations. One of his books, The Big 
Short — later made into an award-winning movie — is 
about individuals in the financial scene who figured out 
that the US home-loan sector was going to melt down due 
to all the subprime mortgages.14 The methods used by 
these operators illustrate different ways of detecting 
deception. One qualification is necessary: in much of the 
financial sector, ignorance and short-sighted self-interest 
rather than deception can explain much of the behaviour 
that led to the crisis. 
 Michael Burry, a stock market investor, was ac-
claimed for his astute understanding of markets. He had an 
eye for numbers while remaining independent of public 
opinion. He scanned through prospectuses of subprime 
mortgage bonds and came to the conclusion that the 
housing mortgage market would begin to collapse in early 
2007, when variable mortgage rates would become much 
greater, causing owners to default on their loans. Seeking 
to take advantage of this knowledge, he entered into 
mortgage swaps with banks, essentially betting that the 
housing boom would go bust, eventually putting over a 
billion dollars into this bet. Given that housing bonds were 
widely seen as the most stable of investments, the compa-
nies he approached for the swaps thought they were 
getting something for nothing at Burry’s expense. 
                                                
14 Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine 
(Penguin, 2011). 
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 A hedge fund manager, Steve Eisman, was sceptical 
of the investing orthodoxy. He started focusing on the 
lenders and borrowers. To check what was happening, his 
partners visited new housing estates in Miami. These were 
huge houses costing far more than the usual US home, yet 
the owners had little income. Through interviews with 
lenders, Eisman’s partners discovered that no one was 
being refused a loan, no matter how lacking in jobs or 
income. 
 
Vinny and Danny [Eisman’s partners] flew down to 
Miami, where they wandered around empty neigh-
borhoods built with subprime loans, and saw with 
their own eyes how bad things were. “They’d call me 
and say, ‘Oh my God, this is a calamity here’,” 
recalls Eisman.15 
 
 Then there were two young investors, Charlie Ledley 
and Jamie Mai, who in a matter of four years had turned 
$100,000 into $30 million by a simple approach: they took 
into account highly unlikely events that other investors did 
not want to think about. They chanced on information that 
the property market was going to collapse. In order to 
make major investments (bets), they needed access to the 
exchanges run by the large firms, but discovered that the 
minimum funds for sitting at the table were $1.5 billion. 
So they turned to a former trader they knew who enabled 
them to make huge bets on a market collapse. 
                                                
15 Ibid., p. 96. 
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 These stories of investment analysts who anticipated 
the global financial crisis show several ways of detecting 
deception. Burry used his extraordinary capacity to see 
patterns in rows of numbers. Eisman investigated the 
housing market by having his staff talk to new homeown-
ers and the lenders who had enabled them to buy houses. 
Ledley and Mai did it by following the example of others, 
using their intuition.16 
 Burry, Eisner, Ledley and Mai were exceptions. Most 
investors did not anticipate a collapse. Many were simply 
ignorant: they did not understand what was going on. 
However, many of them knew about the shaky founda-
tions of bundled mortgages and junk bonds. It might be 
said they were subject to self-deception. There had not 
been a housing market collapse for decades, so it seemed 
impossible and the prospect was simply ignored or dis-
missed. This is especially easy when everyone else is 
proceeding as if there was no problem.  
 Self-deception is one of the greatest barriers to 
detecting deception by others. What it often means in 
practice is not searching for contrary evidence. This is 
well known in psychology and is called confirmation bias: 
people with a strong commitment to a point of view are 
more likely to notice evidence supporting their view and 
to ignore or contest contrary evidence. There is even a 
phenomenon, called backfire, in which exposure to 
contrary evidence can reinforce people’s original views: in 
                                                
16 The story is more complex than indicated by these vignettes, 
and other players were involved. See Lewis’s book for more 
information. 
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contesting the challenging evidence, their original views 
are reaffirmed.17 
 
Conclusion 
To detect deception, there are three main approaches: 
assess the speaker, uncover and analyse the evidence, and 
assess the history and context. What methods to use 
depends a lot on the circumstances. Collecting and exam-
ining the evidence is usually crucial. Doing this in a fair 
fashion is hard for many people. A common problem is 
assuming that others are lying because they say things 
with which you disagree or think are plain wrong. 
However, there might be other explanations, for example 
that they believe what they are saying or that there is some 
truth in what they are trying to express.  
 On the other hand, some individuals regularly lie and 
some governments and corporations are involved in 
operations that involve serious ongoing deception. Study-
ing historical examples and patterns of collusion can help 
in deciding whether something shady is going on. 
 It is important to remain aware of the possibility of 
self-deception, by others and yourself. Self-deception 
combined with people’s tendency to follow the crowd can 
lead to collective illusions. Furthermore, experts may be 
just as susceptible to self-deception as anyone else, so 
                                                
17 Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, “When corrections fail: the 
persistence of political misperceptions,” Political Behavior, Vol. 
32, No. 2, 2010, pp. 303–330. This is different from my own 
concept of backfire that can result when people are outraged by 
an injustice. 
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deferring to someone who is confident and seems 
knowledgeable can be risky.  
 Detecting deception is one thing. What to do about it 
is another. If you’ve just caught your close friend in a lie 
— he said he was at a work meeting but actually was 
having drinks at a bar — confronting him with it might 
wreck your relationship, and you need to consider whether 
confronting the lie is worth jeopardising everything you 
share. If you demand complete truth from everyone you 
know, you may not end up with any friends at all! 
Perhaps, sometimes, it is better not to know.  
 
 
 
 
 
Graphic adapted from http://www.wikihow.com/Care-for-a-Sick-Dog 
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Key points 
• A prohibition on lying has some harmful consequences. 
• More useful is seeing truth-telling as one virtue among 
others. 
• One way to help decide when deception is warranted is 
to look at the criteria for effective nonviolent action.  
 
Is lying good or bad? More generally, is deceiving people 
good or bad? There are several possible answers. One is 
that lying is always bad and therefore should be avoided at 
all costs. A second is that lying is usually bad and should 
be avoided except in exceptional circumstances. A third 
answer is that it depends on the circumstances. 
 The absolutist position, namely that lying is always 
bad, was endorsed by famous philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(1724–1804) via his idea of the categorical imperative. 
Kant said we should look at the implications if everyone 
lied all the time. The result would be a totally dysfunc-
tional society, because no one could trust what anyone 
said. Therefore, according to Kant, it is imperative to 
avoid lying. 
 
“A lie can be halfway round the world before the truth 
has got its boots on.”  —  James Callaghan, British 
politician (1976) 
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 The trouble with such an absolute position is that just 
a few exceptions undermine the rule. The classic example 
is when Nazis come to the door of your house and ask 
whether there are any Jews inside. You know the Nazis 
will kill the Jews you are harbouring, so you lie and say 
no. It might be wrong to lie, but in this instance it prevents 
a far greater wrong, killing of innocent people. 
 This example and others like it lead to the second 
answer to the question “Is lying good or bad?,” namely 
that it usually bad and should be avoided or discouraged 
when possible. Ethicist Sissela Bok, in her widely cited 
book Lying,1 says most lying is undesirable and that it 
would be worthwhile to implement policies and promote 
practices that reduce the need to lie, for example when 
defending a client in court or when writing a letter of 
recommendation if telling the full truth sinks an appli-
cant’s chances. 
 Mohandas Gandhi held the view that lying should be 
avoided whenever possible. Gandhi characterised his 
approach to social engagement — which involved chal-
lenging systems of oppression — as a search for the truth. 
One aspect of this search was complete honesty. In 
mounting campaigns against British rule in India, Gandhi 
always began by writing to his opponent spelling out his 
concerns and requests and saying what he and others 
would do should his requests not be met. For example, 
prior to the famous 1930 salt march challenging the 
British salt laws, Gandhi wrote an open letter to Lord 
                                                
1 Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life 
(Hassocks: Harvester, 1978). 
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Edward Irwin, the Viceroy, seeking a resolution and 
stating his plans. 
 Gandhi and his supporters knew that polite letters 
would not bring about significant changes in British 
policy, and probably not even minor concessions. The key 
point here is Gandhi’s modelling of appropriate behaviour, 
which in his mind was part of a search for truth. He did 
not claim to know what was best but instead sought a 
dialogue from which truth was more likely to emerge. 
Gandhi tried to initiate such a dialogue by being open 
about his motives, goals and plans. This can be contrasted 
with activists who, seeing dialogue as pointless, organise 
surprise rallies or otherwise try to mislead authorities 
about who they are and what they are going to do. 
 Another way of understanding Gandhi’s commitment 
to a search for truth is that he wanted his means to be 
compatible with his ends. If the goal, or end, is a peaceful 
world, then the means or methods to achieve it should also 
be peaceful. This leads to Gandhi’s adherence to methods 
not involving any violence against opponents. 
 Applied to truth-telling, the principle of making the 
means reflect the ends leads to the conclusion that lies 
should be avoided. The goal presumably is a world in 
which everyone is committed to seeking the truth and in 
which deception is avoided, so to move towards this goal 
of a truthful world, every effort should be made to be 
totally honest along the way. 
 Robert Burrowes, a prominent Australian nonviolent 
activist and author of The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 
followed Gandhi’s precepts. In his chapter “Planning and 
organizing nonviolent defense,” Burrowes discusses the 
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importance of nonviolent discipline — refusing to use 
physical violence in response to being physically assaulted 
— and recommends that activists make a pledge to a 
“Code of nonviolent discipline.” He lists one particular 
code or covenant, drawn from one used by Gandhi in 1930 
and one used widely in Brazil.2 It has 14 points, including: 
 
1. I will speak the truth. 
2. I will endeavour to overcome my fear of punish-
ment and death. 
3. I will work conscientiously to purify my personal 
life. 
4. I will treat each person with honesty, openness, 
caring, and respect. 
 
Most relevant here is point #1: “I will speak the truth.” He 
took this very seriously, always attempting to try to say 
what he really felt. 
 
Gandhi: too trusting? 
Gandhi’s position on lying, as recommended by Burrowes, 
is close to Kant’s view that lying should be avoided as a 
matter of principle, at least in relation to activist-related 
matters. This sounds noble, but there are many traps for an 
honest individual in a world filled with deception. 
 The salt march, conceived and led by Gandhi, stimu-
lated Indian popular resistance to British rule like nothing 
                                                
2 Robert J. Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A 
Gandhian Approach (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1996), pp. 183–184. 
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before it. Participation in civil disobedience by making 
salt captured the national imagination. The British impris-
oned tens of thousands of Indians but could not quell the 
challenge. But something else did: a promise. Lord Irwin, 
in lengthy negotiations with Gandhi, agreed that inde-
pendence for India would be seriously considered at a 
conference in London. Gandhi, as trusting as he was truth-
telling, took the British at their word, called off the salt 
campaign, attended the conference and came back with 
nothing.3 The promise and the conference provided only 
an illusion of honest negotiation: independence was not 
really on the table. Gandhi was easily fooled by the British 
promises. Similarly, many activists in the years since have 
been taken in by promises by politicians, corporate leaders 
and others. 
 In the 1930s, the Japanese military invaded China. 
Then after the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese 
troops quickly conquered the Philippines, Singapore, 
Burma and other countries in southeast Asia, and were 
poised to face the British, still the rulers of India. Gandhi 
opposed Japanese imperialism just as he opposed British 
imperialism. He decided to write a letter to the Japanese 
people, including what he admired about Japan as well as 
his criticisms of Japanese war-making. What Gandhi 
didn’t anticipate was the way his letter would be used to 
serve the Japanese rulers.  
                                                
3 Thomas Weber, On the Salt March: The Historiography of 
Gandhi’s March to Dandi (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 
462. The story is more complex than the abbreviated account 
here. 
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 Several newspapers published Gandhi’s letter — in 
an edited form, reproducing the sections praising Japan 
but omitting criticisms of Japanese military expansionism. 
Gandhi scholar Thomas Weber explains what happened: 
  
Regardless of context, those parts of the letter which 
were beneficial to Japanese policy were published on 
the front page of the Yomiuri on 18 September 1942 
under the heading “An Open Letter to Japan from 
Gandhi.” Rather conveniently, it left out all sections 
critical of Japanese imperialism. The letter as pub-
lished in Yomiuri is a flagrant example of misinfor-
mation. The article ended up reproducing only a 
carefully selected fraction of Gandhi’s original letter 
and included sentences which did not appear in 
Gandhi’s original at all. […] 
 In short, Gandhi’s actual message did not reach 
the people of Japan. At this stage in his life, Gandhi 
was one of the most famous people on the planet. He 
was widely respected but there was no internet and 
the Japanese people were generally monolingual. 
Their information came from the Japanese press. 
Here they were told that Gandhi more or less sup-
ported the imperialism of Japan while he detested the 
imperialism of the British. With very selective quot-
ing Gandhi was brought on side for the most un-
Gandhian of causes.4 
                                                
4 Thomas Weber, “101 uses for a dead mahatma: the co-option of 
Gandhi for non-Gandhian causes,” Gandhi Marg, Vol. 37, No. 2, 
July-September 2015, pp. 387–392, quote from pp. 391–392. 
100     The deceptive activist 
This is a good example of the perils of telling the truth and 
being too trusting of others. Gandhi did not anticipate how 
his letter would be used by ruthless nationalists and 
unscrupulous propagandists. If he had known how his 
letter would be used, what should he have done according 
to his principle of seeking the truth? He might decline to 
write anything to the Japanese people, but this would be 
withholding his views, a type of self-censorship. Or he 
could have written a letter that omitted anything positive 
about Japan, again engaging in self-censorship. For 
Gandhi, it seems, there was no easy way to reconcile a 
total avoidance of deception and preventing his words 
being used to serve a goal he opposed. 
 
Truth-telling and other virtues 
Rather than adopt an absolutist prohibition on lying, an 
alternative is to see truth-telling as a virtue or a value that 
sometimes clashes with other desirable values, such as 
protecting life, liberty or the environment. Lots of scenar-
ios can be imagined in which a clash of values occurs.  
 A man, who is known to have beaten his wife on 
numerous occasions, arrives looking for her. He is armed 
and extremely angry. Which value is your priority? To tell 
the truth that she is inside the house, or to protect her 
safety by lying? 
 A government security official detains you and 
demands the password to your online files where you have 
the names and contact details of activists. You know that 
revealing the names will make them vulnerable to arrest or 
surveillance. Do you provide the password? Or do you 
deceive the security official by giving a different password 
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that gives access to a version of your online files without 
the names and contact details? In this case, not only did 
you deceive the official: you made advance plans for lying 
in this very situation. 
 Imagine that you work in public relations for a 
company, and you are asked to write a statement that 
covers up responsibility for a faulty product that led to the 
deaths of many consumers. If you write the statement, you 
are implicated in a falsehood. If you refuse, you may lose 
your job. Another option is to write the statement and then 
leak information about the faulty product and the com-
pany’s responsibility to the media or action groups. Leak-
ing involves lying (to your bosses), yet it can be the most 
effective way of getting the truth to outside audiences. 
 When telling the truth is treated as one value among 
several, and lying is treated as sometimes the right thing to 
do, it may seem like principles of right and wrong have 
flown out the window. Morality becomes dependent on 
circumstances. When choosing what to do, lots of things 
need to be considered, including the people, the circum-
stances and the likely consequences, including your credi-
bility as a truth-teller. 
 Although saying that truth-telling is contingent on 
circumstances might seem to be a rejection of morality, it 
can also be considered to be the basis for a superior 
morality, one that takes into account the realities associ-
ated with deception. An absolutist position that lying is 
always wrong is actually a form of deception itself, 
because too often it is violated (covertly or otherwise) and 
leads to damaging consequences. For achieving a better 
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world, a relativist position, sensitive to people and circum-
stances, has better prospects. 
 People can ask themselves questions about what is 
the best course of action, and examine their own behav-
iour to come up with principles that apply in particular 
circumstances. When is it wise to lie to authorities? In an 
action group, is it ever beneficial to lie to others in the 
group? If a member of the group has done something 
wrong, is it better to be open about it now or to keep it 
hidden in the hope that outsiders will never know? What 
about deceptions you know about occurring in other 
groups, on your side? What are the pros and cons of infil-
trating opposition groups to collect information about 
harmful activities? Should we use encryption in our 
communications? Should we invite police to our planning 
meetings? Should we wear masks at rallies?5 
 Then there are questions about whether to reveal 
personal feelings and thoughts. Should I tell others that 
I’m afraid to join an action, or pretend that I’m confident? 
If I think the cause is hopeless, should I say so, say 
nothing, or join in the chorus of optimism? If I think 
someone might be an infiltrator, should I say this in the 
group, say it to a close friend, or keep quiet and collect 
more information? 
 These and other questions raise a host of delicate 
issues about trust, relationships, tactics and principles. 
Discussing such questions is worthwhile in clarifying 
people’s ideas and coordinating plans. Strangely enough, 
discussing when to lie can be a process for building trust, 
                                                
5 Several of these scenarios are discussed in the next chapter. 
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a trust based on a common understanding of when 
deception is a worthwhile option, and a trust based on 
understanding of differences in views about honesty and 
deception. Of course, any discussion of lying itself is 
subject to the possibility of participants being deceptive 
and subject to self-deception, making the complexities 
greater.  This might be frustrating but is likely to be more 
useful than the illusion of always telling the truth. 
 
Lying, the nonviolent way 
Another way to assess deception is to look at the charac-
teristics of nonviolent action — such as rallies, vigils, 
strikes, boycotts and sit-ins — and see whether they apply 
to particular instances or types of lying. Elsewhere I 
selected seven features of effective nonviolent action that 
might be transported to arenas where there is no physical 
violence, such as being defamed or engaging in the debate 
over euthanasia.6 The seven features are nonstandard, 
limited harm, participation, voluntary participation, fair-
ness, prefiguration and skilful use. It may seem strange to 
see whether lying can be analogous to nonviolent action, 
or be part of nonviolent action, but it is worthwhile 
looking at what this means in practice. 
 Standard or authorised methods of political action in 
countries where civil liberties are respected include 
writing to politicians, advertising, public meetings, elec-
                                                
6 Brian Martin, Nonviolence Unbound (Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene 
Publishing, 2015). One of my case studies was verbal defence, 
but this involved defending against verbal abuse, without 
particular attention to lying. 
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tion campaigning and voting. Nonviolent action is defined 
as being different from such standard methods while not 
involving physical violence against opponents. So when is 
deception standard and nonstandard? It is standard in 
social conventions such as responding “Fine” to the casual 
enquiry “How are you today?” and in the convention in 
media reporting to not mention that journalists have been 
fed material for stories from governments, corporations, 
special interest groups and other “newsmakers.” For 
deception to qualify as non-standard, it needs to be 
unusual or provocative. An example is the comedy team 
the Yes Men, who set up fake websites, impersonate 
corporate executives, arrange stunts and otherwise use 
deception and humour to challenge powerful groups.7 In 
one stunt in 2015, Edward Snowden unexpectedly 
appeared at the Los Angeles Convention Center, having 
just been pardoned by the President, to huge applause 
from the capacity crowd — except that it was an actor and 
Snowden hadn’t been pardoned; Snowden then spoke 
from Russia via a live video link. 
 The second feature of effective nonviolent action is 
limited harm, namely not causing serious pain, suffering 
or physical harm to anyone involved. This feature is 
central to the classic example of lying to the Nazis. If 
lying reduces or prevents harm, it is easier to justify. Lies 
that cause unnecessary harm are not effective tools in a 
campaign that benefits the world. 
 The third feature is participation: the more people 
who can join a nonviolent action, the more likely it is to be 
                                                
7 See the Yes Lab, http://yeslab.org/. 
Ethics and lying     105 
 
effective. Just about anyone can participate in a rally, 
strike or boycott, but very few are able or willing to perch 
on top of a tripod or hang a banner from the side of a 
building. Rallies, strikes and boycotts feature prominently 
in mass campaigns against repressive regimes. In line with 
this feature, lies in which lots of people can participate are 
more likely to be effective as part of a campaign based on 
nonviolence principles. Groups of activists, when arrested, 
might all give their name as Mohandas Gandhi. If there is 
a ban on wearing the hijab, many women might wear it as 
a form of protest, even though they are not Muslims. 
 However, according to the fourth feature of effective 
nonviolent action, participation in deception needs to be 
voluntary. This rules out police, lawyers or public rela-
tions personnel lying to the public because of government 
instructions.  
 The fifth feature is fairness. Many observers think it 
is unfair for police to beat non-resisting protesters. 
However, when protesters throw bricks at police, this is 
likely to be seen as unfair to the police, and justify police 
counter-violence. Refraining from any physical violence is 
a good way to prevent unfairness. Applying this feature to 
lying requires assessing the likely response of observers. 
Consider a leaker of secret government information, 
someone like Daniel Ellsberg, Chelsea Manning or 
Edward Snowden. They were involved in deception, at 
least until their identities were exposed. The greater the 
crimes and abuses they expose, the more likely their 
deceptions will be seen as fair. Of course not everyone 
thinks the same way about leaking secret documents or 
any other action, so assessing this criterion requires 
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determining or anticipating the reactions of a range of 
observers. 
 The sixth feature is prefiguration, which occurs when 
the means reflect the ends. If the goal is a world without 
organised violence, then nonviolent action is prefigurative 
whereas armed struggle is not. If the goal is a world of 
total honesty, then lying will never be prefigurative. 
However, as discussed before, it can be argued that a 
world of total honesty would be intolerable for most 
people, and hence not a desirable goal. If, instead, the goal 
is a world without malign lies that serve oppressive 
systems, then prefiguration is much easier: it just means 
restricting lies to those that help challenge oppressive 
systems. 
 However, there is an extra complication here. In 
advance, it can be difficult to know when a lie will help 
challenge an oppressive system: the lie might turn out to 
be counterproductive, and then it is too late to undo it. 
 The seventh and final feature of effective nonviolent 
action is skilful use. Rallies, strikes, boycotts and other 
such methods need to be well organised and carried out by 
people with suitable understanding, capacities and experi-
ence. This may involve training. Just as soldiers need 
training to be effective, so do nonviolent activists. The 
implication for lying on behalf of a worthy cause is that if 
you’re going to do it, do it well. An unconvincing lie can 
be worse than telling a damaging truth. 
 The seven features of effective nonviolent action can-
vassed here — nonstandard, limited harm, participation, 
voluntary participation, fairness, prefiguration and skilful 
use — are not automatically relevant to lying or deception. 
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To see their relevance is a matter of applying them to 
particular cases and seeing whether they help in offering 
insights or making judgements about appropriateness. 
There is a reasonable prospect that they are likely to offer 
some useful guidance, without forming a rigid prescription 
about when and how to be deceptive. This is because 
nonviolent action, in its traditional areas of application — 
strikes, rallies, boycotts and the like — is based on 
principles of dignity and equality.8 
 A key aspect of the ethics of nonviolent action is not 
causing physical harm to others. A strike or boycott can 
cause economic harm, but the opponent’s physical integ-
rity is respected. Nonviolent action keeps open the possi-
bility of dialogue. Indeed, one of the key functions of 
nonviolent action is to create the conditions for dialogue. 
The seven features of effective nonviolent action capture 
some of the ethical character of this approach to conflict. 
Therefore, applying these seven features elsewhere may 
include implicit ethical considerations, and this may also 
apply to lying. 
 To summarise: Kant’s approach, using the categorical 
imperative, treats lying as always bad. A modified version 
of this approach treats lying as an evil to be adopted only 
when it serves to prevent a greater evil. A more pragmatic 
approach treats lying as something to be used or avoided 
depending on the circumstances. For activists who want 
guidance in tune with their principles, it can be worth 
                                                
8 On dignity and equality as core values of nonviolence, see Todd 
May, Nonviolent Resistance: A Philosophical Introduction 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2015). 
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looking at the seven features of effective nonviolent action 
and seeing how they apply to issues involving deception. 
In the next chapter, these approaches will be applied to 
some typical scenarios. 
 
Images from http://www.vectorfree.com/modern-businessman-vectors; 
Dialogue adapted from a cartoon in The Australian Media, 27 September 
2001, p. 2 
6 
Case studies 
 
 
Key points 
• Case studies of deception in activism are useful for 
clarifying values and strategies. 
• Several criteria can be used to judge deception in 
activism, including participation, prefiguration, possible 
harm and fairness-related impacts. 
• In deciding whether to use deception, no single criterion 
or answer will apply in all circumstances. 
 
To better judge when activists might use deception — 
with each other, in relation to opponents or the public — 
it’s useful to examine sample activities or situations. I 
present several here, with comments about considerations 
to take into account concerning deception. At the end of 
the chapter, I look at each of the activities from several 
viewpoints. There is no single answer about whether 
deception should be avoided, ignored or embraced. It is 
important to be aware of the issues. 
 
Keeping a secret 
You’re in a group campaigning for a worthy cause, for 
example promoting peace, overcoming poverty or com-
batting racism. One of the group members, Rose, tells you 
some personal information: she once became very drunk, 
hit someone, was arrested and convicted of assault, and 
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was sentenced to community service. She asks you to keep 
this information secret. You need to weigh up confidenti-
ality in relation to the group’s cause. 
 Rose’s confidential information might also have been 
about sexual relationships, drug addiction, gang member-
ship, mental illness or any of a host of other topics that 
might cast her in a negative light. For the time being, let’s 
assume the information does not relate to your group’s 
cause. If your group is opposing racism and Rose was 
previously a member of a racist group, your response 
might be different. 
 Keeping a secret may require being deceptive. It 
might be that nobody asks you anything about Rose’s past, 
but still you’re not revealing something you know. Fur-
thermore, another member, Fred, might say to you, “I 
heard that Rose was convicted of assault. Do you know 
anything about it?” To keep the secret means telling a 
falsehood: “I haven’t heard anything like that.” 
 Some people are no good at keeping secrets. The first 
thing they do is go and tell someone else, retelling the 
story with their own interpretations, assumptions and 
exaggerations. Others are cautious about who they tell: 
they might tell a few close friends who are not involved 
(and who don’t know Rose), trusting them not to tell 
others. If you’re the sort of person who tells no one at all, 
you’re unusual. Rose has good reason to trust you. 
 There are all sorts of complications. Consider Fred’s 
question about whether Rose had been convicted of 
assault. If Rose has told both of you, then it might seem 
safe to talk about it. But what if Fred is bluffing? Actually, 
Rose hasn’t told him anything, but he heard a rumour and 
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thought he’d check it out with you. If you suspect Fred’s 
claim, it would be better to talk to Rose first. Maybe she’s 
talked only to you, or maybe she’s individually told a 
number of people. 
 Another complication is that Rose may not have told 
you everything. Maybe she’s playing down how serious 
the incident was: actually the person she hit was seriously 
disabled as a result, or she wasn’t drunk but actually 
angry, or she went to prison. On the other hand, maybe 
she’s exaggerating what happened — it was a minor 
scuffle and she was asked to leave the club and never 
arrested or convicted — to make it sound like she’s had a 
rough past. 
 There are various factors you need to consider. If 
Rose is a key figure in your group, perhaps a spokes-
person, will opponents and journalists be interested in 
information about her conviction for assault? Will they 
use the information to discredit Rose and your group? If 
so, is it better to try to hide the information, or to make it 
public in your own way to reduce the impact, perhaps by 
showing that she has learned from her mistakes? Should 
you talk to Rose about these possibilities? Should you 
raise the issue, without mentioning Rose, at a meeting? 
“What should we do if opponents try to obtain dirt on any 
of us in order to discredit the group and our goals?” 
 If you think Rose’s past is going to be a significant 
vulnerability to your group, maybe you should check out 
her story. You could, for example, look up court records. 
Or, if you know enough, you could talk to some of the 
people involved, especially the person she assaulted, and 
find out what they think. If you can learn something, then 
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opponents or journalists could too, presumably. But if you 
start probing, perhaps Rose will hear about it and think 
you’ve violated her trust. Furthermore, if you start prob-
ing, others might hear about your enquiries and start 
investigating for themselves. Trying to verify Rose’s story 
might make things a lot worse. 
 This example illustrates that absolutist positions — 
never tell a lie, or always keep a confidence — are not 
very helpful. There are too many complications, and a 
suitable course of action depends on the personalities of 
the people involved, the details of the information, the 
dynamics of the group, and the possible actions by oppo-
nents, journalists and others.  
 What about good news? Should you ever keep that 
secret? Rose has told you she’s going to receive a 
prestigious award or she has a great new job or has 
decided to have a child. Let’s assume, for the sake of 
argument, that she thinks this is good news and you do 
too, and you’re happy for her. However, Rose asks you to 
keep the information secret for the time being. In fact, you 
promised before she told you the news.  
 This might be more difficult, because what’s the 
harm in people knowing something positive? Actually, 
there can be harm. Rose knows about the award through a 
confidential source, but it’s not official yet, and announc-
ing the award to the world would offend the committee 
members who made the decision. Rose knows about her 
job offer, but her colleagues at her current job don’t, and 
she wants to tell them in her own way. She has decided to 
have a child but hasn’t told her partner that she’s pregnant. 
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 So it might be safer to say nothing about good news 
you’ve been asked to keep secret. As in the case of nega-
tive information, a lot depends on the circumstances. It’s 
valuable in all circumstances to think about possible 
scenarios, to examine likely impacts — including whether 
you maintain Rose’s trust — and act accordingly. If in 
doubt, it can be useful to talk to someone who is not 
involved and doesn’t know Rose and lay out the situation, 
without names or details. 
 
Leaking 
Whistleblowing means speaking out in the public interest.1 
A typical whistleblower is an employee who sees a prob-
lem at work — for example corruption, abuse or hazards 
to the public — and reports it to someone in authority. 
Most whistleblowers initially report their concerns to their 
boss. If that doesn’t work, they might go to higher 
management (the boss’s boss), a governing board, outside 
agencies such as an ombudsman or anti-corruption body, 
politicians or the media. 
 If managers also want the problem fixed, then whis-
tleblowing might be welcomed. However, when the prob-
lem implicates managers, they will see the whistleblower 
as the problem and initiate reprisals. These include ostra-
cism (cutting off collegial interactions), spreading of 
rumours, petty harassment (verbal abuse; requests being 
ignored; inconvenient shifts being assigned), assignment 
                                                
1 There is a large amount of writing about whistleblowing. For 
my perspective, see Whistleblowing: A Practical Guide 
(Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2013). 
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to trivial duties or to duties with high demands, open 
denunciations, formal reprimands, referral to psychiatrists, 
demotion, dismissal and blacklisting.  
 This is a long list of reprisals, and the impact on the 
whistleblower is often devastating, leading to financial 
loss, emotional upset and adverse impacts on relationships 
and health. 
 Whistleblowers can be ideal allies for activist groups. 
Consider a group campaigning against use of a chemical. 
A worker in the company producing the chemical might 
have information about its health or environmental 
impacts — information kept secret by the company. 
 Openly speaking out about problems at work has 
several shortcomings. One is that as soon as you speak 
out, reprisals begin. That is bad enough. As well, you will 
be denied access to information. Furthermore, managers 
will start a cover-up operation, hiding or destroying 
information that might reveal their criminality or lack of 
oversight. For this reason, it’s usually advisable for 
potential whistleblowers to collect as much information as 
possible before speaking out. 
 Another option is to leak, which can also be called 
blowing the whistle anonymously. Rather than speaking 
out to the boss or an ombudsman and revealing your 
identity, instead you collect information and post it to a 
journalist or an action group. Alternatively, you may 
decide to reveal your identity to a journalist or activist, 
meeting with them and telling what you know. By leaking, 
you avoid reprisals and can stay on the job, collecting 
more information and leaking again if needed. Indeed, you 
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can continue to be a leaker for months or years — unless 
you are discovered.  
 Being a leaker involves deception. You collect infor-
mation and send it to a journalist or an activist, but you 
say nothing to your boss or colleagues. (You might 
confide with a few trusted friends and family members, 
but this is risky. They might not be able to keep a secret.) 
If your leak has an impact, there will be a news report 
based on it, or perhaps a message that there will be an 
official investigation of your unit. 
 If you’re careful, you will have ensured that nothing 
you’ve leaked can identify you directly. You’ve converted 
word-processed documents to text files so the revealing 
“properties” of the documents disappear. If you’ve written 
an explanation of the documents, you’ve disguised your 
writing style. You’ve destroyed the stand-alone device 
you used to write it and used a short-term email account to 
send it. In these and other ways, you’ve hidden or 
disguised your actions.2 From your point of view, you’re 
being careful. Others may see you as being devious. 
 No matter how careful you are, there is a risk that a 
thorough investigation will identify you as a possible 
leaker. You may need to lie convincingly to an investiga-
tor, saying you don’t know who the leaker might be, and 
perhaps providing some cover story for some of your 
                                                
2 Brian Martin, “Leaking: practicalities and politics,” The Whistle 
(Newsletter of Whistleblowers Australia), #81, January 2015, pp. 
13–16, http://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/contacts/au_wba/whistle20 
1501.pdf. 
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activities. You might even point to one or two co-workers 
as possible leakers if you’re confident they will be cleared. 
 You’ll also need to behave normally with your co-
workers. This means that when asked about the leak, 
you’ll need to feign surprise, cynicism, anger or whatever 
emotion would be most typical of you if you weren’t the 
leaker. Indeed, it can be useful to imagine that actually 
someone else was the leaker (maybe there were two 
independent leaks) and respond accordingly. If you’re 
normally an outgoing, gossipy sort of person, then you’ll 
initiate conversations speculating about who the leaker 
could be and what might happen. You could even joke that 
some people might think you are the leaker and say, 
facetiously, “I wish I’d done it. Damn whoever did this 
before me.” Basically, you need to pretend to be yourself, 
but in a parallel world in which you’re not the leaker. 
 If you’re a trusted employee, known for your consci-
entiousness and integrity, it’s possible that you will be put 
in charge of an investigation to find the leaker. This will 
require of you another level of acting, as you go through 
the motions of trying to find the leaker. You need to make 
the investigation seem thorough but come up short. 
 If your leak is about something important, something 
that can thwart major corruption or save lives, the ethics of 
leaking are straightforward: you are lying for a good 
cause. Instead of speaking up immediately and thereby 
allowing the perpetrators to marginalise you and cover up 
their actions, by leaking you are most likely being far 
more effective.  
 However, there is one scenario that can cause an-
guish. If your bosses are ruthless, they may decide to 
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finger some worker as the leaker and take reprisals, 
perhaps firing them. They picked some innocent person to 
make the real leaker — you! — feel guilty. You might try 
to leak information to show that your bosses penalised the 
wrong person, but they don’t care. There’s no easy answer 
to this dilemma. It’s possible that you’ll want to resign as 
soon as you’ve finished gathering as much information as 
possible. 
 An action group and a leaker make for a powerful 
combination. The action group — on the environment, 
financial probity, human rights, or some other cause — 
has the freedom to speak out, organise protests and take 
actions that workers could not contemplate, because they 
would immediately lose their jobs. However, the activists 
need to know what’s happening inside the organisation: 
what plans are being made, what impact protests have had, 
and what strategies would be most effective. A leaker or 
confidential informant can provide the inside perspective 
that can help the action group be far more effective. The 
action-group-leaker combination is potent — and it re-
quires ongoing secrecy and deception. 
 
Planning an action 
Your group is planning a protest. Should you inform the 
police about your plans? Should you invite the police to 
attend your planning meeting? Answers depend on several 
factors. 
 One factor is how safe it is to protest. If police, politi-
cians and most members of the public think public protest 
is acceptable and routine, even laudable, then it may be a 
good idea to invite the police to attend your meeting and 
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send them the minutes. This will build trust with the police 
— at least if your protest does not involve violence — and 
can allow you to focus on what you are protesting about, 
for example militarism, environmental damage or racism. 
If the police know what’s going to happen, they are much 
less likely to over-react. In fact, they may become your 
protectors if there are counter-protesters who want to 
attack you. 
 In some circumstances public protest is very risky, 
with a high likelihood of arrests and beatings. If the police 
know what you’re planning, they might arrest your leaders 
in advance, blockade the location of your protest, or 
prepare for mass arrests. In such a circumstance, being 
open about your plans would be disastrous, so some 
degree of secrecy and deception is warranted. 
 Perhaps you are organising a “flash mob”: members 
of your group seem to be going their separate ways and 
happen to converge on a busy street in front of a bank and 
then take coordinated action — singing a song or display-
ing some placards, for example — and 30 seconds later 
melting into the crowd again. If police know about the 
flash protest in advance, they may be able to thwart it. 
Secrecy is essential, and so perhaps is spontaneity, with 
the location chosen at the last moment and coordinated by 
social media. 
 In a highly repressive situation, protest can be open if 
protesters are relatively safe. In Brazil in the 1960s, Chile 
in the 1970s, Argentina in 2001, Turkey in 2013 and 
elsewhere, people have banged pots and pans as a form of 
protest, called cacerolazo. In some of these actions, people 
remain in their apartments and commence banging at a 
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designated time, thereby reducing their vulnerability to 
police reprisals.  
 In this type of action, participants are open in what 
they are doing. However, in some cases secrecy is needed 
to organise the action, namely to decide on what it would 
involve and how to communicate with the people. So it 
was wise for planners and communicators to maintain a 
low-profile role. 
 Sometimes activists believe they are under surveil-
lance, for example with political police listening to their 
phone calls. To test this belief, a highly deceptive tech-
nique can be used. The activists talk to each other by 
phone about a protest they are planning for a particular 
place and time. But instead of protesting, at the nominated 
time they watch the location from a distance. If they see 
police preparing as they usually do at demonstrations, this 
is a good indication that someone has been listening in on 
the activists’ phone conversations. However, if no police 
are present, the implications aren’t clear. It might mean 
the activists’ phones aren’t being tapped. Alternatively, 
the police might be tapping the activists’ phones but 
suspect the activists might be tricking them, so they are 
also watching the location from a distance. Another possi-
bility is that the police may not want to bother dealing 
with run-of-the-mill protests, and instead save their 
information for a more important action. Or perhaps the 
police have an informant in the group who tells them what 
the group is doing. 
 Another key factor is how many people can and will 
join an action. The greater the participation, the safer it is 
to join and so the lower the level of secrecy needed. If 
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groups believe in openness whenever possible, to reduce 
the level of unaccountable power associated with secrecy, 
then organising actions that enable wide participation may 
often be a preferable option. 
 These examples illustrate that in planning an action, 
the suitable level of secrecy depends a lot on a range of 
factors, especially the likely response of authorities to 
protest. Usually the more repressive the circumstances, the 
more secrecy is warranted.  
 
Communicating confidentially 
Activists, like other people, often want to ensure confi-
dentiality when communicating with each other and with 
trusted outsiders. This is especially true when there is the 
possibility that governments or private investigators are 
using surveillance techniques to monitor conversations. 
 Surveillance capacities are becoming ever more for-
midable. It is possible, for example, to remotely install 
software on electronic devices to record every keystroke, 
or to use lasers to record the vibrations of window panes 
and thereby detect what people are saying inside a room. 
There are now mechanical insects that can be piloted into 
a room and used to obtain real-time video feeds to those 
running this “bug.”  
 Monitoring can also occur via collection of metadata, 
for example electronic records of when and where a phone 
is used to make a call or when a credit card transaction is 
made. By combining metadata, an individual’s location 
and interactions can be pinned down with remarkable 
precision. Using a mobile device can provide signals about 
a person’s location; driving a car may enable collection of 
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information about location via electronic recognition of 
licence numbers; surveillance cameras can provide images 
to place individuals at particular times and places; use of 
social media can provide data for analysing a person’s 
profile and predilections. 
 Pervasive electronic monitoring is more common, yet 
there is relatively little opposition to it, in part because 
most people are entranced by the benefits of connected-
ness: they voluntarily supply information about them-
selves on social media and revel in the ease of electronic 
commerce. Most people will never come under intensive 
surveillance: information about them is collected but never 
used for any adverse purpose. However, some individuals 
and groups have more to worry about. 
 Common targets for intensive surveillance include 
political leaders (by foreign governments), terrorism sus-
pects, organised crime figures, leaders of trade unions and 
extreme political parties, investigative journalists — and 
activists. Organising a protest on a sensitive topic, whether 
freedom of speech, animal rights, genetic engineering or 
economic inequality, can make a group a candidate for 
scrutiny. It is in this context that activists may want to 
safeguard their communications, for example when dis-
cussing strategy or planning actions. 
 One tried-and-true method is to talk face-to-face, 
away from all electronic devices and perhaps with some 
background noise to make remote monitoring difficult. 
When sending sensitive messages, encryption can be used 
to deter reading of the contents: the message may be 
intercepted but cannot be immediately read. Other options 
include using anonymous remailers (to allow sending 
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emails so recipients cannot see who sent them), anony-
mous web browsers (such as Tor), pseudonyms and fake 
identities (for example on social media). Other possibili-
ties are to use someone else’s phone, to set up multiple 
identities online, and to use false names. These all involve 
some level of secrecy and/or deception. 
 There is a longstanding competition between encryp-
tion system developers and designers and those who try to 
decipher encrypted messages. This is a story in itself, with 
its own elements of secrecy and deception. There are 
many technical details, and new options are being devel-
oped all the time.  
 In places where expressing criticism of the govern-
ment is seen as subversive and where penalties are severe, 
maintaining anonymity seems warranted both ethically 
and practically. In 2010 in Egypt, Wael Ghonim set up a 
Facebook page titled “We are all Khalid Said,” after the 
name of a young man who was beaten to death by police. 
The page quickly became highly popular and was a 
magnet for opposition to the regime. Ghonim went to 
great lengths to maintain his anonymity. If his identity had 
been known to the Egyptian authorities, his life would 
have been in danger and the effectiveness of the Facebook 
page greatly reduced.3 
 In other circumstances, anonymity is less beneficial. 
If a dissident is arrested, one of the greatest sources of 
protection is being known to outsiders, both inside a 
country and internationally. 
 
                                                
3 Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0 (London: Fourth Estate, 2012). 
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Infiltrating the opposition 
Being a spy is a way of gaining information. It means 
pretending you are part of a group — a foreign country, a 
corporate competitor or an opposition party — when actu-
ally you are serving a different one. 
 Spying has a long tradition in foreign affairs. Con-
sider for example the US and Chinese governments: each 
one would like to gather secret information about the 
other, and one way is to have agents who infiltrate various 
organisations in the other country. A US spy might seek to 
join a government department in China, and likewise a 
Chinese spy might seek to join a US research agency — or 
they might already work in these organisations and be 
recruited to spy.  
 These days, electronic surveillance has replaced 
much spying, and there is not as much reliance on individ-
ual agents to gather information. If you can intercept 
phone conversations, it’s less important to actually be 
there. Nevertheless, individual spying still plays a role. 
 Spying requires an exceptional level of deception: the 
spy must convince everyone in the target group of being 
genuine. It essentially means lying almost all the time. 
 As described in chapter 3, activist groups have been 
targets of spying, the most well known case involving the 
anarchist group London Greenpeace, which was infiltrated 
by agents paid by McDonald’s, which then sued five 
members of the group for defamation. Helen Steel, who 
along with Dave Morris defended the case, was later the 
victim of an even more damaging type of deception. She 
had a relationship, lasting many years, with a man who 
called himself John Barker. Then, suddenly, he disap-
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peared. It turned out that his actual name was John Dines, 
and he was an undercover officer working for the London 
Metropolitan Police. He was a married man tasked with 
gaining information about Steel’s activities by establishing 
and maintaining the closest type of personal relationship. 
 Steel was just one of a number of activists who 
became victims of this sort of deception. And it was a 
particularly damaging experience, undermining Steel’s 
trust in others. 
 Now think of this from the other side, from the point 
of view of the infiltrators. They are paid to collect infor-
mation about groups that are criminal or dangerous, at 
least according to the infiltrators’ employers. To do this, 
they pretend to be activists, pretend to be concerned about 
the issues and pretend to be friends with genuine activists. 
In some of this, no pretending is required: the infiltrators 
might feel a real sense of connection with activists, and 
even be sympathetic to their cause. But they also have 
another loyalty, to their employer, so they betray the 
activists through turning over confidential information. If 
they form intimate relationships with activists, even 
having children with them, the deception and betrayal are 
even more serious. 
 London Greenpeace was infiltrated by agents paid by 
McDonald’s. Think now of infiltration in the opposite 
direction: activists infiltrating mainstream organisations, 
for example armies, corporations or government depart-
ments. There are differences between these two scenarios, 
of course. Activists would become infiltrators out of 
commitment to a cause, not because they are paid. Main-
stream organisations have enormous resources to pay 
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infiltrators, whereas few activist organisations have suffi-
cient funds to pay generous salaries even to their own 
staff. 
 Imagine, then, a committed peace activist who de-
cides to get a job with an arms manufacturing firm, or a 
committed environmental activist who decides to get a job 
with an oil company. Their plan would be to rise within 
the organisation, obtain inside information and feed it to 
their campaigning allies on the outside. This would require 
an exceptional level of long-term deception: as well as 
needing to put on a mask during working hours, it might 
also involve socialising after hours. Any deviation from a 
highly conformist corporate culture would by risky, jeop-
ardising the possibility of advancement or even risking 
exposure. The more the infiltrator adapts to the organisa-
tional culture, the more revealing are the insights. 
 There is always a risk of “going native”: inhabiting a 
role thoroughly and for a long period may lead to a change 
in beliefs. Most corporate workers are decent people who 
are quite sincere in their commitments, and the activist 
infiltrator might come to sympathise with them and lose 
incentive to expose what is going on. Another problem is 
that the information gained would not be very useful to 
outsiders. Unless there is major corruption, and the infil-
trator has access to revealing information, there is not 
much to report, except for corporate culture itself. This is 
indeed a mystery to outsiders, but is not top secret. It’s 
possible for activist groups to interview corporate insiders 
or to get to know them through social networks. 
 The question then arises: is infiltration by activists 
worthwhile in purely pragmatic terms? Anyone willing to 
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spend months or years for a cause might achieve more by 
other means, such as becoming a campaigner or organiser. 
It might be easier to gain inside information by cultivating 
contacts inside organisations than trying to infiltrate them. 
Add to this the risk of infiltrators becoming sympathetic to 
the people they engage with, and it might be that infiltra-
tion is not a very effective tactic. 
 Indeed, it can be asked whether government and 
corporate infiltration into activist groups is all that effec-
tive. It can be disruptive and harmful, but does it provide 
information that can’t be gained otherwise? One thing is 
sure, infiltration can be highly damaging to the people 
involved. In this case, deception is disastrous to relation-
ships, and so should be contemplated only in extreme 
circumstances. 
 
Wearing masks 
At some demonstrations, protesters wear masks. Usually 
the reason is to prevent reprisals from authorities. Police 
may identify and arrest leaders; they may photograph 
crowds, attempt to identify participants and put their 
names on lists, subject them to additional surveillance, or 
arrest them. In some circumstances, being identified as a 
protester means the possibility of imprisonment, interro-
gation and torture. 
 Another reason for wearing masks is to encourage 
more people to participate. When the risk of reprisals is 
lower, and lots of people are involved, it feels safer to join 
the crowd.  
 Given these advantages, it might be asked, why don’t 
protesters wear masks all the time? One reason is that by 
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being open, protesters can more readily trust each other: 
they feel more confident when they are among their 
friends. It is easier to communicate when observing facial 
expressions.  
 When protesters wear masks, it is easier for agents of 
the police or security forces to infiltrate the demonstration 
and do things to discredit the protest, for example by 
shouting verbal abuse or throwing stones at shop windows 
or at police, thereby helping justify police action against 
the protesters.4 There is also evidence that wearing a mask 
can have a disinhibition effect: it may make it easier to 
steal and be aggressive towards others. Actions seen as 
antisocial can discredit the protest.5 
 Wearing a mask at a demonstration is a fairly minor 
form of deception. It hides the identity of protesters from 
police, but not necessarily from other protesters, especially 
                                                
4 Members of “black blocs,” who wear black clothing and usually 
cover their faces, often engage in aggressive actions against 
police and property. Their actions can be used by police to justify 
repression against all protesters, including the bulk of protesters 
who are not violent. For a sophisticated analysis of black blocs, 
see Francis Dupuis-Déri, Who’s Afraid of the Black Blocs? 
Anarchy in Action around the World (Toronto: Between the 
Lines, 2013). 
5 Edward Diener, Scott C. Fraser, Arthur L. Beaman and Roger 
T. Kelem, “Effects of deindividuation variables on stealing 
among Halloween trick-or-treaters,” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1976, pp. 178–183; Robert I. 
Watson, Jr., “Investigation into deindividuation using a cross-
cultural survey technique,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1973, pp. 342–345. 
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when sticking with a group of friends who recognise each 
other’s voices. Even so, agents provocateurs have an 
easier time when protesters wear masks. 
 So there are quite a few factors to take into account 
when deciding whether wearing masks is a good idea, 
including the level of repression and the risk of reprisals, 
the number of people participating and the risk of infiltra-
tion by police agents.  
 
Setting up a radical flank 
In the US environmental movement, mainstream organi-
sations like the Sierra Club6 primarily use methods such as 
lobbying and providing information: they work within the 
system. Then there is Earth First! It uses sabotage to 
oppose assaults on nature, for example pulling up survey 
stakes and putting sand in the petrol tanks of vehicles. 
(Earth First! activists take great care to avoid endangering 
humans.) From the point of view of the mainstream 
organisations, Earth First! is a “radical flank.” A radical 
flank pursues more extreme objectives or uses more force-
ful methods.7 
                                                
6 In recent years, the Sierra Club has taken stronger 
environmental stands and done more to encourage grassroots 
action. 
7 The classic reference is Herbert H. Haines, “Black 
radicalization and the funding of civil rights: 1957–1970,” Social 
Problems, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1984, pp. 31–43. For a recent analysis, 
see Eric Chenoweth and Kurt Schock, “Do contemporaneous 
armed challenges affect the outcomes of mass nonviolent 
campaigns?” Mobilization, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2015, pp. 427–451. 
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 In some struggles against repressive regimes, meth-
ods of nonviolent action such as rallies, strikes and boy-
cotts become the dominant approach. Armed resistance in 
such circumstances represents a radical flank. 
 Radical flanks can be beneficial or harmful to the 
cause. Sometimes the radical flank is seen as threatening 
to opponents, who as a result may make concessions to 
mainstream groups. This is called a positive radical flank 
effect. On the other hand, sometimes a radical flank is 
seen as so extreme or dangerous that it discredits the 
movement, turning popular opinion away. This is a 
negative radical flank effect. Sometimes there are combi-
nations of positive and negative effects. 
 Imagine you’re in a human rights activist group 
concerned about imprisonment of people without trial, so-
called preventive detention. You decide to try to take 
advantage of the positive radical flank effect. You think 
the mainstream groups are fairly conventional: they make 
submissions to governments, push for law reform and 
issue press releases. Yet these efforts don’t seem to you to 
have much effect: your government is still imprisoning 
people without trial. So your group decides to pretend to 
be extreme, in an attempt to make the mainstream human 
rights groups seem more acceptable. You say you’re going 
to arrest a couple of leading politicians and hold them in 
preventive detention until the laws are changed and politi-
cal prisoners are released. 
 You might have some reservations. Your group’s 
announcement might end up being counterproductive: it 
might be a negative radical flank effect. It might lead to 
intense surveillance of your group and all human rights 
130     The deceptive activist 
groups. It might lead to an expansion of preventive deten-
tion. For the sake of this example, set aside your reserva-
tions and assume the effect is positive: preventive 
detention is shown up as outrageous. 
 Your group made the announcement, but actually 
none of you ever intended to arrest politicians or hold 
them hostage. It was all rhetoric designed to attract atten-
tion and serve the cause. It was an elaborate lie. Was it a 
good idea? Can lying be worthwhile to produce a positive 
radical flank effect? 
 Your group might lose all credibility if your lie is 
exposed. Perhaps, after the laws are changed, you come 
out and say it was all pretence. Or perhaps a government 
agent informs on your discussions, or your phones are 
tapped and your deception is exposed. Does it matter? 
 One disadvantage is that a major deception like this 
can undermine the credibility of other human rights 
groups. On the other hand, perhaps your group will be 
seen as rogue operators, and people are more likely to turn 
to the tried and true human rights groups. That’s the whole 
point of being a radical flank in this example.  
 Now imagine a different scenario. Your group wants 
to discredit your opponents by creating a negative radical 
flank effect. Your plan is to set up a fake group that 
supports your opponents and is so extreme that it hurts 
them. You’re in a pro-choice group and you want to 
discredit opponents of abortion, so you set up a fake group 
that advocates maiming women who have abortions. Al-
ternatively, you’re in a pro-life group and you want to 
discredit pro-choice groups, so you set up a fake group 
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that advocates assaulting pro-life protesters outside abor-
tion clinics. 
 Setting up such fake groups is risky, because they 
might not have a negative effect: they might actually give 
support for your opponents. Another possibility is that the 
fake groups might become real groups: the existence of a 
fake group might attract people who think this sort of 
extreme action is a good idea. The result might be maim-
ing of women who have abortions or assaults on abortion 
protesters, with serious harm to individuals and unpredict-
able wider consequences. It might even be that your fake 
group triggers an escalation of retaliatory violence in the 
struggle. 
 For the purposes here, the key issue is the role of 
deception, and setting up a fake group is definitely 
deceptive. The whole operation, if exposed, might back-
fire on your side, suggesting that everyone supporting 
your cause is implicated. If the deception is exposed, your 
attempt to create a negative radical flank effect for the 
opponents might instead create a negative radical flank 
effect for your own side. (This possibility suggests an 
even more devious tactic: setting up a fake group that you 
allow or intend to be exposed at some point so it will 
discredit your opponents.)  
 In quite a few struggles, there are fake groups, most 
commonly set up by industry. For example, corporations 
have set up groups that pretend to be community groups 
supporting environmental causes when actually they are 
funded by corporations and take anti-environmental 
stands. For example, according to Sourcewatch, the Center 
for Consumer Freedom is a front for tobacco, meat, restau-
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rant and alcohol interests, and attacks environmentalists 
and others it sees as threats.8 Fake groups like this are 
commonly called front groups, and when they pretend to 
be composed of sincere citizens the process is called 
astroturfing, named after the synthetic grass substitute 
used in indoor sporting arenas. Astroturfing is setting up 
fake grassroots groups. 
 Front groups are most commonly used by corpora-
tions and governments and involve deception to serve the 
interests of those with more economic and political power. 
Activist groups seldom use front groups, most obviously 
because they are the real grassroots and don’t need to 
pretend to represent community interests. It is probably 
unlikely that activists would want to set up a fake group.9 
Nevertheless, the thought experiment concerning radical 
flanks is useful for discussing whether deception is worth-
while, in moral or pragmatic terms. 
 
Circulating disinformation 
Activists often have to deal with false and misleading 
information from governments, which can be designed to 
hide crimes, to make bad policies look good or to discredit 
opponents. This can be called disinformation, propaganda 
or in some cases information warfare. The purpose of 
informing and educating people is secondary; instead, 
                                                
8 http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Center_for_Consumer_ 
Freedom 
9 Umbrella organisations are sometimes set up to allow silenced 
groups to have a voice, but such organisations are open about 
their aims. 
Case studies     133 
 
information is used, sincerely or cynically, as a tool to 
achieve goals. Disreputable techniques include making 
false claims (lying), giving a misleading impression by 
emphasising information that is not representative, tar-
nishing reputations by suggesting discrediting connec-
tions, and putting out fabricated documents that seem to 
come from others. 
 Should activists ever use disinformation techniques? 
They are definitely deceptive, and they are potentially 
harmful to others. But perhaps there are compensating 
benefits.10 
 Imagine that you’re in an anti-racist group and you 
are concerned about the rise of Suyptum, a militant, 
outspoken organisation that is overtly racist.11 In public 
actions and comments, it sometimes uses veiled threats 
that encourage violence against ethnic minorities, and 
have inspired a greater level of hate speech and violence. 
By changing the tone of public debate, Suyptum has en-
couraged mainstream politicians to pander to prejudice. 
The group has been receiving favourable media coverage, 
especially from some right-wing outlets that are giving it 
attention and credibility out of all proportion to its size 
                                                
10 Robert L. Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking 
about the Fundamentals (Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 
2004), includes a chapter on psychological operations that begins 
“Psychological operations (PSYOPS) is the centerpiece of a well-
planned strategic nonviolent struggle” (p. 77). Helvey advocates 
use of propaganda to influence people’s attitudes and behaviours, 
but only for worthwhile causes: he sees propaganda as a neutral 
tool. He does not explicitly recommend deceptive practices. 
11 Suyptum is fictitious. 
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and its incoherent policies. You see the increasing popu-
larity of Suyptum as a serious threat to the tolerance and 
inclusiveness that you’ve been promoting for years. 
 You’ve received some reports about Suyptum that 
suggest an unsavoury side to its activities. You are sorely 
tempted to do whatever is possible to undermine its credi-
bility and disrupt its activities. Your group brainstorms 
some possible tactics. 
 You know that Suyptum’s beliefs seem to be an 
amalgam of xenophobia, nationalism and welfare policies. 
You decide that you could label Suyptum a cult that 
promotes, indeed mandates, a strange set of beliefs. You 
know this is an exaggeration and that Suyptum is no more 
a cult than your own group, but applying the label will 
help discredit it. Furthermore, in labelling Suyptum a cult, 
you can spread rumours that anyone subscribing to 
Suyptum beliefs will, later on, be targeted. 
 You have a bit of second-hand evidence that 
Suyptum has been very sloppy with its finances, collecting 
donations but not properly accounting for expenditures. 
You decide to claim that Suyptum is corrupt and is fleec-
ing the public. 
 A couple of Suyptum supporters are collectors of 
Nazi artefacts, in the spirit of thumbing their noses at 
political correctness. You decide to highlight the connec-
tion between Suyptum and the Nazis, suggesting that 
Suyptum is anti-Semitic, anti-gay and potentially murder-
ous, even though all the main figures in Suyptum are care-
ful to avoid any association with Nazis or other fascists. 
 Suyptum is organising a three-day conference, a 
showcase for its ideas and a venue for developing policies 
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and plans. Several prominent individuals, not previously 
involved with Suyptum, have agreed to speak at the con-
ference. One of your members tells of a plan to write 
letters to these speakers that seem to come from a 
disgruntled Suyptum member, providing damaging 
information about Suyptum that might discourage their 
attendance. 
 All these techniques — attributing beliefs, applying a 
misleading label, making allegations, highlighting nega-
tive associations and circulating damaging information — 
are deceptive. Using them is risky, because your tech-
niques could be exposed, your methods seen as under-
handed and your group discredited as a result. So can you 
get away with circulating disinformation? The larger and 
more powerful your group and the weaker your opponent, 
the more likely you can use disinformation techniques and 
not be held to account. That is exactly why authorities use 
them so often. Even so, it’s possible that your opponents 
have skills to expose your methods, and there might be 
some people not involved who like to expose false claims 
and unfair techniques. If your methods are exposed, this 
might be a recruiting tool for Suyptum.  
 The better the reputation of your group and your 
cause, the more you have to lose by being associated with 
devious methods. Because disinformation campaigning is 
potentially disastrous if exposed, you may want to take 
steps to avoid accidentally using this form of campaign-
ing. When you think the worst of your opponent — they 
are racists, after all — it is easy to assume that negative 
information about them is correct. So you, or some of the 
members of your group, are quick to attribute beliefs, 
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apply derogatory labels and accept that damaging claims 
about Suyptum are true. Then, it is a short step to circu-
lating claims or using labels in newsletters, in public 
statements and on social media.  
 All it takes for this process to occur is lack of check-
ing. Someone tells one of your members about some 
gossip about Suyptum, and it is taken as the truth. The 
information might be true, but about a single member, or it 
might be misleading. Strangely enough, then, if you want 
to avoid circulating disinformation and be exposed for 
doing so, you need to be extra careful in everything you 
say about your opponents. This is because of the natural 
tendency to believe that “we” are good and “they” are bad 
and so to assume the worst about others. This is a type of 
self-deception and requires constant attention to avoid.  
 If you are really serious about being fair to your 
opponents, then ideally you can establish a connection 
with one or more of them and check any information that 
comes your way before using it. If no one in your group 
knows anyone in Suyptum, another option is consulting 
someone — perhaps a journalist or academic — who 
studies the issue and the groups. Yet another option is to 
assign someone in your group to be a devil’s advocate and 
to take Suyptum’s side, or attempt to think from 
Suyptum’s point of view, when examining claims about 
Suyptum.  
 In summary, using disinformation techniques can be 
very damaging to opponents. At the same time, using them 
is risky because if you are exposed, your reputation may 
be seriously damaged. Therefore it may be worthwhile to 
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take extra care not to inadvertently use these sorts of 
techniques.  
 
Appearing conventional 
Suppose you have some radical ideas. For example, you 
think the military should be abolished, that everyone 
should receive the same income, that all drugs should be 
legalised or that seriously disabled babies should be 
euthanised. Should you share your views with all your 
friends and workmates?  
 In many circumstances, it might be better to hide or 
moderate your views. You might have good reasons to 
back them up — lots of evidence and carefully considered 
arguments — but know that most people are not interested 
in this. Rather, they will make a summary judgement 
based purely on a gut reaction.12 For example, they might 
think legalising drugs is foolish and dismiss your views 
without serious consideration. Furthermore, they might 
dismiss your views on other topics too, assuming that if 
you have one crazy idea, then nothing you have to say is 
worthy of consideration. 
 So, as a result, you decide to be careful about what 
you say, only expressing your true views with others you 
trust totally. And because many people love to gossip, and 
might exaggerate stories in the retelling, you are very 
careful indeed about sharing your views. In doing this, 
you’re being deceptive. Indeed, you could be said to be 
                                                
12 On what drives these reactions, see Jonathan Haidt, The 
Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
Religion (New York: Pantheon, 2012). 
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lying by omission, namely not revealing the full truth 
about your beliefs. 
 If a whole group of people behave like this, the result 
can be an appearance of conformity. This happens in 
corporations when subordinates say only what they think 
the boss wants to hear. The actual diversity of viewpoints 
is hidden, and workers may not even realise that others 
share their views. 
 There’s another down side of being cautious about 
expressing personal viewpoints. Over time, behaviour can 
influence beliefs: if you never express your views, then 
your views might change to reflect your behaviour, so 
eventually you don’t have those radical ideas any more, or 
at least not in such a well developed form. 
 When you defend a viewpoint, presenting evidence 
and rebutting counter-arguments, you may end up believ-
ing it more strongly.13 By failing to defend your belief, the 
belief itself may fade. 
 There’s a related issue concerning appearing conven-
tional or mainstream. If you have radical ideas and 
campaign for radical goals, should you dress and behave 
correspondingly? For example, suppose you hold anarchist 
views, believing governments should be abolished and 
replaced by self-managing groups. Should you dress in the 
stereotype of an anarchist, perhaps wearing punk clothes, 
nose rings and tattoos? Should you behave according to 
                                                
13 Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, “When corrections fail: the 
persistence of political misperceptions,” Political Behavior, Vol. 
32, No. 2, 2010, pp. 303–330. 
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the stereotype of an anarchist, being loud and insulting 
authority figures? 
 An alternative is to dress and behave like others who 
do not share your views. You can be the well-dressed and 
well-spoken anarchist, looking like any other corporate 
executive or doctor or whatever. Some people might think 
this is deceptive, but only if there is some expectation to 
dress and behave according to stereotypes. There is no 
rule that people attending protests must dress like the 
stereotype of a protester, whatever that stereotype might 
be. It might be more effective to wear formal dress, or an 
occupational uniform, and thus confound expectations. 
 Not conforming to stereotypes can be effective, but is 
it deceptive? It might clash with people’s expectations, but 
you aren’t setting out to deceive anyone and in fact you 
may be offering a deeper truth: stereotypes of radicals are 
misleading. There is no necessary connection between 
beliefs, clothes and verbal styles. 
 There is an interesting interaction between behaviour 
and beliefs. People will often judge protesters according to 
their methods more than their beliefs. If protesters use 
violence, then many observers will see them as extreme, 
assuming their goal is to destroy society: they are extrem-
ists, indeed terrorists. It often doesn’t matter that their 
goals are protecting the environment or stopping a war. By 
the same sort of inference, others may judge you more 
according to your dress and verbal style than by your 
beliefs. If you are calm and polite, your beliefs may be 
treated as more reasonable than if you are angry and 
verbally aggressive. The implication is that how you 
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express your views may be, in some circumstances, more 
important than what your views actually are.14 
 Back to the original question: should you share your 
radical views with others? You might decide to hide your 
views so you can fit in better. However, there’s a related 
question: how should you dress, speak and behave? 
Should you conform to stereotypes or try to confound 
them? Finally, if any of your choices involve deception — 
hiding and thus implicitly misrepresenting your views — 
can this deception be justified, and is it a good idea? 
 
Other situations 
There are many other situations in which activists might 
be deceptive for a good cause. Here are some possibili-
ties.15 
 • Helping asylum seekers, dissidents, deserters, perse-
cuted individuals or targets of domestic violence to hide: 
this might involve lying about their names, backgrounds 
and locations. 
 • Investigating military and national security opera-
tions: this might involve lying about your name and 
identity when making enquiries. 
 • Investigating human rights abuses: to gain access to 
countries and locations within them, it may be useful to 
use forged identity documents, wear disguises, create 
                                                
14 This is called correspondence bias. See for example Nicholas 
Epley, Mindwise: How We Understand what Others Think, 
Believe, Feel and Want (London: Penguin, 2014), p. 142. 
15 I thank Jørgen Johansen, Jason MacLeod and Dalilah Reuben-
Shemia for suggesting several of these possibilities. 
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cover stories (which can involve others lying to verify the 
story), lie about relationships, and much else. 
 • Ploughshare actions: planning actions to damage 
military equipment, for example hammering missile 
nosecones, as a symbolic and material protest against 
military operations, usually requires some degree of se-
crecy. Ploughshare activists usually offer themselves for 
arrest after their actions, in the same location, so secrecy is 
not used to avoid accountability, but rather to enable their 
acts of civil disobedience.  
 • Being a labour organiser: in many workplaces, there 
are risks in trying to recruit members for trade unions or 
building support for an industrial action such as a strike or 
work-in. Organisers and workplace union delegates who 
are open in their activities could be fired or barred from 
the workplace. Furthermore, employers may be better able 
to counter future organising efforts. 
 • Humorous political stunts: some types of humour 
used by activists can deceive some audience members, at 
least part of the time.16 For example, in Copenhagen on 22 
December 1974, activists dressed as Santas took books off 
shop shelves and gave them to customers, saying they 
were free, as a protest against the commercialisation of 
Christmas. The Yes Men specialise in elaborate hoaxes 
that serve as political statements, for example announcing 
that the company Union Carbide took responsibility for 
the victims of the chemical accident at its plant in Bhopal, 
India, and made a huge payment in settlement. 
                                                
16 Majken Jul Sørensen, Humour in Political Activism: Creative 
Nonviolent Resistance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
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 • Size of a protest group: to maintain morale or 
deceive opponents, lies might be told about the number of 
people attending a rally or occupation. Jørgen Johansen 
tells of a civil disobedience action in Mardøla, Norway, in 
1969 to block construction of a dam. Activists established 
a tent camp. Individuals brought and set up several tents 
each, most of them empty, to mislead the police and media 
about the number of protesters involved. 
 • Corruption in the movement: when members of a 
group are suspected of stealing money or abusing other 
members, a covert investigation might be undertaken. 
 • Detecting infiltrators: when there are suspicions 
about infiltrators, one way of finding out is to give 
misleading information to a few people and see what 
happens. For example, if police seem to act on the basis of 
the information, this might be due to infiltrators (though 
electronic surveillance is another possibility). 
 
Assessing the use of deception 
Each of the situations described above involves activists 
being deceptive in some way. You might have your own 
views about whether deception is essential, justified, 
irrelevant, risky, harmful or disastrous — or some other 
assessment. Here I will illustrate some ways to evaluate 
the use of deception according to different criteria. These 
ways do not provide conclusive answers, but can be 
helpful in thinking about deception from a variety of 
perspectives. 
 First consider the view that lying is nearly always 
bad: it should be avoided except in rare cases. This view 
derives from Kant via his categorical imperative, which 
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involves looking at the consequences of everyone doing 
what you do, and if everyone is deceptive, there are big 
problems. This view might also be derived from Gandhi, 
for whom honesty was paramount.17 
 A contrasting view is the pragmatic approach. In this 
view, lying is accepted as something that can be beneficial 
or harmful. There is no universal judgement possible: each 
circumstance needs to be assessed on its own merits. For 
example, lying to a friend can be justified when in helps 
them or maintains a valuable relationship. Table 6.1 gives 
a summary judgement for each activity for Kantian and 
pragmatic approaches. 
 Some of these assessments could be contested. For 
example, a Gandhian might say that appearing conven-
tional in dress and demeanour is okay if that’s the way you 
really are, even though it deceives others about your 
beliefs and intentions. A pragmatist might say that setting 
up a fake radical flank will always be foolish. In general, 
though, these two approaches to deception do not provide 
a lot of guidance. 
                                                
17 For a useful discussion of openness and secrecy in nonviolent 
struggle, see Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action 
(Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 481–492. Sharp was the 
pioneering researcher on the pragmatic approach to nonviolent 
action, in contrast to Gandhi’s approach founded on morals. 
However, Sharp reaches conclusions not all that different from 
Gandhi’s, namely that openness is usually better than secrecy, 
even when facing severe repression. See also Robert Burrowes, 
The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 
230–232. 
144     The deceptive activist 
Table 6.1 Judgements about activities involving deception 
from Kantian and pragmatic perspectives 
 
Activity Kantian 
approach 
Pragmatic 
approach 
Keeping a secret No It depends 
Leaking No  It depends 
Planning an action No  It depends 
Communicating 
confidentially 
No  It depends 
Infiltrating the 
opposition 
No  It depends 
Wearing masks No  It depends 
Setting up a radical 
flank 
No  It depends 
Circulating 
disinformation 
No  It depends 
Appearing 
conventional 
No  It depends 
 
Another approach is to assess situations according to the 
features of effective nonviolent action, discussed earlier in 
chapter 5.18 This doesn’t immediately tell you whether 
deception is a good idea, but it does provide some insight 
that can be used in discussions, taken from a pragmatic 
perspective, to get beyond “It depends.” 
 First is participation. In general, the more people who 
can participate in a form of social action, the better. There 
                                                
18 Brian Martin, Nonviolence Unbound (Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene 
Publishing, 2015). 
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are several reasons why participation is valuable. Im-
portantly, greater participation means a greater likelihood 
of success in a campaign: rallies, if large enough, some-
times can help topple a dictator. When many different 
sorts of people — men and women, young and old, rich 
and poor, different occupations and so forth — can join in, 
the movement can be broader, with a greater opportunity 
for cross-fertilisation of ideas. Basically, the movement 
will be stronger when lots of people from different walks 
of life can join in common actions. 
 How does this apply to deception? The same sorts of 
considerations apply. If only a few people, perhaps with 
special skills, can participate in a form of deception, this 
restricts its value: there is a possibility of abuse of power 
and of vanguardism. 
 
Table 6.2 Likely levels of participation in activities 
involving deception 
 
Activity Participation 
Keeping a secret Dependent on the secret 
Leaking A few leakers, many 
recipients  
Planning an action Those involved in 
planning  
Communicating 
confidentially 
Those involved in 
communicating  
Infiltrating the 
opposition 
Infiltrators and maybe a 
few others  
Wearing masks Everyone in an action who 
wants to 
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Setting up a radical 
flank 
Those involved in the 
operation and a few others  
Circulating 
disinformation 
Potentially nearly 
everyone, including 
unwitting participants 
Appearing 
conventional 
Potentially nearly 
everyone  
 
Some activities, like setting up a radical flank, involve just 
a few people whereas for others, like circulating disinfor-
mation, lots of people can join in. When participation is 
restricted, it’s more likely the deception can be used by a 
small group to serve its own interests. This assumes, 
though, that the deception is something worth doing.  
 It is worth looking at methods of deception in terms 
of whether they are a desirable goal for a future society. 
For activism, the implication is that the means of achiev-
ing a goal should reflect or embody the goal itself. For 
example, if you want peace, then use peaceful methods to 
pursue it. This is sometimes called prefiguration: methods 
should embody, or prefigure, the goal. 
 In relation to deception, this raises quite a few 
questions, because people may differ about the desirable 
level and types of deception in a future society.19 Many 
                                                
19 A desirable future society might be less than perfect. For 
example, there might be serious conflicts along with mechanisms 
for resolving them without violence. There might continue to be 
activities that some people believe are damaging and should be 
challenged or curtailed, so leaking and wearing masks might still 
be needed.  
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might agree that ill-intentioned, harmful deception should 
be minimised, and likewise institutional deception, and 
say that benign interpersonal deception is acceptable. 
Then there is the question of whether people should 
become more aware of the prevalence of deception. These 
are difficult questions. In Table 6.3, one possible set of 
answers is given. Others will differ in their assessments. 
The point here is that these issues are worth discussing. 
Prefiguration is a criterion, but it is not definitive. 
 
Table 6.3 One set of answers concerning whether an 
activity prefigures a desirable future society 
 
Activity Prefiguration 
Keeping a secret Possibly, dependent on the 
secret 
Leaking Yes, if leaking remains 
necessary  
Planning an action Dependent on decisions by 
those involved  
Communicating 
confidentially 
Dependent on decisions by 
those involved  
Infiltrating the 
opposition 
Not desirable  
Wearing masks Possibly if necessary  
Setting up a radical 
flank 
Not desirable 
Circulating 
disinformation 
Not desirable  
Appearing 
conventional 
Yes, if desired  
148     The deceptive activist 
Another feature of effective nonviolent action is that harm 
to opponents and third parties is limited. Nonviolent 
action, by definition, means no physical violence is used 
against opponents. However, methods such as strikes and 
boycotts can cause economic harm, and methods such as 
ostracism can cause psychological distress. The principle 
of limited harm is that actions should be designed to 
minimise harm to others, compatible with the goals of the 
action. For example, if an employer is exploiting workers 
or exposing the community to dangerous chemicals, a 
strike or boycott might cause economic or reputational 
harm to the employer, but this can be judged necessary to 
challenge the greater harm caused by the employer. On the 
other hand, there is no need to extend a boycott if the 
employer makes appropriate changes. 
 Table 6.4 gives one possible assessment of the harm 
caused by methods involving deception. 
 
Table 6.4 Possible harm caused by using methods 
involving deception 
 
Activity Possible harm 
Keeping a secret Little or none for benign 
lies; dependent on the 
secret and individuals 
involved 
Leaking Exposure of confidential 
information; breakdown of 
trust 
Planning an action Little or none  
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Communicating 
confidentially 
Little or none  
Infiltrating the 
opposition 
Breakdown of trust 
Wearing masks None, unless the masks 
are seen as threatening  
Setting up a radical 
flank 
Severe damage to 
campaigns if the radical 
flank causes harm to 
individuals or is 
counterproductive 
Circulating 
disinformation 
Damage to campaigns  
Appearing 
conventional 
None  
 
You might want to contest some of these assessments. For 
example, secrecy in planning an action might break down 
trust built up previously through liaison with police. This 
suggests that the assessments are dependent on the 
context. Still, there are considerable differences in the 
possible harms involved. Leaking is a much more delicate 
operation because of potential harms compared to wearing 
masks at a rally. 
 Another feature worth considering is fairness: will 
the deception seem fair to people who know about it? Of 
course, if no one knows about a lie except the liar, then no 
one will think it’s wrong. But some lies are exposed, 
sooner or later, and that’s when the fairness criterion 
becomes significant. If lots of people think, “That’s 
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wrong” or “That’s horrible” and turn against the people 
involved in the deception, this is a heavy price to pay. In 
the worst case, the consequences of deception are far 
worse than any potential benefits.  
 Table 6.5 lists possible assessments of the impact of a 
form of deception being exposed to others, including 
opponents and wider audiences. 
 
Table 6.5 Impacts of activities involving deception, 
in relation to judgements about fairness 
 
Activity Fairness-related impact 
Keeping a secret Not significant except to 
those involved 
Leaking Depends on the scenario 
Planning an action Not significant: normal 
practice  
Communicating 
confidentially 
Not significant: normal 
practice 
Infiltrating the 
opposition 
Antagonism, especially 
from opponents  
Wearing masks Not significant  
Setting up a radical 
flank 
Disastrous bad publicity  
Circulating 
disinformation 
Possible bad publicity 
Appearing 
conventional 
Not significant  
 
For several of the situations, there are few adverse conse-
quences for exposure of deception. When activists keep 
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secrets from each other, this usually is of no interest to 
anyone else. There can be serious impacts on trust 
between individuals, but others, if told about the keeping 
of secrets, will probably say “So what?” Furthermore, in 
some cases keeping secrets serves the goals of the group. 
In this situation, then, the criterion of fairness provides 
little leverage for a general assessment of deception.  
 Leaking is a complicated case. Suppose there is a 
leaker in a government agency providing information to 
an activist group that enables more effective campaigning. 
No one knows about the leaking except the leaker and the 
recipients of the leaks. If the leaking becomes known to 
managers, they may be upset and take various measures, 
for example instituting greater security measures, tracking 
down the identity of the leaker, or playing a double game 
with the activist group by circulating false information in 
the expectation that it will be leaked. In all these eventual-
ities, the leaking operation is potentially jeopardised, but 
there are unlikely to be any public consequences. 
 Another possibility is that the group publicises the 
leaked information, for example a secret plan for a trade 
agreement or an internal memo about the dangers of a 
pharmaceutical drug. In this case, the existence of a leaker 
becomes public knowledge. The anonymous leaker might 
be condemned by some and lauded by others, largely 
depending on their viewpoint concerning the information 
being leaked. 
 If the leaker is exposed, what are the consequences? 
Will there be a backlash against your group, or will the 
leaker be seen as a courageous, civic-minded whistle-
blower? A lot depends on who the leaker is and how the 
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leaker behaves. A leaker who comes across as principled 
and selfless will help your cause; one who has a shady 
past, seems devious or who can easily be painted as 
corrupt may hurt your cause. There are lots of complica-
tions. It is worth remembering that most leakers are never 
exposed. 
 
If you’re planning an action or a campaign and deception 
is involved, it can be worthwhile considering the implica-
tions. The criteria here — participation, prefiguration, 
possible harm and fairness — may be useful for helping to 
think about what is involved. However, in some circum-
stances these criteria may be irrelevant and other factors 
may be more important. The key is not the criteria but 
being aware of the role of deception and discussing the 
implications.  
 
Conclusion 
Is it a good idea to lie or otherwise deceive people? Most 
people make choices concerning deception based on gut 
reactions, often doing what others do or seem to do. In an 
activist group, though, this can be risky because the 
consequences can be harmful to the group and to the 
cause. Depending on the circumstances, there are risks in 
being too open and in being too secretive and devious. 
 To help minimise the risks, it is worth being aware of 
options and possible outcomes, and a good way to in-
crease awareness is to discuss case studies. Discussions 
can be with one or two trusted friends or an entire group. 
There are no automatic answers. The point is to put 
deception and its consequences on the agenda. 
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 Saying that lying is always wrong is unlikely to be 
helpful. Nor is it useful just to say, “It depends on the 
circumstances,” because this provides little guidance. One 
way to evaluate situations is by using criteria such as 
harm, fairness, participation and prefiguration. These 
criteria do not on their own offer a sure guide to making 
good decisions. Their value is in encouraging thinking 
about deception from different angles, thereby fostering a 
richer and better informed discussion. 
 Finally, there is the question of what words to use. 
“Lying” and “deception” have negative connotations, and 
most people do not like to think of themselves as lying or 
as deceiving others. Simply applying the label may be 
enough to reject an option, which would be unfortunate. 
One way forward is to change people’s attitudes towards 
deception and to see it in a more neutral way, as either 
beneficial or harmful. Another possibility is to use differ-
ent words. In some cases, it’s possible to refer to secrecy 
or, even better, to confidentiality. Wearing masks can be 
portrayed as protecting against reprisals. Infiltrating the 
opposition can be said to be collecting information about 
corrupt and damaging activities.  
 The cases here are illustrations, intended to raise 
issues rather than settle them. It is worthwhile thinking up 
your own scenarios, analysing some actual cases and 
discussing options. Much of the benefit comes not from 
finding definitive answers but from making explicit what 
is involved, and becoming attuned to options that can be 
considered when sensitive issues arise. 
7 
Lessons 
 
 
Lying has a bad reputation, and most people don’t like to 
think of themselves as liars. One solution is to use a 
restrictive definition of lying, so it only applies when 
telling a blatant falsehood — and even then, most in-
stances of lying are ignored as trivial or justified as 
necessary. When someone asks “How are you?” and you 
say “Fine” even though you’re feeling miserable, it’s 
technically a lie but perhaps better classified as a conven-
tion. When you say you can’t come to the party because of 
another engagement, when actually you can’t stand the 
people, you’re just being polite. 
 Setting aside definitions, most people deceive others 
in all sorts of ways, in the way they dress, in how they 
behave, in what they say and in what they don’t say. 
Rather than ignoring deception or condemning it while 
engaging in it, another path is to recognise that it is 
common and sometimes beneficial. Calling something 
deception should not be the end of the story but rather the 
beginning of an investigation. 
 Activists are people who want to change the world 
for the better, and who do something beyond following the 
rules or looking after their own interests. Activists include 
public protesters as well as those who work within the 
system while seeking to change it. Activists are usually 
public-spirited, making sacrifices to address injustice. This 
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makes activists sound wonderful, but activism can be 
turned to harmful purposes. However, that is another 
story. 
 Public-spirited activism may seem at odds with 
deception. If someone is serving the public good, then 
surely they should be honest. But if deception is an every-
day practice, and sometimes beneficial, then there should 
not necessarily be a clash between activism and deception. 
 It can be hard to accept that deception can sometimes 
be valuable, especially when opponents might attack by 
saying “You’re lying!” More deeply, the negative conno-
tations of the words “lying” and “deception” are hard to 
overcome, making it difficult to have a sensible discussion 
of deception. Ironically, being honest about deception can 
be challenging. 
 The first step is to recognise that deception is com-
monplace. Of course it is easy to point out that others — 
especially authorities — are lying, as well as doing other 
harmful things. This is definitely worthwhile. When poli-
ticians, business executives, and mass media blatantly lie 
or engage in major cover-ups, exposing their deceptions 
and presenting the truth is crucial. It can be useful for 
activists to overcome their truth bias — the tendency of 
most people to initially believe that others are telling the 
truth — and to subject the actions and statements of those 
in power to extra scrutiny. 
  It is more challenging to accept that everyone rou-
tinely engages in various forms of deception. We lie! But 
it’s not all bad: some forms of deception are beneficial. 
However, it would be self-serving to assume that their 
deceptions are harmful but our deceptions are justified. 
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Instead, the task should be to work out when deception is 
necessary or valuable and to avoid harmful lying. 
 With these preliminaries — which may not be possi-
ble to accomplish — the stage is set for open and honest 
discussions of the need for deception, and how to go about 
it. Should we wear masks? Should we encrypt our mes-
sages? Should we announce our plans? Should we encour-
age leaks? Should we infiltrate the opposition? Should we 
spread rumours? 
 Getting down to specifics can be helpful, because it 
avoids the misleading dichotomy between lying and 
telling the truth. It can be more productive to look at 
actions and campaigns in terms of criteria such as partici-
pation and fairness. Questions of deception need to be 
placed in context, as one consideration among others. 
 Activists have much to gain by becoming better at 
detecting deception by others, especially by opponents. 
Part of this is to practise trying to detect lies through 
behavioural cues, something that can be improved through 
practice. However, many people think they are good at 
detecting lies when actually they can do no better than 
chance, so it’s probably better to acquire a realistic sense 
of one’s own abilities, and usually this means admitting 
that you can’t tell when someone is lying just by watching 
them. Far more effective is collecting evidence — docu-
ments, recordings, records of investigations — that can be 
used to make a case about cover-ups and lies. 
 Perhaps the most useful thing to learn about is the 
role of self-deception in human affairs. It is tempting to 
think or claim that someone else — a politician or another 
activist — is consciously trying to mislead you. However, 
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often they have deceived themselves: they believe what 
they are saying, which means they are not lying. Many 
people start out lying and eventually start to believe their 
own lies. They reconstruct their memories. Self-deception 
has a close connection with lying, one often not fully 
appreciated. 
 Everyone is subject to self-deception. Seeing that 
others are deceiving themselves is one thing; it is more 
challenging to see it in ourselves. To accomplish goals, 
some self-deception can be functional: when the task is 
enormous, some unrealistic optimism can help to get 
started and continue efforts. Self-deception can also be 
harmful, especially when it hinders developing a realistic 
assessment of circumstances and personal behaviour. To 
overcome the traps of self-deception, it is worthwhile 
cultivating friends who will tell you what they really 
think. If you react negatively against those who try to alert 
you to unwelcome truths, you are missing out on valuable 
feedback. The same applies to groups. There is a delicate 
balance between maintaining illusions that build cohesion 
at the expense of effectiveness and being open to contrary 
views that can be integrated into a group’s way of under-
standing and acting in the world.   
Bibliography 
 
 
Dan Ariely, The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty: How 
We Lie to Everyone — Especially Ourselves (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2012) 
 An eye-opening and engagingly written account of 
fascinating findings from experiments about honesty, 
many by Ariely himself. According to Ariely, most people 
cheat in little ways and a few have no reservations about 
cheating in big ways. His most dispiriting finding is that 
most people lie to themselves about their own achieve-
ments: after they do this, they convince themselves that 
they haven’t. The experiments to test this are highly 
ingenious. 
 
F. G. Bailey, The Prevalence of Deceit (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991) 
 A study of truth and truths by an anthropologist, sur-
veying various ideas about truth and commenting on the 
common types of lying — opportunistic and ideological 
— and their connection to power. This is a fascinating, 
thought-provoking, meandering treatment, with no obvi-
ous central message but lots of insights. Bailey introduces 
the idea of “basic lies” (dogma, scripture, fundamental 
assumptions) that masquerade as basic truths. 
 
Bibliography     159 
 
J. A. Barnes, A Pack of Lies: Towards a Sociology of 
Lying (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
 A comprehensive discussion of lying, covering a 
range of domains (law, science, different cultures, warfare, 
politics, fiction, advertisements) and types of lying 
(including self-deception), detection and the value of 
lying. 
 
Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private 
Life (New York: Random House, 1978) 
 A philosophically-oriented tour of the arguments 
about lying, covering many familiar cases, excuses, types 
and responses, for example lying in a crisis, lying to liars, 
lying to protect clients and lying to the sick and dying. 
The basic thrust is that most lying is undesirable. Accord-
ing to Bailey, Bok makes the incorrect assumption that 
lies can usually be identified. 
 
Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Market-
place, Politics, and Marriage (New York: Norton, 
1985/2009) 
 An accessibly written account of research on detect-
ing lies from a liar’s words, voice or body. It includes a lot 
of discussion of lying situations, the research Ekman has 
done on detecting lies, analysis of lie detectors (polygraph 
machines) and especially the limitations of lie catching. 
 
160     The deceptive activist 
Charles V. Ford, Lies! Lies!! Lies!!! The Psychology of 
Deceit (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 
1996) 
 A straightforward, readable account of the psychol-
ogy of lying and deceit, covering developmental issues, 
personality types, pathological lying, false memories, 
detecting deceit and the effects of deception. Ford 
highlights the pervasiveness of lying and the importance 
of deceit, especially self-deception, in maintaining self-
esteem. He sees lying as morally neutral. 
 
Dariusz Galasiński, The Language of Deception: A 
Discourse Analytical Study (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
2000) 
 A sophisticated study of deception, covering a range 
of issues, including definitions, evasions, deception about 
communication and cooperating to enable misrepresenta-
tion. Galasiński analyses the way debaters misrepresent 
previous communication; their purpose is to represent 
reality in a particular way, and deception is one way to do 
this. Deception is normally treated as about physical or 
social reality; deception can also be about what people say 
and how they say it: it is deception about communication. 
People can cooperate to deceive audiences: they cooperate 
in order to be uncooperative. 
 
Jon Latimer, Deception in War (London: John Murray, 
2001) 
 A comprehensive account of deception in war, with 
lots of examples, from ancient history to twentieth century 
war, especially World War II. Latimer covers bluff, 
Bibliography     161 
 
surveillance and counter-surveillance, tactical and strate-
gic deception, land, sea and air cases, and guerrilla 
warfare. 
 
John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about 
Lying in International Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 
 A short, insightful treatment of lying by government 
leaders, with lots of examples. Mearsheimer catalogues 
five main types of international lies: lying between states; 
fearmongering; strategic cover-ups; nationalist myths; 
liberal lies (concerning violations of the norms of liberal 
democracy). 
 
David Nyberg, The Varnished Truth: Truth Telling and 
Deceiving in Ordinary Life (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993) 
 A powerfully argued case that deception doesn’t 
warrant the condemnation that it normally receives, and 
instead that truth-telling and deception are tools that are, 
and need to be, mobilised for human benefit. 
 
Steven Poole, Unspeak™ (London: Little, Brown, 2006) 
 A delightful analysis of political speech, based on 
examining key words and showing the ways they are asso-
ciated with particular misleading meanings. “Unspeak” is 
defined as a “mode of speech that persuades by stealth.” 
 
162     The deceptive activist 
W. Peter Robinson, Deceit, Delusion and Detection 
(London: Sage, 1996) 
 An amazingly thorough treatment of lying from a 
psychological perspective. Robinson includes a systematic 
treatment of institutional lying and the relevance of power 
in lying, favours a general belief in the value of truth, and 
treats the circumstances that affect what is considered 
lying. 
 
David Shulman, From Hire to Liar: The Role of Decep-
tion in the Workplace (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2007) 
 An excellent account of workplace deception, focus-
ing on routine deceptions that are built into modes of 
behaviour (rather than just individual tactics). 
 
Robert Trivers, The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit 
and Self-Deception in Human Life (New York: Basic 
Books, 2011) 
 A tour-de-force treatment of self-deception from a 
biologist’s perspective, starting with deceit among non-
human animals, using evolutionary arguments and work-
ing through self-deception at a range of levels, including 
war, religion and social science. What is most impressive 
is the use of a single framework to offer insights across a 
whole range of areas and disciplines. Trivers writes as a 
scientist, presenting research findings as facts. He also 
provides lots of personal anecdotes, giving the treatment a 
refreshing honesty, especially important on the topic under 
examination. 
 
Bibliography     163 
 
Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and 
Opportunities, 2nd edition (Chichester, West Sussex: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2008) 
 A comprehensive survey of methods of detecting lies, 
including verbal and nonverbal cues, lie detectors, behav-
iour analysis interviews, statement validity assessment, 
reality monitoring, scientific content analysis, and fMRI. 
 
Robert L. Wolk and Arthur Henley, The Right to Lie: A 
Psychological Guide to the Uses of Deceit in Everyday 
Life (New York: Peter H. Wyden, 1970) 
 An engaging treatment of interpersonal deceit, with 
the main message being that lying is often okay, and 
feeling guilty about it is unproductive. Wolk and Henley 
provide numerous case studies, giving assessments of the 
appropriateness of lying. 
 
Index 
 
1984, 43 
 
Abbott, Tony, 69 
Abjorensen, Norman, 79–82 
Abu Ghraib, 27–30, 33–35 
activists, 3–4, 50–51, 96–97, 114–15, 
117, 119–20, 124–26, 132–33, 141–
42, 154–55. See also case studies; 
Gandhi; nonviolent action; protest  
Acton, Lord, 25 
agents provocateurs, 128 
Ariely, Dan, 158 
astroturfing, 132 
Australia, 69, 83. See also ICAC; 
Whistleblowers Australia 
authorities, 24; deception by, 22, 24–
59, 70, 155 
 
Bailey, F. G., 158 
Barnes, J. A., 159 
behaviour, conventional, 116, 138 
behavioural cues, 65–67 
Bettelheim, Bruno, 67–68 
The Big Short (Michael Lewis), 87–91 
black blocs, 127n4 
Bok, Sissela, 95, 159 
Burrowes, Robert, 1, 96–97 
Burry, Michael, 89, 91 
Bush, George W., 48–49 
 
cacerolazo, 118 
Canberra Times, 79–80 
case studies, 109–53 
Cheney, Dick, 48–49 
children, 3, 21–22, 31, 61–62 
churches, 39, 53 
CIA, 47 
clergy, 53 
codes, 7–8, 10, 97 
COINTELPRO, 51 
confidentiality, 110, 120 
conventions, 7, 10, 56–57, 104, 137–
40, 154. See also codes 
correspondence bias, 140n14 
corruption, 13, 25, 82–86, 142. See 
also leaking 
courts, 20, 30–31, 38, 52, 70, 71–74. 
See also official channels 
cover-up, 27–28, 35–38, 114. See also 
secrecy 
Cuba, 47 
 
deception, 6, 9–12, 101, 154–57; 
assessing, 103–8; by authorities, 22, 
24–59, 70, 155; case studies in, 
109–53; detecting, 18–19, 60–93; 
political, 40–43; in science, 56–58. 
See also honesty; lies; secrecy; self-
deception; truth-telling 
defamation, 50, 123 
democracy, 21 
detection, 18–19, 60–93 
devaluation, 27–28, 36, 39 
Dirty Politics, 41, 43 
disabilities. See T4 programme 
disinformation, 132–37. See also 
propaganda 
disinhibition, 127 
Index     165 
 
drug companies, 58, 74–75 
 
Earth First!, 128 
Eisman, Steve, 90–91 
Ekman, Paul, 6, 9–10, 18–19, 61n1, 
62n2, 65n4, 159 
ethics, 94–108 
euthanasia, 36. See also T4 programme 
evidence, 76–78, 86–87. See also 
detection 
exposure, 38–39, 54, 150–51 
 
fairness, 82, 105–6, 149–51 
fake groups, 130–32 
flash mob, 118 
Ford, Charles V., 160 
front groups. See fake groups 
funding, 75 
 
Galasiński, Dariusz, 160 
Galen, Clemens August von, 38–39 
Gandhi, Mohandas, 1–2, 95–100, 143 
Ghonim, Wael, 122 
Gillard, Julia, 69 
global financial crisis, 87–91 
Grünenthal, 25–26 
 
Hager, Nicky, 41, 43 
harm, 12, 22, 24, 72, 104, 107, 112, 
148–49 
Hemmings, Noel, 85–86 
Henley, Arthur, 163 
Hitler, Adolf, 35, 37, 43 
home loans, 87–91 
honesty, 7, 22–23, 68–70, 95, 106, 
143, 158. See also deception; 
fairness; lies; truth-telling 
humour, 104, 141 
 
ICAC (Independent Commission 
Against Corruption), 83–86 
image management, 8–9, 45, 54, 57 
incentives, 71–75 
infiltration, 50–51, 123–28, 142. See 
also surveillance 
intimidation, 33, 38, 40 
Iraq, 5, 48–49. See also Abu Ghraib 
 
Japan, 98–100 
Jews, 39, 95. See also Nazis 
just world, 32 
justice, 29–31, 39, 52. See also courts; 
official channels 
 
Kant, Immanuel, 94, 97, 107, 142–44 
Key, John, 41–42 
 
labour organisers, 141 
Latimer, Jon, 160–61 
law. See courts. See also official 
channels 
lawyers, 14, 73–74. See also courts 
leaking, 41, 101, 105, 113–17, 151–52 
Ledley, Charlie, 90–91 
Lewis, Michael, 89–91 
lie detector, 63 
lies, 5–23; by authorities, 22, 24–59; 
basic, 20–22, 31; definition of, 6; 
types of, 12–14. See also deception 
London Greenpeace, 50, 123 
Lying (Sissela Bok), 95 
 
Mai, Jamie, 90–91 
masks, 126–28 
McDonald’s, 50, 123 
McLibel, 50 
McNicol, John, 78–82 
Mearsheimer, John J., 161 
166     The deceptive activist 
 
micro-expressions, 65 
mind, 16–17, 72, 137. See also motives 
mobilisation, 39–40 
motives, 71–76 
 
Nazis, 1–2, 35–40, 43, 95, 104, 134 
New Zealand, 40–43 
news, 20, 34, 40, 79, 99, 104. See also 
social media 
nonstandard, 103–4 
nonviolent action, 96–97, 103–8, 129, 
133n10, 143n17, 148. See also 
Gandhi; protest 
Northwoods, 47 
nuclear weapons, 55 
Nyberg, David, 161 
 
official channels, 29–33, 37–40 
openness, 143n17. See also honesty; 
secrecy 
Orwell, George, 43 
outrage, 26–33, 38, 40, 47, 92n17 
 
participation, 104–5, 119–20, 126, 
144–46 
planning, 117–20, 141, 152 
ploughshares, 141 
police, 2–3, 51–53, 70, 105, 117–19, 
126–27. See also courts; infiltration 
Pollak, Richard, 67–68 
polygraph, 63, 159 
Poole, Steven, 161 
power, 25, 46, 52, 162. See also 
authorities; official channels; 
outrage 
pragmatic perspective, 107, 143–44 
prefiguration (means reflecting ends), 
3, 96, 106, 146–47 
propaganda, 36, 43–49, 133n10; black, 
46–48; grey, 48–49; white, 46. See 
also disinformation 
protest, 55, 117–20, 126–28, 139, 142. 
See also activists 
public relations, 44–45, 50, 54, 73, 
101, 108 
 
radical flanks, 128–32 
recovered memory, 11 
reframing, 39 
reinterpretation, 28–29, 36–37 
resistance, 40. See also activists; 
protest 
rewards, 33 
Robinson, W. Peter, 162 
 
Saddam Hussein, 48–49 
salt march, 95–98 
science, 56–58 
secrecy, 14–15, 27, 34–35, 54–55, 
109–13, 119–20, 141, 143n17. See 
also confidentiality; cover-up 
self-deception, 13, 15–18, 49, 57, 91–
92, 103, 136, 156–57, 162. See also 
deception 
self-presentation. See image 
management 
shame, 9 
Sharp, Gene, 143n17 
Shulman, David, 162 
skilful use, 106 
Slater, Cameron, 40–43 
smiling, 65–66. See also image 
management 
Snowden, Edward, 104–5 
social media, 8–9, 118, 121. See also 
news 
sock puppets, 46 
Index     167 
 
spin doctoring, 44–45. See also 
propaganda 
spying, 51, 123 
Stalin, 35 
Steel, Helen, 50, 123–24 
surveillance, 119–22. See also 
infiltration 
Syria, 47–48 
 
T4 programme, 35–40 
terror management theory, 66–67 
thalidomide, 25–26 
tobacco companies, 44–45, 54–55, 68, 
70 
Tonkin Bay incident, 49 
torture, 27–30, 33–35, 70 
track record, 67–71 
Trivers, Robert, 162. See also self-
deception 
truth bias, 59, 69–70, 155 
truth-telling, 22, 56, 58, 74, 96–97, 
100–3. See also honesty 
 
United States, 21, 27–30, 33–35, 47–
49, 51, 55, 87–90, 128. 
 
validation, 39. See also devaluation 
Vellar, Frank, 85–86 
verballing, 52, 70. See also police 
Vietnam, 49 
Vrij, Aldert, 163 
 
Weber, Thomas, 98–99 
Whistleblowers Anonymous, 78, 81 
Whistleblowers Australia, 81 
whistleblowing, 81, 113–14. See also 
leaking 
Wittner, Lawrence, 55 
WMDs, 5–6, 48–49 
Wolk, Robert L., 163 
Wollongong, 83 
 
Yes Men, 104, 141 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
“When telling a lie, remember to look 
straight ahead and avoid blinking.” 
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